Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT This paper examines how the reporting model for a firm's operating assets affects analyst forecast accuracy. We contrast U.K. and U.S. investment property firms having real estate as their primary operating asset, exploiting that U.K. (U.S.) firms report these assets at fair value (historical cost). We assess the accuracy of a balance-sheet-based forecast (net asset value, or NAV) and an income-statement-based forecast (earnings per share, or EPS). We predict and find higher NAV forecast accuracy for U.K. relative to U.S. firms, consistent with the fair value reporting model revealing private information that is incorporated into analysts' balance sheet forecasts. We find this difference is attenuated when the fair value and historical cost models are more likely to converge: during recessionary periods. Finally, we predict and find lower EPS forecast accuracy for U.K. firms when reporting under the full fair value model of IFRS, in which unrealized fair value gains and losses are included in net income. This is consistent with the full fair value model increasing the difficulty of forecasting net income through the inclusion of non-serially correlated elements such as these gains/losses. Information content analyses provide further support for these inferences. Overall, the results indicate that the fair value reporting model enhances analysts' ability to forecast the balance sheet, but the full fair value model reduces their ability to forecast net income.

ABSTRACT Although regulation makes audit committees responsible for determining and negotiating audit fees, researchers and practitioners express concerns that CFOs continue to control these negotiations. Thus, regulation may give investors a false sense of security regarding auditor independence. We utilize the recent financial crisis and economic recession as an exogenous shock that allows us to shed light on the relative influence of the audit committee and the CFO on fee negotiations. During the recession, we find larger fee reductions in the presence of more powerful CFOs, and smaller fee reductions in the presence of more powerful audit committees. We also find the CFO or the audit committee primarily influences fees when their counterpart is less powerful. Our findings suggest a more complex relationship between the CFO and the audit committee than current regulations recognize and cast doubt on the ability of regulation to force one structure on the negotiation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

ABSTRACT A growing literature investigates the association between stock return variation and several aspects of information and governance structures, in both a cross-country setting and a cross-firm setting within the U.S. Papers use either idiosyncratic stock return volatility or R2 as interchangeable measures of firm-specific return variation but report inconsistent results. An important reason for the differing interpretations is the assumption about whether lower R2 (or higher ) captures firm-specific news or noise. We document that higher (or equivalently, lower R2) resembles noise. In addition, we show, analytically and empirically, that different results obtain when using R2 or because the systematic risk inherent in the R2 metric is also correlated with the independent variable of interest. Therefore, we recommend that when assessing the association between R2 (or ) and some independent variable, researchers (1) control for elements of systematic risk and (2) triangulate their findings with other measures of information environment. Data Availability: The data in this study are available from commercial providers, e.g., WRDS, Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S.

ABSTRACT This paper examines how earnings performance relates to firms' narrative R&D disclosure decisions. The unique nature of R&D investments and financial statements' limited ability to communicate the value of such investments highlight the role of narrative disclosure as a supplement to the financial statements. I predict and find that current earnings performance (adjusted for R&D expense) is negatively related to the quantity of narrative R&D disclosure. Conducting a content analysis of the detail, tone, and readability of narrative R&D disclosures, I find that managers adjust R&D disclosures based on earnings performance to provide relevant information rather than to obfuscate performance. Finally, I provide evidence that market participants find narrative R&D disclosure informative because it significantly affects sell-side analyst behavior, disclosure information content, and information asymmetry. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

ABSTRACT We analyze survey responses from nearly 600 corporate tax executives to investigate firms' incentives and disincentives for tax planning. While many researchers hypothesize that reputational concerns affect the degree to which managers engage in tax planning, this hypothesis is difficult to test with archival data. Our survey allows us to investigate reputational influences and, indeed, we find that reputational concerns are important—69 percent of executives rate reputation as important and the factor ranks second in order of importance among all factors explaining why firms do not adopt a potential tax planning strategy. We also find that financial accounting incentives play a role. For example, 84 percent of publicly traded firms respond that top management at their company cares at least as much about the GAAP ETR as they do about cash taxes paid and 57 percent of public firms say that increasing earnings per share is an important outcome from a tax planning strategy. JEL Classifications: D83; G31, M41. Data Availability: Survey responses are confidential. Other data are available from public sources identified in the paper.

