Knowledge that Transforms

Since 1999 regulators have attempted to improve the monitoring of financial reporting by exerting significant pressure on firms to appoint accounting financial experts (AFEs) to their audit committees. Yet, many firms have been reluctant to do so, which has made these firms more prone to financial reporting problems. We examine appointments of AFEs to the audit committees of S&P 1500 firms during the period 1999–2008 to explore whether concerns about the status of these experts discouraged firms from appointing them. We find that typical AFEs (CFOs and retired audit partners) have lower director status (board seats, trusteeships, social club memberships, and elite education) than other types of directors, and that this status gap is greater for higher status firms (larger, better connected, and more admired firms). Moreover, we find that higher status firms are less likely to appoint AFEs, suggesting that status-related concerns reduce the demand for accounting financial expertise on audit committees. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Extant research on voluntary disclosure about future prospects has focused on two forward-looking disclosure mechanisms: management forecasts and conference calls. This study examines the accelerated filing of material contracts as another type of future-related disclosure that involves no forecasting. I find that firms are more likely to accelerate material contract filings when forward-looking disclosures could lack credibility or arouse litigation concerns. However, for proprietary cost considerations, firms delay contract filings when facing high (low) product market competition from incumbents (potential entrants). I also find that accelerated contract filing is incrementally associated with lower information asymmetry. Overall, while presenting a cost-benefit trade-off that is distinctly different from forward-looking disclosures, accelerated contract filing is an important alternative channel through which firms communicate future prospects to investors. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the public sources identified in the paper. Contact the author for any specific data requests.

We test whether earnings management spreads between firms via shared directors. We find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. Earnings management contagion is stronger when the shared director has a leadership or accounting-relevant position (e.g., audit committee chair or member) on its board or the contagious firm's board. Irregularity contagion is stronger than error contagion. The board contagion effect is robust to controlling for endogenous matching of firms with directors, fixed firm/director effects, incidence of M&A, industry, and contagion via a common auditor or geographical proximity. These findings support the view that board monitoring plays a key role in the contagion and quality of firms' financial reports. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; M49; G34; G39; D83. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

In an environment where individual productivity can be increased through efforts directed at a conventional task approach and more efficient task approaches that can be identified by thinking outside-the-box, we examine the effects of productivity-target difficulty and pay contingent on meeting and beating this target (i.e., target-based pay). We argue that while challenging targets and target-based pay can hinder the discovery of production efficiencies, they can motivate high productive effort whereby individuals work harder and more productively using either the conventional task approach or more efficient task approaches when discovered. Results of a laboratory experiment support our predictions. Individuals assigned an easy productivity target and paid a fixed wage identify a greater number of production efficiencies than those with either challenging targets or target-based pay. However, individuals with challenging targets and/or target-based pay have higher productivity per production efficiency discovered, suggesting these control tools better motivate productive effort. Collectively, our results suggest that the ultimate effectiveness of these control tools will likely hinge on the importance of promoting the discovery of production efficiencies relative to motivating productive effort. In doing so, our results provide a better understanding of conflicting prescriptions from the practitioner literature and business press.

We examine whether short sellers in the equity market provide valuable information to investors in the bond market. Using a sample of publicly traded bond data covering the period from 1988 to 2011, we find that firms with high short interest have lower credit ratings and are more likely to have their ratings downgraded. We also find that firms with highly shorted stocks are associated with higher bond yield spreads (about 24 basis points). Evidence of causality from short interest spikes and a natural experiment based on the SEC's Regulation SHO pilot program confirms our findings. Overall, our results suggest that equity short sellers provide predictive information to creditors in the bond market. JEL Classifications: G12; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the study with the exception of the bond data from Lehman Brothers, which is a proprietary dataset.

This study examines the effect of timing (gradual versus immediate) and direction (tax increase or decrease) of a tax change on taxpayer behavior. Specifically, we focus on capital gain tax changes and preferences for investment in riskier assets. We run an experiment with 117 participants who allocate investment dollars between two funds of differing risk. Drawing on mental accounting and hedonic editing (Thaler 1985; Thaler and Johnson 1990), we posit that a tax decrease (a “gain”) implemented gradually over several years will result in a greater increase in risky investment once the decrease is fully implemented than when the tax change is implemented all at once. In contrast, once a tax increase (a “loss”) is fully implemented, a smaller decrease in risky investment will result when the change occurs all at once rather than gradually. Our findings support these expectations, suggesting that the manner of implementing a tax law change may impact decisions. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

The concept of conditional conservatism (asymmetric earnings timeliness) has provided new insight into financial reporting and stimulated considerable research since Basu (1997). Patatoukas and Thomas (2011) report bias in firm-level cross-sectional asymmetry estimates that they attribute to scale effects. We do not agree with their advice that researchers should avoid conditional conservatism estimates and inferences from research based on such estimates. Our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest the explanation is a correlated omitted variables problem that can be addressed in a straightforward fashion, including fixed-effects regression. Correlation between the expected components of earnings and returns biases estimates of how earnings incorporate the information contained in returns. Further, the correlation varies with returns, biasing asymmetric timeliness estimates. When firm-specific effects are taken into account, estimates do not exhibit the bias, are statistically and economically significant, are consistent with priors, and behave as a predictable function of book-to-market, size, and leverage. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.

We investigate whether insider selling affects the likelihood of firms receiving auditor going-concern opinions. Prior studies document significant negative market reactions to the issuance of going-concern opinions, indicating that such opinions convey bad news to investors. Insider sales followed by negative news are likely to attract regulators' scrutiny and investor class-action lawsuits. Therefore, we predict that, to reduce the risk of litigation, managers have incentives to avoid receiving going-concern opinions after their insider sales by pressuring auditors for clean audit opinions. We evaluate this prediction empirically and find that the probability of receiving a going-concern opinion is negatively associated with the level of insider selling. Further analysis indicates that this negative relation is more pronounced for firms that are economically significant to their auditors but less pronounced when (1) auditors have concerns about litigation exposure and reputation loss and (2) audit committees are more independent. Finally, the negative relation between going-concern opinions and insider sales is significantly weakened after SOX.

This study provides both survey and experimental evidence to consider how social interactions between staff-level auditors and client management may affect staff auditors' perceptions and influence their decisions regarding the collection of audit evidence. During fieldwork, staff-level auditors have extensive interaction with client management. Survey evidence suggests that these staff-level auditors are often “mismatched” with client management, in terms of their experience, age, and accounting knowledge. Experimental results indicate that staff-level auditors may reduce the extent to which they collect evidence to avoid these interactions. Finally, the use of email communication with client management helped to mitigate the reduction in evidence collected caused by avoiding in-person interactions. Interestingly, when not collecting all the evidence, approximately half of the participants documented their findings in a vague or inappropriate manner, which would likely reduce the likelihood that reviewing auditors would identify a problem. Given the extent of audit evidence collected by young staff auditors, these findings have direct implications for workpaper and audit quality. Data Availability: Data and materials used in this study are available upon request.

Using a new database that contains accounting data for a large sample of U.S. private firms, we provide an investigation of financial reporting quality (FRQ) of U.S. private versus public firms. We find that in general public firms have higher accrual quality and are more conservative. The results are consistent with public firms' reporting reflecting greater demand for financial information. However, these reporting qualities of public firms are mitigated or eliminated in settings where public firms are more likely to manage earnings or face reduced demand for their financial information. Our study contributes not only to the current debate on private versus public financial accounting, but also to the broader literature attempting to understand the determinants of FRQ.