Knowledge that Transforms

We analyze a sample of firms accused of fraudulently overstating their earnings and examine the extent, if any, to which they paid additional income taxes on the allegedly fraudulent earnings. Based on restatements of current tax expense adjusted for the tax benefits of stock options, the evidence indicates that many firms included the overstated financial accounting income on their tax returns, thus overpaying their taxes in the process of inflating their accounting earnings. We estimate that the median firm sacrificed eight cents in additional income taxes per dollar of inflated pretax earnings. In aggregate, we estimate that the firms in our sample paid $320 million in taxes on overstated earnings of about $3.36 billion. These results indicate how far managers of firms are willing to go when allegedly inflating earnings.

I test whether hints at an attorney's line of argument influence accountants' expert witness testimony. In experiment 1, litigation services accountants review evidence adopted from a recent auditor-liability case and decide whether a defendant auditor complied with generally accepted auditing standards. I find that hints posed before the review of evidence result in decisions that are more consistent with the attorney's verdict preference. Motivated by a lack of research on the role of accountants' expert testimony in judges' decisions and by evidence that most auditor-liability cases settle, I find in experiment 2 that the certainty of decisions in an expert's report affects the settlement decisions of experienced lawyers, a proxy for trial judges. These findings show that hints at an attorney's line of argument can influence accountants' decisions about evidence documenting auditing issues, and that the certainty of decisions in an expert's report can affect the decisions of mock trial judges. The study has implications for drafting attorney-expert retention letters, and for training accounting experts and the judiciary about the role of hints in the attorney-expert setting.

This study investigates the effects of industry specialization on auditors' risk assessments and audit-planning decisions. In an experiment, auditors from different industry specializations complete a hypothetical audit case set in a specific (bank) industry, which creates either a match or a mismatch between the auditors' industry specialization and the hypothetical client's industry. Furthermore, I manipulate the industry-specific case information to achieve differential audit risk levels. I also provide the auditors with a set of preliminary audit procedures and a constrained time budget. I find that the auditors' knowledge of the client's industry improves their audit risk assessments and directly influences the nature and the perceived quality of their audit-planning decisions. In addition, the auditors' knowledge of the client's industry moderates the sensitivity of the auditors' planning decisions to their audit risk assessments.

This paper examines transfer pricing in multinational firms when individual divisions face different income tax rates. Assuming that a firm decouples its internal transfer price from the arm's length price used for tax purposes, we analyze the effectiveness of alternative pricing rules under both cost- and market-based transfer pricing. In a tax-free world, Hirshleifer (1956) advocated that the internal transfer price be set equal to the marginal cost of the supplying division. Extending this solution, we argue that the optimal internal transfer price should be a weighted average of the pre-tax marginal cost and the most favorable arm's length price. When the supplying division also sells the intermediate product in question to outside parties, the external price becomes a natural candidate for the arm's length price. We argue that for internal performance evaluation purposes firms should generally not value internal transactions at the prevailing market price if the supplying division has monopoly power in the external market. By imposing intracompany discounts, firms can alleviate attendant double marginalization problems and, at the same time, realize tax savings due to differences in income tax rates. Our analysis characterizes optimal intracompany discounts as a function of the market parameters and the divisional tax rates.

This study investigates the effect of shareholder capital gains taxes on the structure of corporate acquisitions. We analyze a sample of large publicly traded firms acquired in taxable cash-for-stock and tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions from 1975 to 2000. We model acquisition structure (i.e., taxable cash-for-stock acquisitions versus tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions) as a function of target shareholder capital gains taxes and other economic factors believed to influence acquisition structure. Consistent with expectations, we find a positive association between the capital gains tax rate for individual investors and the use of tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions. In addition, we find that the effect of the capital gains tax rate for individuals decreases with target institutional ownership (a proxy that represents the likelihood the price-setting shareholder is not subject to the individual capital gains tax rate). We reconcile our analyses with previous studies and identify a plausible explanation for the lack of results in prior research. In supplemental analysis, we also report evidence that corporations “time” the completion of taxable acquisitions around major tax rate changes to minimize shareholder capital gains taxes. In sum, results suggest that shareholder-level taxes have a significant effect on the choice of taxable cash-for-stock versus tax-free stock-for-stock acquisitions, and this effect varies with the tax status of target shareholders.

