[This paper explores the determinants of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets under SFAS No. 109. We find that, consistent with SFAS No. 109, the allowance is larger for firms with relatively more deferred tax assets and smaller for firms with higher levels of expected future taxable income. The most important explanatory variable for the valuation allowance is the level of firms' tax credit and tax loss carryforwards, consistent with these items being more difficult to realize. We find little evidence that managers use the valuation allowance for earnings management purposes, although these tests may not be very powerful.]
[We examine the correlation between the expected rate of return on pension assets (ERR), as reported in the financial statements, and the composition of the pension portfolio, measured as the percent invested in equities (% Equity). Our evidence indicates that ERR and%Equity are related, but the relation is rather weak. We also examine whether ERR and%Equity are correlated with future returns on pension assets. Only%Equity is correlated with future pension returns. Our results suggest that the FASB should consider the enforcement rather than elimination of current disclosure requirements regarding pension asset composition.]
[Institutional investors have strong incentives to search for private predisclosure information about companies in their portfolios because of their fiduciary responsibilities and large resource bases. In addition, large institutional ownership may induce a high level of voluntary disclosure prior to earnings announcements. Greater private information acquisition and greater levels of voluntary disclosures prior to earnings releases suggest that the content of the earnings releases by firms with higher institutional ownership is partially preempted in predisclosure market prices. This paper tests the hypothesis that the market price response to the earnings announcements is smaller for securities with higher institutional holdings. The empirical tests provide evidence that the higher the institutional holdings, the lower the market reaction to earnings releases after controlling for security capitalization and the number of analysts following the firm.]
[Implicit taxes reflect the extent (if any) to which tax-favored assets bear lower pretax returns than do tax-disfavored assets of similar risk. Prior research on implicit taxes has met with mixed results, particularly in equity securities, because of the difficulty in separating tax effects from effects caused by cross-sectional differences in risk. We avoid problems of risk by essentially comparing each security to itself before and after an unexpected change in the manner in which dividends are taxed to corporate investors. We find strong evidence of implicit taxes in preferred stocks. Extensive testing using the same event date indicates that no similar implicit tax effect exists in common stocks.]
[We provide evidence that the auto-regressive structure of seasonally differenced quarterly earnings is consistent with the requirements of the integral approach to interim reporting. In particular, we show that the auto-regressive coefficients for standardized seasonally differenced quarterly earnings are larger when the quarters employed in the auto-regressions belong to the same fiscal year than when they belong to different fiscal years. We then show that the signs and magnitudes of abnormal stock returns following earnings announcements are systematically related to these differences in the auto-regressive structure of seasonally differenced quarterly earnings. Specifically, stock returns act as if investors underestimate the larger auto-regressive coefficients between quarters in the same fiscal year. Thus, we corroborate and extend the Bernard and Thomas (1990) hypothesis that stock prices fail to reflect the extent to which quarterly earnings series differ from a seasonal random walk.]
[Prior research on auditors' memory for evidence encountered during working paper review suggests that auditors commit memory errors that could inhibit audit efficiency and effectiveness. The current study extends this line of research by examining whether two prominent features of the auditing environment, audit risk and information importance, affect the accuracy of auditors' memory and auditors' willingness to rely on memory. These issues were examined in an experiment in which auditors were required to review two working-paper areas (accounts) and, 24 hours later, recognize if information items had been present in the working papers and express how willing they would be to rely on their memory for each item. The results indicate that: (1) the accuracy of auditors' memories is positively related to the level of audit risk of the area and the degree of importance of an information item within the area; (2) the auditors' willingness to rely on memory is negatively related to the degree of information importance but not related to the level of audit risk of the area; and (3) the auditors' likelihood of referring back to the working papers is negatively related to the accuracy of auditors' memories, and this negative relationship increases with the degree of information importance. Collectively, these results suggest that audit risk and information importance altered auditors' cognitive activities during the review process in a manner that contributes to the effectiveness (e.g., better memory for more consequential evidence) and efficiency (e.g., less verification of more strongly remembered and less consequential evidence) of the audit.]
[This paper examines whether institutional investors create or reduce incentives for corporate managers to reduce investment in research and development (R&D) to meet short-term earnings goals. Many critics argue that the frequent trading and short-term focus of institutional investors encourages managers to engage in such myopic investment behavior. Others argue that the large stockholdings and sophistication of institutions allow managers to focus on long-term value rather than on short-term earnings. I examine these competing views by testing whether institutional ownership affects R&D spending for firms that could reverse a decline in earnings with a reduction in R&D. The results indicate that managers are less likely to cut R&D to reverse an earnings decline when institutional ownership is high, implying that institutions are sophisticated investors who typically serve a monitoring role in reducing pressures for myopic behavior. However, I find that a large proportion of ownership by institutions that have high portfolio turnover and engage in momentum trading significantly increases the probability that managers reduce R&D to reverse an earnings decline. These results indicate that high turnover and momentum trading by institutional investors encourages myopic investment behavior when such institutional investors have extremely high levels of ownership in a firm; otherwise, institutional ownership serves to reduce pressures on managers for myopic investment behavior.]
[This study investigates the relationship between insider trading and fraud. We find that in the presence of fraud, insiders reduce their holdings of company stock through high levels of selling activity as measured by either the number of transactions, the number of shares sold, or the dollar amount of shares sold. Moreover, we present evidence that a cascaded logit model, incorporating insider trading variables and firm-specific financial characteristics, differentiates companies with fraud from companies without fraud.]
[This study examines whether certain types of financial reporting fraud result in a higher likelihood of litigation against independent auditors. We expect that auditors are more likely to be judged responsible for failing to detect commonly occurring frauds or those that stem from fictitious transactions. We examine companies with SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and designate whether each fraud present in their financial statements is common and/or arises from fictitious transactions. We then examine whether these types of fraud are related to auditor litigation in analyses that control for various client, auditor and case characteristics. Our results provide some support for our two primary hypotheses-auditors are more likely to be sued when the financial statement frauds are of a common variety or when the frauds arise from fictitious transactions.]
[This paper examines the effects of banning contingent fees for tax return preparation services. The paper presents a principal-agent model in which a taxpayer contracts with a tax practitioner to attempt to resolve tax law uncertainty. The optimal contract provides incentives for the practitioner to do research and to choose the tax return reporting position that the taxpayer prefers. Analysis of the model shows that banning contingent fees raises the expected fee of the practitioner. The amount of this increase is increasing in the quality of the practitioner. Conventional wisdom holds that contingent fee arrangements will lead to an increase in tax undercompliance. In contrast, we find that undercompliance decreases when contingent fees are allowed.]