Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We examine how executives' ability to control their firms' exposure to risk affects the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. Our natural experimental evidence shows that exchange-traded weather derivatives allow executives to control their firms' exposure to weather risk. Once these derivatives became available, those executives who use them to hedge experience relative reductions in their total compensation and equity incentives. The decline in compensation is consistent with a reduction in the risk premium that executives receive for exposure to weather risk. The decline in equity incentives is consistent with the relation between risk and incentives shifting in a complementary direction when executives can better control their firms' exposure to risk. Collectively, our findings provide evidence that executives' ability to control their firms' exposure and, by extension, their own to an important source of risk influences the design of their incentive-compensation contracts. JEL Classifications: G32; J33; J41.

ABSTRACT To minimize costs related to unfavorable perceptions of their tax-related activities, firms with low effective tax rates (ETR) could avoid, where possible, explicit mentions of their effective tax rates. Using this reputational cost perspective, we study an item of required disclosure in the income tax footnote of the 10-K, the ETR reconciliation table, where firms can choose a presentation format that reveals the tax rate (the percentage format) or one that avoids explicit mention of the effective tax rate (the dollar format). We find that firms with low ETRs are 24 percent more likely to use the dollar format and are also less likely to mention their tax rates elsewhere in their disclosures, consistent with the choice of dollar format reflecting a firm's overall tax disclosure strategy. Analysts' tax expense forecasts are less accurate for dollar format firms, suggesting higher processing costs associated with tax-related disclosures for these firms. JEL Classifications: H20; G30; M40.

ABSTRACT Banks play a central role in creating liquidity for the economy by financing illiquid assets with liquid liabilities. This paper examines the effect of accounting restatements on bank liquidity creation. Using a difference-in-differences research design, I show that restatements trigger a significant reduction in liquidity creation. This effect derives mainly from banks shifting away from illiquid assets and toward liquid assets. Further analysis reveals that restatements affect liquidity creation through supervisory enforcement actions and unravelling of risk exposures accumulated in the misreporting period. Government deposit insurance blunts the effect of an information asymmetry channel. JEL Classifications: G21; G28; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT I investigate capital market consequences of an increase in prescribed timeliness of firms' mandatory disclosure of material events. Specifically, I examine an SEC regulatory change that accelerates the Form 8-K filing deadline and classifies 8-Ks as likely to be constrained or unconstrained by the increase in prescribed timeliness. After the regulatory change, firms filing constrained 8-Ks exhibit increases in information asymmetry between investors and investor disagreement at the 8-K filing date relative to firms filing unconstrained 8-Ks. Moreover, the relative increases in information asymmetry and investor disagreement for firms filing constrained 8-Ks appear to be attributable to a decline in the length of and quantitative information included in 8-K disclosures. My findings shed light on the costs of a prescriptive approach to enhanced disclosure timeliness of ongoing disclosure. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D82; D83; G18; M41.

ABSTRACT We investigate the role of gender on the aggressiveness of sell-side analysts' questions during earnings conference calls. Our tests reveal that the verbal aggressiveness of analysts' questions is significantly associated with both the gender of the analyst asking the question and the gender of the CEO fielding the question. First, we find that male analysts are more verbally aggressive than female analysts. Specifically, male analysts' questions are more direct and more likely to be followed with further questions, to have a preface statement, and to be negative, all of which are consistent with verbal aggressiveness. Second, male analysts' questions to female CEOs are more aggressive than their questions to male CEOs. Gender-based verbal aggressiveness appears to be associated with analysts' career trajectories: female analysts who ask aggressive questions have a higher likelihood of becoming “star” analysts, whereas we fail to find such evidence for male analysts. JEL Classifications: D83; J16; M14; M40; M41; Z13.

ABSTRACT Disclosure is of fundamental interest to accounting research. When the sign/magnitude of disclosed news is unclear, the information in disclosure events is inferred using the ratio of return volatilities during event and non-event windows (Beaver 1968). We show that return noise due to microstructure frictions and mispricing affects this ratio, and that effect is comparable to or exceeds that of information content. We use the SEC's Tick Size Pilot program to confirm the causal effect of return noise on the ratio, and to evaluate alternative ways to control for it. The most promising approach is to use the difference between, rather than the ratio of, return volatilities during event and non-event windows. We illustrate its benefits by showing how it alters prior inferences regarding time-series and cross-sectional variation in information content as well as changes in the information content of earnings announcements around the 2004 amendments to Form 8-K filings.

ABSTRACT A large body of empirical work provides mixed support for the central prediction from agency theory that noisier performance measures receive less weight in incentive contracts. We develop a method to calculate price-based and non-price-based performance measure weights using CEO pay and holdings of stock, options, and performance-vested awards. Consistent with theory, we find that noisier performance measures receive less weight. We find that this negative relation strengthened following the adoption of ASC 718 (formerly SFAS 123R), which equalized the accounting treatment for options and other share-based awards. We further find that firms that increased non-price incentives for CEOs realized improvements in ROA and in Tobin's Q. Our results suggest that misaligned incentives prior to ASC 718, and the under-weighting of non-price measures in particular, negatively affected firm performance. JEL Classifications: G30; J33; M12; M52.

ABSTRACT The going concern (GC) assumption forms the basis for preparing financial statements unless liquidation becomes imminent. ASU 2014-15 requires management to evaluate GC uncertainties quarterly and provide disclosures in the notes. I compare management GC disclosures between the pre-standard and post-standard regimes. I find that the market reacts negatively to substantial doubt in GC only after ASU 2014-15. Next, I find the effect of ASU 2014-15 for quarterly reports, but not annual reports. More importantly, by employing detailed textual analysis to extract and categorize mitigation-plan discussions, I show that certain types of management mitigation plans are interpreted more positively by investors after ASU 2014-15, thereby alleviating the negative market reaction. These plans include issuing debt, debt restructuring, increasing revenue, and selling assets. Finally, I demonstrate that management GC conclusions are more indicative of corporate failures after ASU 2014-15 and that mitigation-plan discussions are associated with firms' future viability.

ABSTRACT Review correspondence between the SEC and firms is a potentially valuable resource for investors, revealing important information about firms' financial reporting quality. Research suggests that reducing access costs (i.e., the amount of effort required to access review correspondence) could increase investors' processing of this important information. Drawing on psychology theory, I predict and find that access costs interact with another key characteristic within the SEC's control—review ambiguity (i.e., transparency about outcomes from the SEC's review process)—to influence investors' judgments. Results show that when access costs are low, greater review ambiguity decreases investors' reliance on review correspondence information and influences investment judgments in a corresponding manner. In contrast, review ambiguity has no effect on investors' reliance or investment judgments when access costs are high. Overall, my results provide important new insights on the importance of SEC transparency during its review process, particularly as information becomes more easily accessible. JEL Classifications: C91; D81; D83; G11; M41.

ABSTRACT This study examines how the market share of dark venues changes at earnings announcements. Our analysis shows a statistically significant increase in dark market share in the weeks prior to, during, and following the earnings announcement. We also predict and find evidence that increases in dark market share around earnings announcements are higher for firms with high-quality accounting information. In addition, we find a positive relation between the change in dark market share and the speed of resolution of investor disagreement—a key dimension of informational efficiency, which suggests that dark trading is associated with an improvement in market quality. How market fragmentation changes around news events, the role accounting information plays in market fragmentation, and how changes in market fragmentation relate to market quality can help provide insights to securities regulators. JEL Classifications: G12; G14; D47; M41.