This paper provides evidence on the characteristics of firms that include “pro forma” earnings information in their press releases, whether the usefulness of pro forma earnings to investors varies systematically with these characteristics, and whether the investor response to pro forma earnings is consistent with market efficiency or mispricing. Using a sample of 249 press releases from 1997–99, we find that firms with low GAAP earnings informativeness are more likely to disclose pro forma earnings than other firms. We also find that strategic considerations, measured using the direction of GAAP earnings surprises, are an important determinant of pro forma reporting. In addition, our examination of the relative and incremental information content of pro forma earnings shows that investors find pro forma earnings to be more useful when GAAP earnings informativeness is low or when strategic considerations are absent. Tests of the predictive ability of pro forma earnings for future profitability and returns are mixed, and we therefore cannot conclusively determine whether the investor reaction to pro forma earnings at the time of the press release is consistent with market efficiency or mispricing. The paper contributes to the growing literature on pro forma earnings and more generally to the literature on voluntary and strategic disclosure.

This paper investigates the effect of regulation that mandates open access to information on managers' disclosure choices and investors' reactions to disclosures. The recently passed Regulation FD (Reg FD) requires firms to make material disclosures broadly available. Using a sample of firms that previously restricted access to conference calls and a sample of firms that voluntarily allowed unlimited access to their calls in the pre-Reg FD period, we examine the effect of the new rule on managers' decisions regarding the timing, use, and information content of calls, as well as the effect on investors' trading behavior during the call. Our results indicate that Reg FD had a significant negative impact on managers' decisions to continue hosting conference calls and on their decisions regarding the optimal time to hold the call. However, contrary to the concerns of many critics, the magnitudes of these changes are not large. We do not find evidence that Reg FD decreased the amount of information disclosed during the call period, contrary to the concerns of Reg FD opponents. Finally, we find evidence that the new rule increased price volatility for firms that previously restricted access to their calls (relative to firms that previously held open calls) and that the amount of individual investor trading increased following the rule change. Overall, our results suggest that Reg FD impacted trading during the conference call window for firms most affected by the new regulation.

Firms can delay financial statement recognition of U.S. taxes on repatriations by designating foreign subsidiary earnings as “permanently reinvested” under APB Opinion No. 23. This paper examines (1) whether firms use the permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) designation to manage reported earnings, and (2) whether amounts reported as permanently reinvested reflect investment and tax incentives to reinvest foreign subsidiary earnings abroad. Consistent with the prediction that firms use PRE to manage earnings, year-to-year changes in amounts reported as PRE are positively related to the difference between analyst forecasts and pre-managed earnings. Additionally, changes in reported PRE are positively related to the difference between the foreign and domestic after-tax return on assets and negatively related to the tax benefit of deductible repatriations, thus reflecting investment and tax incentives to reinvest abroad.

This study investigates the relation between share price and stock-based compensation expense that is disclosed but not recognized under SFAS No. 123, after controlling for net income, equity book value, and expected earnings growth. Our instrumental variables approach controls for the mechanical relation between share price and option values. We find that investors view SFAS No. 123 expense as an expense of the firm, and as sufficiently reliable to be reflected in their valuation assessments. Findings based on annual returns indicate SFAS No. 123 expense reflects on a timely basis changes in investor-perceived costs associated with stock-based compensation.

Theory suggests that voluntary disclosure decisions are a function of conflicting incentives vis-a`-vis multiple audiences. However, few opportunities exist to investigate this issue empirically. We identify a setting that offers us such an opportunity: the electric utility industry as it transitions toward deregulation. We consider two types of voluntary disclosures: strategies to protect the firm's existing customer base and plans to exploit emerging opportunities under deregulation. We examine these particular disclosures since they are voluntary, relevant to all sample firms, and convey positive information about the firm's prospects in a deregulated environment. We consider three target audiences: industry regulators, capital market participants, and product market competitors. We find that our disclosure index is negatively associated with the magnitude of utilities' stranded costs in jurisdictions where the stranded cost recovery issue is unresolved, consistent with our predicted regulatory incentives. Further, our evidence indicates that capital market-related incentives are positively associated with our disclosure index. Finally, we find that product market-related incentives play a deterrent role in disclosure, but only after regulatory concerns have been resolved.