Knowledge that Transforms

This study provides evidence regarding the importance that boards of directors place on effective communication with the investor community by examining whether CEO and CFO compensation are related to the quality of the firm's financial disclosures. Using an index derived from analyst forecast characteristics and management forecast accuracy to measure disclosure quality, we find changes in the annual bonus for both the CEO and CFO to be positively associated with changes in disclosure quality. We also find that the relation is stronger for high-growth firms, firms that have stronger governance structures, and for executives with lower equity incentives. Overall, our findings provide insight into the importance that boards place on effective communication with investors as a responsibility of the CEO and CFO and, therefore, provide them with contractual incentives to address the moral hazard problem associated with voluntary disclosures.

We identify a setting in which firms are required to disclose discounted cash flow (DCF) estimates relating to the value of their primary assets. ASC 932 (formerly SFAS No. 69) has mandated DCF disclosures for proved oil and gas reserves since 1982, and these reserves constitute the primary assets of oil and gas royalty trusts. For a hand-collected sample of oil and gas royalty trusts, we find that (1) the mandatory DCF disclosures are incrementally value-relevant over historical cost accounting variables, (2) investors misprice royalty trust units because they underweight the disclosed DCF estimates when forecasting future distributions, and (3) media articles bringing attention to discrepancies between price and the disclosed DCF estimates are significant stock price catalysts. While our evidence indicates that mandatory DCF disclosures can be incrementally useful for security valuation, it also indicates that investors may overlook such information, potentially due to lack of attention and accounting expertise. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text.

We investigate the role of accounting and audit quality in the allocation of international development aid loans provided by the World Bank. This aid is crucial to improve governance functions, infrastructure, and capital markets, and the accounting and audit environments in a country can provide the World Bank with confidence that aid is being used as intended rather than being diverted for personal or political gain. We find that development aid loans are higher for countries with stronger accounting quality, where IFRS use is mandated, and where the audit environment is stronger. However, we also find that United States geo-political interests influence these results. Specifically, the World Bank appears to “overlook” accounting and audit quality in countries where geo-political interests are relatively aligned with those of the U.S. Finally, we find that accounting and auditing matter only in countries with relatively high corruption levels, indicating that the World Bank has greater trust that accounting and auditing are of relatively high quality in low-corruption countries. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

We study how joint delegation of production and disclosure choices alters the incentives that firm owners offer to their managers. Our first set of results shows how the incentive weights that owners place on revenues are affected by firm characteristics and by whether their manager chooses ex ante voluntary disclosure. This arises because the owners choose how sensitive the manager's compensation is to her production choice and, because this sensitivity is naturally greater if the manager opts to disclose, owners substitute disclosure for direct contractual incentives. Owners also substitute a rival firm's disclosures for direct incentives. Finally, we show that joint delegation alters the information environment for competing firms by creating incentives to provide more information about the less aggressive competitor and less information about the more aggressive competitor. All of these effects are exacerbated in industries with less product differentiation.

We examine whether the December 2007 PCAOB disciplinary order against Deloitte affected Deloitte's switching risk, audit fees, and audit quality relative to the other Big 4 firms over a three-year period following the censure. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB censure was associated with a decrease in Deloitte's ability to retain clients and attract new clients, and a decrease in Deloitte's audit fee growth rates. However, methodologies used in extant archival studies yield little or no evidence to suggest that Deloitte's audit quality was different from that of the other Big 4 firms during a three-year window either before or after the censure. Overall, our results suggest that the PCAOB censure imposed actual costs on Deloitte. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.

In this study, we examine a setting where principals use past performance to annually revise performance targets, but do not fully incorporate the past performance information in their target revisions. We argue that this situation is driven by some principals and agents having an implicit agreement where the principal “allows” the agent to receive economic rents from positive performance-target deviations that are the result of superior effort or transitory gains by not revising targets upward, while the agent “accepts” target revisions by not restricting output when these revisions are the result of structural changes in the operation's true economic capacity. Although both the principal and the agent can benefit from an implicit agreement, we argue that for the implicit agreement to be maintainable, the principal either needs information on the cause of the performance-target deviation or there needs to be trust between the principal and the agent. Using archival data across multiple years and independent bank units, we find a pattern of ratchet attenuation and output restriction that is consistent with the existence of implicit agreements for those principal-agent dyads where information asymmetry is sufficiently reduced or mutual trust exists. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating firm.

We propose that auditor-provided tax services (tax NAS) improve internal control quality by accelerating audit firm awareness of transactions material to the financial statements. Using data from 2004 to 2012, we find robust evidence that companies purchasing tax NAS are significantly less likely to disclose a material weakness and that this result is not due to auditor independence impairment. A one-standard-deviation increase in tax NAS is associated with approximately a 13 percent decrease in the rate of material weaknesses relative to the base rate. These results are robust to tests addressing endogeneity concerns. Additional cross-sectional analyses reveal expected increased effects of tax NAS on internal control quality (1) after significant operational changes that require changes to the internal control structure, and (2) earlier in the relationship with the financial statement audit firm, when there are fewer established lines of communication between the audit team and client. This paper contributes to the knowledge spillover literature by identifying a mechanism through which tax NAS improve overall financial reporting quality.

This paper examines whether the identity of the individual audit partners provides informational value to capital market participants beyond the value provided by the identity of the audit firms. Using data from Taiwan, where firms are mandated to disclose the names of the engagement partners, we find a positive association between the partner's quality and the client firm's earnings response coefficient. We also find a positive market reaction when a firm replaces a lower quality partner with a higher quality one. Moreover, we find evidence that firms audited by higher quality partners experience smaller initial public offering (IPO) underpricing and are able to obtain better debt contract terms. Overall, these results suggest that the quality of engagement partners matters to capital market participants.

We examine the relation between accounting conservatism and creditor recovery rates for firms in default. We also test the link between conservatism and the length of bankruptcy resolutions. We find that creditors of firms with more conservative accounting before default have significantly higher recovery rates, and that this positive relation is more pronounced for default firms that violated covenants before the default. We also find that conservative firms have higher asset productivity, shorter bankruptcy resolution, and a significantly higher probability of emerging from bankruptcy. These results suggest that accounting conservatism preserves firm value, leading to higher creditor recovery upon borrower default.

We report the results of two experiments that provide evidence that investors' risk judgments are affected by the numerical format used to describe outcomes within accounting disclosures. Consistent with prior research in psychology, investors assess higher risk in response to dollar-formatted disclosures than to equivalent percentage-formatted disclosures. Consistent with the Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad and Wright 1994), this effect is moderated when investors have both (1) awareness that management has discretion over format, and (2) sufficient cognitive capacity to consider its implications. Our results provide insight about the effects of current disclosure formats and suggest implications for managers who choose formats, investors who interpret formatted information, and regulators who consider whether to further prescribe the formats that are used in financial disclosures.