Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT Relying on the frequency of typos in engagement partners’ graduate theses to measure their conscientiousness, we find that more conscientious partners conduct higher-quality audits, evident in that they are more likely to require an audit adjustment. Our core results hold for both upward and downward adjustments, implying that being conscientious is not equivalent to being overly conservative. Consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981) theory, cross-sectional evidence suggests that the role that partner conscientiousness plays in audit quality comes through both the auditor competence and independence channels. Additionally, we find that the frequency of partner thesis typos is negatively associated with auditor effort. Collectively, our evidence implies that engagement partner conscientiousness plays a major role in shaping audit outcomes. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether prior employment connections influence the strictness of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing review process. Using novel data on over 250 accountants at the SEC, we define connected examiners as accountants reviewing financial statements audited by their former employer. We find that SEC review teams with a higher percentage of connected examiners are less likely to detect financial statement errors, raise fewer substantive issues, and are less likely to push back on registrants’ responses to comment letters. Our estimates also indicate that the effect of examiners’ prior employment connections is strongest earlier in their SEC tenure and attenuates with time. Our findings provide important practical insights on the boundaries of the revolving door between regulators and the regulated, suggesting that even indirect connections can impact oversight. JEL Classifications: G18; M41; M48.

ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of political corruption on the provision of CEO risk-taking incentives. We hypothesize that firms adjust their CEO’s risk-taking incentives to reflect the influence of local political corruption on the firms’ desired level of risk-taking. Using U.S. Department of Justice data on local political corruption, we find that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) is lower in firms located in high-corruption districts. The negative impact of corruption on vega is more pronounced among (1) firms operating in industries that are more dependent on government procurement, (2) firms operating in more innovative industries, and (3) firms without political connections. Our study offers new insights into how the institutional environment shapes executive compensation design. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G32; G38; J33; J41; M52.

ABSTRACT We consider the dynamics of analyst inattention by investigating how analysts allocate their attention when a firm in their portfolio experiences CEO turnover. Our analysis shows that analysts tend to divert their attention toward firms that experience such events, resulting in less attention and a corresponding reduction in forecasting accuracy for nonevent firms. Furthermore, this reduction in accuracy varies with factors related to the costs and benefits of rationally allocating attention to firms that have experienced CEO turnover. Collectively, our analysis responds to the call for research on rational inattention among analysts and illustrates the specific intraportfolio events that alter attention allocation and information. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14; M12; M40; M41.

ABSTRACT Using a dataset constructed through textual analysis and manual data collection, we show that, prior to ASC 606, firms with principal-versus-agent (PA) exposure face heightened GAAP compliance risk, reflected in a greater likelihood of receiving revenue-related SEC comment letters and higher audit fees. Following the adoption of ASC 606, these differences decline, consistent with the standard’s stated goal of simplifying PA assessments and reducing implementation challenges. Overall, our findings provide the first large-sample evidence on PA considerations and show that ASC 606 mitigates compliance risk, although further analyses suggest additional disclosure may be needed to mitigate information challenges associated with PA assessments. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: L86; M41; M42; M48.

ABSTRACT Audit senior associates are essential to audit production, yet we know little about how they experience their organizational role. We interview 45 U.S.-based audit seniors and find they experience persistent paradoxical tensions between contradictory yet interrelated objectives, stemming from their middle hierarchical position as both experienced associates and novice executives. Applying Paradox Theory, we find seniors sometimes work around paradox by attending to one paradoxical objective to temporarily alleviate tension but leave the other paradoxical objective neglected. Other times, seniors work through paradox by dynamically engaging with both paradoxical objectives, particularly when empowered by perceiving adequate resources—time, information, and social capital. Our study reconceptualizes seniors as self-directed fledgling leaders whose capabilities are forged through navigating paradoxical tensions, expanding the conventional academic view of seniors as experienced associates. We discuss how audit firm-level tensions revealed through seniors’ experiences offer insights for human capital development and audit quality.

ABSTRACT We examine how audit firms changed their policies regarding audit partner performance measurement, career development, and compensation during a period of heightened public scrutiny of audit quality (2007 to 2017). We theorize how implementing policy changes requires a delicate transition in the organizational design and internal processes of the firms and may not effectively translate into their day-to-day practices. Our access to proprietary performance management policies and individual partner performance and compensation data from the eight largest Dutch audit firms allows us to gain an in-depth understanding of the evolution of performance management for audit partners. We find that most of the policy changes have real consequences. For example, audit quality becomes more consequential to career development, whereas profit sharing becomes better linked to quality and long-term performance. We conclude that audit firms appear effectively responsive to public scrutiny, increasingly aligning partner incentives with societal expectations of audit quality.

ABSTRACT Concerns that goodwill impairments unresponsiveness to declining performance produces inflated goodwill led standard-setters to reconsider post-acquisition impairment-only accounting. We use granular large-scale data to provide institutionally relevant novel descriptive evidence motivated by this hotly debated accounting standard. Comparing goodwill versus other acquired intangibles growth rates for firms reporting goodwill throughout the 2010–2020 post-FAS 141(R) period provides no evidence of runaway goodwill inflation concerns. For firms with goodwill anytime during 2010–2020 we use Shapley values to explore the explanatory power of performance factors affecting goodwill impairments. Consistent with standard-setters’ intent, single-segment market performance explains 81 percent of goodwill impairment incidence variation (controlling for Fama-French-38 industry and time fixed-effects). Limited evidence of reduced impairment incidence after incorporating FASB sanctioned control premia or alternative market values provides little support for discretionary impairment avoidance. Conversely, higher impairment incidence when book values incorporate IFRS (2020) proposed off-balance-sheet headroom or market-to-book decreases supports discretionary impairment recognition. Data Availability: The data used in this study are obtained from commercial sources, including Compustat, Calcbench, I/B/E/S, FactSet Mergerstat/BVR, and Peters and Taylor's intangible capital dataset. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; G34.

ABSTRACT This paper investigates how consulting services affect audit quality, from the perspective of knowledge- and expertise-sharing between employees. Semistructured interviews with 16 audit partners reveal that consulting expertise is used in 60–80 percent of audit engagements, with the main rationale for such collaboration being knowledge-sharing and improved audit quality. We leverage a comprehensive office-level dataset of employment profiles covering 86 percent of all employees at large U.S. public accounting firms to systematically investigate the effect of consulting employees on audit quality. We document that a one standard deviation increase in the share of consulting employees in an office results in a 2.6 percentage point reduction in restatements (a decrease of 19 percent relative to the baseline). This effect is strongest when consulting employees have skills complimentary to auditors, e.g., technical and human resources skills, and when consultants have specific industry expertise in the same industry as the audit client. Data Availability: Data from common sources, such as Audit Analytics, can be purchased from the providers. Data on firm-level measures of workforce characteristics and skills are available from the authors upon request, conditional on approval from the data provider (Cognism). JEL Classifications: D22; E24; J24; M42.

ABSTRACT Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.