Knowledge that Transforms

[This paper provides evidence on the time-series properties and predictive ability of cash-flow data. It employs a sample of firms on which the accuracy of one-step-ahead cash-flow predictions is assessed during the 1989-1991 holdout period. We develop a new multivariate, time-series prediction model that employs past values of earnings, short-term accruals and cash-flows as independent variables in a time-series regression. Our predictive results indicate that this model clearly outperforms firm-specific and common-structure ARIMA models as well as a multivariate, cross-sectional regression model popularized in the literature. These findings are robust across alternative cash-flow metrics (e.g., levels, per-share, and deflated by total assets) and are consistent with the viewpoint espoused by the FASB that cash-flow prediction is enhanced by consideration of earnings and accrual accounting data.]

[This study examines managers' adoption-timing motives related to SFAS No. 106. Results suggest that firms attempt to correct the market's perception of the magnitude of the postretirement benefit (PRB) obligation by choosing early adoption. We find that 1991 adoptors of SFAS No. 106 had lower unexpected PRB liabilities than 1992 adoptors, who in turn had lower unexpected liabilities than 1993 adopters. Earnings management is also considered as a motive for adoption-timing. Many firms adopt the standard in the year (and quarter) with the lowest pre-SFAS No. 106 earnings. Finally, we consider PRB renegotiation efforts as a motive for delaying adoption and find that 1992 and 1993 adopters are indeed more likely than 1991 adopters to reduce PRB obligations by negotiating a plan amendment.]

[Previous research has demonstrated that information asymmetry translates into higher transaction costs for trading shares of the firm which, in turn, raise the required rate of return and lower current stock price. The information asymmetry perspective suggests that, ceteris paribus, managers wishing to maximize the value of their firms have incentives to reduce the degree of information asymmetry by switching to newly available accounting techniques which make financial statements more informative to investors. Firms with greater information asymmetry are predicted to be more likely to switch to more informative accounting methods when they become available. Tests on the choice of functional currency among U.S. multinational firms support these predictions after controlling for variables such as the debt-equity ratio, interest coverage, size, and the relative size of the foreign currency adjustment in the financial statement.]

[Prior research indicates that auditors encounter difficulty in applying experienced error frequencies to judgments of the probability that an audit objective is violated given a particular transaction cycle. This difficulty may occur because of a mismatch between the organization of this particular judgment task and the organization of auditors' knowledge. We test the effectiveness of two decision aids at counteracting this difficulty: (1) a checklist aid which facilitates knowledge retrieval and (2) a decomposition-and-mechanical-aggregation aid which facilitates both knowledge retrieval and aggregation. The checklist aid slightly improved the degree to which auditors' judgments reflected experienced frequencies and the mechanical-aggregation aid greatly improved auditors' judgments, completely counteracting the effect of the task organization-knowledge organization mismatch.]

[This paper models the effect of information on security prices when there is uncertainty regarding the precision of information. When uncertainty regarding precision is allowed, price response to information is neither linear nor even necessarily monotonic, because the market revises its expectation regarding the precision based on the signal realization. When the underlying information structure is conditionally multivariate normal, the price response (return) is nonlinear with the average response (response per unit of surprise) declining in the absolute magnitude of surprise. This nonlinearity occurs because the market associates lower precision with extreme news. When the precision is distributed in the form of a gamma, the returns function is unimodal in each quadrant ("S-shaped") and negatively sloped at the extremes. The extent of nonlinearity increases in the ex ante uncertainty regarding both the asset value and the precision of information.]

[This paper examines whether firms exhibiting improved inventory utilization subsequent to JIT adoption achieve a corresponding increase in their Return on Assets (ROA) and whether firm-specific characteristics affect such ROA responses. On average, we do not find a significant ROA response to JIT adoption. Cross-sectionally, JIT adopting firms with a diffuse customer base have a superior ROA response relative to both adopting firms with a high degree of customer concentration and their matched control firms. Evidence is consistent with a superior ROA response for firms with lower inventory turns in the adoption year, particularly for work-in-process inventory. Data do not support the prediction that firms with lower committed costs will report a greater ROA response than firms with a higher proportion of committed costs.]

[This paper examines the relations between the disclosure practices of firms, the number of analysts following each firm and properties of the analysts' earnings forecasts. Using data from the Report of the Financial Analysts Federation Corporate Information Committee (FAF Report 1985-89), we provide evidence that firms with more informative disclosure policies have a larger analyst following, more accurate analyst earnings forecasts, less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast revisions. The results enhance our understanding of the role of analysts in capital markets. Further, they suggest that potential benefits to disclosure include increased investor following, reduced estimation risk and reduced information asymmetry, each of which have been shown to reduce a firm's cost of capital in theoretical research.]

[This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to investigate the extent to which information senders develop reputations for truthful reporting. The results indicate that senders were more likely to report truthfully when their misrepresentations imposed costs on the receivers of their reports. With repeated interactions, receivers of the reports were able to discern the sender's reporting strategies, but provided no economic reward for truthfulness.]

[This study uses SFAS No. 106 disclosures to investigate the abilities of postretirement benefit (PRB) liability components and cost components to explain cross-sectional variation in market-to-book ratios. SFAS No. 106 requires disclosures of the sensitivity of the PRB liability and cost to the health care cost trend rate. This study also examines the value-relevance of this new disclosure and its effect on reducing measurement error variance in the PRB information. Results indicate that PRB disclosures are value-relevant conditioned on earnings and pension information. When both cost and liability components are considered, information on cost components is useful, whereas information on liability components has only marginal explanatory power. When the measurement error in the PRB liability is reduced using the standard's sensitivity disclosures, the explanatory power of the liability components increases significantly.]

[This paper studies a stylized model in which a division manager's historical cost reports are verified. In a one-period setting, the problem of tacit collusion between the verifier and the division manager is so severe that no mechanism can be constructed under which there is a unique equilibrium that has the verifier exercising anything other than the minimal level of care. However, by extending the contractual relationship to two periods, the tacit collusion problem can be resolved. A feature of the optimal collusion-preventing long-term contract is that it relies on history-contingent production decisions.]