Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the link between enhanced accounting comparability and the valuation performance of pricing multiples. Using the warranted multiple method proposed by Bhojraj and Lee (2002), we demonstrate how enhanced accounting comparability leads to better peer-based valuation performance. Empirical tests using firms from 15 European Union (EU) countries over the period 1997–2011 (with comparable peers selected from the entire cross-section of foreign firms) document significant improvement in valuation performance measured as pricing accuracy, the ability of value estimates to explain cross-sectional variation in observed price, and the ability of the pricing multiple to predict future market-to-book multiples. Findings for a series of identification tests suggest that enhanced valuation performance is the consequence of improvements in the degree of cross-border accounting comparability that occurred during the sample window, and that a significant fraction of comparability gain operates through improved peer selection.

The SEC is moving toward requiring real-time reporting. Proponents have predicted that disclosing a news event immediately after it arises could reduce information aggregation and disclosure bunching. But evidence from the theoretical literature suggests that the effect depends on whether managers can time the underlying required reporting event. Managers, for example, can time regular poison pill adoptions, but have limited ability to time in-play pill adoptions. Thus, I test whether real-time reporting deters disclosure bunching around the disclosures of regular and in-play poison pill adoptions to examine whether managers' ability to time events affects whether real-time reporting deters strategic disclosure. I find that real-time reporting does not deter disclosure bunching for regular poison pills, but does deter it for in-play pills. These results suggest that real-time reporting will reduce disclosure bunching only if managers cannot time the underlying event.

Based on data collected from 616 experienced financial officers who use U.S. GAAP or IFRS and are domiciled in the U.S., Europe, or Asia, we examine how reporting standards (U.S. GAAP versus IFRS) and domicile (U.S. versus non-U.S.) affect earnings management (real versus accrual). U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP rely more heavily on real methods than non-U.S. firms that use either IFRS or U.S. GAAP and U.S. firms using IFRS. U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP operate in an environment that encourages real over accruals methods; specifically, U.S. GAAP facilitates detection of earnings management, and enforcement is more effective in the U.S. Further, the likelihood and amount of earnings management do not differ across conditions, suggesting that firms using less accruals earnings management tend to fully compensate by increasing real methods. So stronger reporting environments do not necessarily reduce total earnings management, but instead encourage substitution of real for accruals methods.

Prior studies show that equity value has convex relations with earnings and book value of equity, respectively, due to growth and adaptation options (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Zhang 2000). However, these studies do not consider the role of institutions in affecting firms' ability to exercise growth and adaptation options. In this study, we investigate whether these convex relations vary with the degree of a country's economic freedom, which may influence the frictions and costs of exercising these options. We develop four hypotheses: In countries with greater economic freedom: (1) a firm's capital investment in response to profitability is greater; (2) the relation between equity value and earnings, given equity book value, is more convex; (3) the relation between equity value and equity book value, given earnings, is more convex; and (4) the relation between stock return and profitability change is more convex. Using the Economic Freedom of the World index from the Fraser Institute, we test our hypotheses with data from 30 countries during the 2000–2010 period. The empirical results are consistent with these hypotheses. The effect of economic freedom that we document is distinct from the effects of GDP level and growth, legal origin, law enforcement, investor protection, and quality of accounting standards. Our results suggest that greater economic freedom enhances equity value through more efficient management of investment options. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.

Prior studies find inconsistent evidence regarding the effect of CEO equity incentives on financial misreporting. We argue that this inconsistency stems from not considering detection mechanisms that mitigate the effect of equity incentives on misreporting by limiting the ability of managers to carry out such manipulative activities. Using auditor industry expertise as one such detection mechanism, we document that CEO equity incentives are positively associated with misreporting only in subsamples where auditor expertise is low, but not where expertise is high. The implication of these results is that auditor expertise lowers the cost of granting equity-based incentives and that firms audited by an industry expert grant their CEOs greater equity incentives. We find strong evidence in favor of this implication. Controlling for previously identified determinants of CEO equity incentives, we find that firms audited by an industry expert grant their CEOs 14 percent more equity incentives than firms audited by a non-expert. To address endogeneity concerns, we use the collapse of Arthur Andersen as a quasi-natural experiment and find analogous evidence. Overall, our study documents the critical role of detection mechanisms in the link between CEO contracting and financial misreporting.

