Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT: Relative to recording securitizations as collateralized borrowings, the “gain on sale” treatment has several accounting benefits such as reducing leverage, increasing earnings, and improving efficiency. We investigate whether managers engage in real transaction management to take advantages of these benefits. We predict that in order to maximize financial statement window-dressing, managers will engage in securitizations toward the end of the quarter. We find that 41 percent of the quarter's transactions occur in the third month of the quarter and almost half of these occur in the last five days of the quarter. In addition, we show that when firms report securitization gains sufficient to beat earnings thresholds, the securitization transactions are more likely to have occurred in the last five days of the quarter. We also document that the impact of securitizations on leverage is large and material for many firms. Our results suggest that window-dressing the financial statements appears to be a valuable side-benefit of engaging in securitization transactions.

ABSTRACT: We test conjectures about the determinants of materiality judgments by examining a financial reporting choice made by firms that discover errors in prior years' financial statements. From late 2004 to mid-2006, more than 250 U.S. firms uncovered and corrected operating lease accounting errors either by formal restatement—required for errors deemed material—or by a less visible current-period “catch-up” adjustment. We test the role of materiality considerations outlined in SAB No. 99 as well as factors outside authoritative guidance in explaining the correction method chosen. Although both quantitative and qualitative materiality considerations cited in the guidance explain a large portion of the variation in firms' error correction decisions, we find that the prior actions of other firms also appear to play a major role. We also find that clerical considerations, but not strategic disclosure concerns, help explain cross-sectional variation in the timing of firms' error correction announcements.

ABSTRACT: Prior research has separately examined pretax earnings management activities that have current taxable income consequences (book-tax “conforming earnings management”) and those that do not have current taxable income consequences (book-tax “nonconforming earnings management”). Our study documents the prevalence of, and then investigates the firm-specific characteristics that impact the choice between, these earnings management strategies. We utilize a sample of firms that restated their earnings downward due to accounting irregularities and thus can be presumed to have managed earnings upward. We find that nonconforming earnings management is more prevalent and that firms trade off the net present value of tax benefits against the net expected detection costs associated with nonconforming earnings management. In particular, firms having NOL carryforwards, using a high-quality auditor, or engaging in the most egregious misstatements rely less on nonconforming earnings management strategies. We also find that book-tax differences are useful in predicting restatements.

ABSTRACT: I use Adaptive Structuration Theory (DeSanctis and Poole 1994) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen 1991) to model the factors influencing whether auditors use audit support systems appropriately. Understanding the factors that influence appropriate use is important for audit firms to achieve efficient and effective audits from deploying audit support systems. Using a unique data set obtained from 569 auditors, I provide evidence that intention to use the system appropriately and external control increase appropriate use. I find that audit support system restrictiveness and the effectiveness of the audit review process are antecedents of external control. Team and firm consensus on appropriation are antecedents of perceived normative pressure, which, along with an auditor's attitude and self-efficacy, influence an auditor's intention to use the system appropriately. The model is relatively stable across different audit support system designs, but differences are evident across the audit team hierarchy.

ABSTRACT: Prior research documents that CEOs respond to transient ownership preferences by choosing actions to meet short-term earnings targets. This study examines whether contract designers anticipate these actions and respond by adjusting explicit CEO compensation contracts. We find that, in determining CEO cash bonuses, firms with high levels of transient investors, on average, place a relatively low weight on earnings and a relatively high weight on annual returns. Additionally, both the likelihood of granting equity and the magnitude of annual equity grants to CEOs are higher with a higher level of transient investors, after controlling for previously studied determinants of equity grants. The results suggest transient-owner trading behavior creates implicit incentives for CEOs to take actions that increase current earnings, and firms take these implicit incentives into account in the design of explicit CEO compensation contracts.

ABSTRACT: This study uses an experiment to examine (1) what factors give rise to investors' inability to fully incorporate operating cash flows and accruals into their earnings forecasts, and (2) what conditions help to improve investors' forecast accuracy when operating cash flows and accruals exhibit differential persistence. I investigate how decomposing the forecasting task and altering the presentation format combine to enable analysts and nonprofessional investors to acquire and accurately process financial statement information when operating cash flows and accruals are differentially persistent. I find that the earnings forecasts of analysts and M.B.A. students are more accurate only when participants are required to provide separate forecasts for operating cash flows and accruals and the income statement is altered to present the disaggregated cash and accrual components of earnings.

ABSTRACT: Managerial bonus payments are frequently determined by both objective and subjective indicators of managerial performance. By its very nature, subjective information is not verifiable for contracting purposes. The inclusion of such information in managerial bonus schemes therefore requires a principal to retain discretion in authorizing actual bonus payments. At the same time, the principal must be able to commit to an overall bonus pool that will be paid out either inside or outside the agency. Our analysis examines the structure of optimal bonus pool arrangements. The non-verifiability of the subjective indicators changes many of the predictions obtained in traditional agency settings with verifiable performance indicators. In particular, our results address the contractual value of additional information variables, the desirability of compressed incentive schemes, and the nature of relative performance evaluation in settings with multiple agents.

ABSTRACT: We develop and empirically test a parsimonious model of how specific knowledge and the value of knowledge sharing influence manufacturing plants' incentive design choices. Our results confirm the prediction that increases in the extent of agents' specific knowledge and the value of knowledge sharing are associated with greater (less) reliance on output (input) performance measures. Moreover, consistent with our model's prediction, we find that plants rely more on group-based (as opposed to individual-based) output performance measures when the value of knowledge sharing is higher, or the extent of agents' specific knowledge is lower. Finally, consistent with previous research, we find that as output performance measures become noisier, firms rely less on these measures in incentive contracts.

ABSTRACT: We use two experiments to test predictions about the positive and negative impacts of allowing analysts to revise their forecasts in light of the consensus forecasts. We find that such mutual observation not only facilitates information aggregation, but also induces free riding, which offsets the benefits of information aggregation unless incentives for accuracy are high. In our second experiment, we find that participants acting as investors anticipate these effects in the consensus and adjust their own forecasts accordingly. Our study demonstrates that the positive and negative effects of mutual observation are more complex than typically portrayed in the debate about analyst independence, and provides a framework that can be used in future research on the interactive nature of public forecasting.

ABSTRACT: This study examines the relationship between performance pay and the decision to delegate the choice of work methods and scheduling. I compare two theoretical approaches, based on specific knowledge and measurement costs, respectively. Both perspectives suggest a complementarity between discretion and performance pay, but the former predicts a positive effect of job complexity on discretion and performance pay, and the latter implies a negative effect. Results suggest that group and firm-wide incentives are used to decentralize decisions and to take advantage of employees' specific knowledge, whereas piece rates are driven by performance measurement considerations and are not associated with more discretion.