ABSTRACT This study investigates the role of the business press in the pricing of accounting information. Using a comprehensive dataset of more than 111,000 earnings-related business press articles published from 2000 to 2010, we find that press coverage of the annual earnings announcement mitigates cash flow mispricing, but has a negligible effect on accrual mispricing. We provide evidence that this impact is driven primarily by the press disseminating the information more broadly, rather than by the creation of new content that helps investors understand the implications of accounting information. Our results suggest that the business press plays an important role in facilitating the market's ability to efficiently impound accounting information into stock prices and provide new insights into the role of the business press as an information intermediary in capital markets.

ABSTRACT The textbook make-or-buy decision is typically described as choosing the cheaper of the two sourcing options. However, research in accounting has consistently demonstrated that strategic and informational considerations often complicate such seemingly straightforward criteria. In a similar vein, this paper shows that when a firm becomes privy to accounting information pertaining to its profitability, its sourcing choice has powerful informational reverberations. This is because input procurement from an outsider serves to convey both profitability information and strategic positioning. Conveying profitability information refers to the fact that the size of the input order provides the supplier a credible signal of the firm's internal accounting information and, thus, its relative ability to compete in the marketplace. Conveying strategic positioning refers to the fact that the upfront placement of the input order also informs the supplier about the firm's chosen strategic choices in the marketplace. We demonstrate that both sources of information conveyance together can point to a firm preferring to buy inputs from a retail rival even when it can make them internally at a lower cost. This penchant for outsourcing to a rival is more pronounced the more accurate the firm's accounting system.

ABSTRACT Firm disclosures often reach only a portion of investors, which results in information asymmetry among investors and, therefore, lower market liquidity. This issue is particularly salient for firms that are not highly visible, as they tend not to receive broad news dissemination via traditional intermediaries, such as the press. This paper examines whether firms can reduce information asymmetry by more broadly disseminating their news. To isolate the impact of dissemination, we focus our analysis on firms' use of Twitter and exploit the 140-character message restriction. Specifically, using a sample of technology firms, we examine the impact of using Twitter to send market participants links to press releases that are provided via traditional disclosure methods. We find this additional dissemination of firm-initiated news via Twitter is associated with lower abnormal bid-ask spreads and greater abnormal depths, consistent with a reduction in information asymmetry. Moreover, this result holds mainly for firms that are not highly visible, consistent with them being in greater need of this additional dissemination channel. We also examine the impact of dissemination on a volume-based measure of liquidity, and find that dissemination is positively associated with liquidity. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper.

ABSTRACT Using an international sample of banks and country-level indices for individualism and uncertainty avoidance as proxies for national culture, we study how differences in culture across countries affect accounting conservatism and bank risk-taking. Consistent with expectations, our cross-country analysis indicates that individualism is negatively (positively) related to conservatism (risk-taking) and uncertainty avoidance is positively (negatively) related to conservatism (risk-taking). We also find that cultures that encourage higher risk-taking experienced more bank failures and bank troubles during the recent financial crisis. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the text.

ABSTRACT The design of CEO incentives is particularly important for firms in financial distress. We compare the resolution of CEO incentive problems in distressed firms between the 1980s versus the 1990s, focusing on how changes in contractual provisions, as well as in the executive labor market, resulted in a shift to a new equilibrium. Our analyses provide evidence that the increased bargaining power of creditors, together with changes in the use of contractual provisions in the 1990s, enabled creditors to more effectively retain highly skilled CEOs with firm-specific knowledge and provide them with incentives to improve firm performance. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the article. JEL Classifications: G33; G34; M46.