Prior research suggests that audit seniors' judgments are sometimes biased by their affect toward (i.e., feeling of personally liking or disliking) client personnel. We examine how experienced audit reviewers respond when reviewing an audit preparer's judgment that appears to be biased by the preparer's affect toward a client's controller. In our experiment, reviewers are provided with a preparer's judgment that appears inconsistent with the audit workpapers. We then examine the effect of providing versus not providing reviewers with a cue about the preparer's positive or negative affect toward the controller. We find that despite reviewers' belief that affect biases a preparer's judgment, reviewers who are informed of the preparer's affect do not rely less on the preparer's judgment. Instead, they actually rely more on the preparer's judgment than do those who are not informed about the preparer's affect. This result is consistent with Wegner's (1994) ironic rebound effect, which predicts that sometimes when individuals are trying not to rely on information, they ironically rely on it more. Our findings suggest a potential limitation of the audit review process.

For decades, prominent members of the accounting community have argued that the quality of accounting education is falling. Support for this claim is limited because of a scarcity of data characterizing the constructs of interest. This study is a comparative evaluation of the quality of accounting education from the 1970s to the 2000s using unique data to quantify education quality for accounting and many comparison disciplines. I find that, compared to most other types of college education, accounting education quality has been steady or increasing over the sample period. However, relative to other business degree programs, the evidence is mixed. The quality of students self-selecting non-accounting business degrees has increased while the quality of accounting students has not. The disparity in student quality is not reflected in the pay received by accounting graduates, which has remained stable relative to the pay received by graduates with other business degrees, although this result is likely influenced by regulatory changes during the 2000s, including Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Together, the evidence suggests that the quality of accounting education has not declined rapidly over the last four decades, but in the competition among business degree programs for high-quality students, accounting has underperformed. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available in the Freshman and Senior Surveys of the Cooperative Institutional Research Program's Higher Education Research Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles; the IPUMS-USA database, which is compiled and distributed by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota; the National Survey of College Graduates, which is available from the National Science Foundation; and the General Social Survey, which is maintained by the National Opinion Research Center at The University of Chicago.

In this study, we examine whether interacting hierarchical teams outperform nominal hierarchical teams in electronic brainstorming. Our hierarchical audit teams were composed of 111 managers and seniors from two Big 4 accounting firms. We compare fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams for two tasks of varying complexity: a simpler task of fraud risk factor identification and a more complex task of fraud hypothesis generation. We find that nominal teams generate a significantly larger number of unique fraud risk factors and fraud hypotheses than interacting teams. Nominal teams also generate higher-quality fraud hypotheses. We provide evidence that social loafing by less experienced auditors in interacting teams drives the differences between nominal and interacting teams in the fraud hypothesis generation task. In addition, less experienced auditors have less developed mental simulations for frauds in interacting teams compared to those in nominal teams. A key contribution of our study is that it identifies the underlying mechanisms of the differential fraud brainstorming outcomes between nominal and interacting teams.

This paper investigates whether and how financial restatements affect the market for corporate control. We show that firms that recently filed financial restatements are significantly less likely to become takeover targets than a propensity score matched sample of non-restating firms. For those restating firms that do receive takeover bids, the bids are more likely to be withdrawn or take longer to complete than those made to non-restating firms. Finally, there is some evidence that deal value multiples are significantly lower for restating targets than for non-restating targets. Our analyses suggest that the information risk associated with restating firms is the main driver of these results. Overall, this study finds that financial restatements have profound consequences for the allocation of economic resources in the market for corporate control. JEL Classifications: D82; G14; G34; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

We empirically examine the joint predictions of the pecking order theory and the theory of time-varying asymmetric information regarding the timing of security offerings around information disclosures. We analyze loan originations and bond offerings around earnings announcements and compare them against equity offerings. In support of the theories' predictions, we find a positive association between the information sensitivity of securities and the likelihood of their issuance after earnings announcements. In particular, we find that clustering after earnings announcements is weakest in loan originations, stronger in bond offerings, and strongest in equity offerings. Also consistent with the theories, we find that the size of news in earnings announcements matters in the timing decision. We find weak evidence regarding the theories' implication that the direction of news in the announcement plays a role in the timing decision. We test and find that this latter result is partly attributable to potential costs associated with the omission of material negative information, such as litigation risk.