Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the impact of distortions wrought by transfer pricing when a firm is engaged in both internal production and external procurement of inputs. In particular, we demonstrate that a firm can actually glean benefits from often-discussed transfer-pricing problems in dealing with an external supplier. Though transfer prices above marginal cost introduce inter-division coordination problems, they also introduce a lower willingness to pay to outside suppliers. Knowing that costly internal transfers will eat into demand, the supplier is more willing to set lower prices. Such supplier discounts can make decentralization worthwhile for the firm. This benefit of decentralization is shown to be robust to variations in both downstream and upstream competition.

We consider stock markets in 20 countries to investigate whether the accrual anomaly (Sloan 1996), characterized by U.S. stock prices overweighting the role of accrual persistence, is a local manifestation of a global phenomenon.We explore whether the occurrence of the anomaly is related to country differences in accounting and institutional structures, and examine alternative explanations for its occurrence. We find stock prices overweight accruals in general, with accruals overweighting occurring in countries with a common law relative to a code law tradition. Using firmlevel data on a country-by-country basis, we document the occurrence of the anomaly in four countries, Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., and also in a sample of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) of firms domiciled in countries where we do not detect the anomaly. Using country-level data, we confirm the anomaly is more likely to occur in countries having a common law tradition, and also in countries allowing extensive use of accrual accounting and having a lower concentration of share ownership. Additional analyses reveal that earnings management and barriers to arbitrage best explain the anomaly.

SAS No. 99 requires brainstorming sessions on each audit to help auditors detect fraud. This study investigates audit team brainstorming sessions and the resulting fraud judgments. The psychology literature provides mixed results on the benefits of brainstorming. Results from my experiment suggest that while the overall number of ideas is reduced, brainstorming audit teams generate more quality fraud ideas than individual auditors generate before the brainstorming session. Further, audit teams generate new quality fraud ideas during the brainstorming session. Results also suggest that audit teams' fraud risk assessments after the brainstorming session are significantly higher than those assessments given by individual auditors on the team prior to the brainstorming session, especially when fraud is present. These results should be informative to standard setters as they suggest that brainstorming audit teams' generation of new quality fraud ideas and their improved fraud risk assessments will likely enhance their ability to identify fraud.

This study uses a sample of 530 Texas school districts to investigate the information relevance of governmental financial statements published under Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB No. 34). Specifically, we examine whether the new government-wide statements provide information relevant for assessing a government's default risk, and if this information is incremental to that provided by the governmental funds statements. GASB No. 34 requires governments to publish governmental funds statements prepared on a modified accrual basis, and government-wide statements prepared on an accrual basis. We find that GASB No. 34's Statement of Net Assets (similar to a corporation's balance sheet) provides information relevant for assessing default risk, and this information is incremental to that provided by the governmental funds statements. However, GASB No. 34's Statement of Activities (similar to a corporation's income statement) does not provide information relevant for assessing default risk. The accrual “earnings” measure is not more informative than the modified-accrual “earnings” measure. A government's modified accrual earnings measure can be thought of as a type of measure of changes in working capital. Therefore, our results are consistent with research on corporate entities that attributes the superiority of earnings over cash flows primarily to working capital accruals and not long-term accruals. For our sample of school districts, evidence suggests that total net assets from the government-wide Statement of Net Assets, along with a measure of modified-accrual “earnings” from the governmental funds statement, provide the best information for explaining default risk.

This study investigates the influence of analyst forecast dispersion on Ohlson's (2001) proposed linear information dynamics where consensus analyst forecasts are suggested as a proxy for other information. Our results indicate that Ohlson's proposed valuation model is most descriptive of market pricing when forecast dispersion, and hence information asymmetry, is high. Our results also suggest that when analysts are confronted with high information asymmetry, they tend to focus less on accounting fundamentals and rely more on other nonaccounting information, thus decreasing the correlation between the explanatory power of analyst forecasts and that of earnings and book value.

We examine the relation between accruals quality and internal controls using 705 firms that disclosed at least one material weakness from August 2002 to November 2005 and find that weaknesses are generally associated with poorly estimated accruals that are not realized as cash flows. Further, we find that this relation between weak internal controls and lower accruals quality is driven by weakness disclosures that relate to overall company-level controls, which may be more difficult to “audit around.” We find no such relation for more auditable, account-specific weaknesses. We find similar results using four additional measures of accruals quality: discretionary accruals, average accruals quality, historical accounting restatements, and earnings persistence. Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm characteristics that proxy for difficulty in accrual estimation, known determinants of material weaknesses, and corrections for self-selection bias.

The binary classification of firms into profits or losses represents a powerful heuristic. The literature that has examined the impact on the firm of this earnings heuristic has focused on the earnings management actions of small profit firms. The impact of this earnings heuristic on the actions of firms reporting accounting losses and the decision-making effects the heuristic may have other than earnings management have not been examined. In this study we hypothesize that reporting an accounting loss acts as a heuristic trigger for firms to exercise the abandonment option and discard unproductive investments. The results are consistent with the hypothesis. We find that there is a sharp and economically significant discontinuity around zero in the level of investment in labor between small profit and small loss firms. The discontinuity is due to loss firms having a lower-than-expected level of investment in labor, given their economic fundamentals. Further tests show that this discontinuity is due to the exercise of the abandonment option. We find that firms switching from a profit to a loss cut labor to a greater extent than other firms with similar changes in earnings that do not pass the loss threshold. Taken together the results are consistent with the accounting loss heuristic acting as a major disciplinary or incentive altering event that resolves agency problems.

Prior research finds that firms warning investors of an earnings shortfall experience lower returns than non-warning firms with similar risks and earnings news. Openness thus appears to be penalized by investors. Yet, this finding may be due to a self-selection bias that occurs when firms with a larger amount of unfavorable non-earnings news (“other bad news”) are more likely to warn. In this paper I use a Heckman selection model to infer the amount of other bad news and document that, on average, warning firms have a larger amount of other bad news than non-warning firms. After controlling for this effect, I find that warning firms' returns remain lower than those of non-warning firms in a short-term window ending five days after earnings announcement. When this window is extended by three months, however, warning and non-warning firms exhibit similar returns. My evidence suggests that openness is ultimately not penalized by investors.

As part of a federal government initiative to increase efficiency and quality, in 1996 the United States Veterans Health Administration (VHA) radically restructured its organizational design and management processes. This study uses 1992–1998 clinical, workload, and financial data to examine the effect of this reform on performance. Several previous government attempts to introduce private sector management practices, such as management by objectives (MBO) or program planning and budgeting system (PPBS), have been largely unsuccessful. In contrast to prior reforms, the current restructuring introduced coordinated changes in the VHA organizational structure, performance measurement, and reward systems. Our results document that, following the reorganization, the VHA cost per patient declined significantly and various quality measures improved. Our analysis suggests that reduction in excess capacity and the more intense use of remaining capacity are among the primary explanations for the VHA achieving the observed cost reductions. These findings suggest that coordinated changes in organizational structure, performance measures, and incentives can create value for public enterprises even though control mechanisms are generally more limited in these environments than in the private sector.

The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed “corporate governance.” Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.