Knowledge that Transforms

Regulators are concerned that auditors do not sufficiently identify and report material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). However, psychological licensing theory suggests reporting material weaknesses could have unintended consequences for acceptance of aggressive client financial reporting. In an experiment, we predict and find auditors accept more aggressive client reporting after they report a material weakness in ICFR than after they report no material weakness. We provide evidence licensing underlies this effect. In a second experiment, we investigate the efficacy of an intervention to reduce the identified licensing effects by prompting an audit quality goal. We find this prompt mitigates the unintended consequence when auditors report a material weakness. While regulators are concerned companies are undeservedly receiving clean ICFR audit opinions, our findings indicate adverse ICFR opinions may lead auditors to give companies undeservedly clean financial statement opinions. We provide a potential remedy to this unintended consequence.

This paper examines how the interaction of perceived subjectivity and pay transparency in profit allocation is associated with an important aspect of law partners' professional judgment, namely their tendency to accede to the wishes of their client and fellow partner (labeled hereafter as partner accedence). Based on interviews with 56 corporate law partners working in large Canadian law firms, we find higher partner accedence in a less subjective system than in a more subjective system, but only under no pay transparency. We find that pay transparency (versus no transparency) is associated with increased accedence in a more subjective system, but it is marginally associated with decreased accedence in a less subjective system. In an experiment where we randomly assign MTurk participants to conditions, we replicate the finding that pay transparency (versus no transparency) has a more positive effect on partner accedence as subjectivity level increases. Data Availability: Lawyers participated in the study upon which this paper is based only after signing agreements that strict confidentiality of all data would be maintained by the researchers. As such, we are bound by these confidentiality agreements with individual lawyers interviewed for the study. Experiment data from Amazon Mechanical Turk are available from the authors.

In this paper I revisit the issue of real income smoothing in the setting used by Lambert (1984). I demonstrate that the particular effect identified in his paper is actually an error: under his assumptions, there is no input-driven equilibrium income smoothing of the type he suggests. There are, however, several other drivers of equilibrium behavior ignored in that paper. In this paper, I identify those and, for the particular model structure, show that when all effects are considered together, there is little support for the suggestion that second-best earnings generally are being smoothed through the equilibrium behavior.

We provide evidence about allocations of cash flow freed up by not paying taxes (“tax-related cash”). Uncertainty about future repayments suggests firms may use tax-related cash more cautiously than other cash flow. We utilize a flow-of-funds model from finance to quantify the relative amounts of tax-related cash associated with various potential uses of operating cash flow. We find firms allocate tax-related cash differently than other after-tax cash flow. Prior studies find tax avoiders hold more cash, and our results suggest this is because firms invest less (and save more) tax-related cash. We also find that the allocation of tax-related cash varies with relative financial constraints, economic uncertainty, and firms' multinational status in ways consistent with prior findings. For example, firms facing relatively higher levels of financial constraints invest a lower (higher) percentage of tax-related cash in capital expenditures (marketable securities and R&D), possibly to preserve funds for future investment opportunities.

We predict that a firm's greater accounting comparability with its industry peers facilitates its learning from those peer firms' research and development (R&D) investments, allowing that firm to have greater innovative efficiency. We estimate accounting comparability using pro forma capitalized R&D earnings that link lagged R&D expenditures to future profitability employing the Almon (1965) distributed lag model. We find that greater accounting comparability leads to enhanced ability to predict future cash flows generated by R&D investments of peer firms. In the cross-section, we observe that the relation between accounting comparability and innovative efficiency is stronger if peer firms exhibit higher accounting (accrual) quality and are themselves successful innovators. In sum, this study shows that a shared qualitative characteristic of accounting, namely, accounting comparability, is positively associated with innovative efficiency.

This study examines whether material corporate events that occur during the year-end closing process constrain management's and the auditor's resources and inhibit them from providing high-quality financial reports. For a sample of U.S. company financial reports issued during 2000–2013, we identify material corporate events using Type II subsequent event footnote disclosures (i.e., material events that occur in year t+1, but prior to the issuance of the year t financial statements, yet do not affect amounts recognized in year t). We find that Type II subsequent events are associated with lower financial reporting quality, as measured by the need to subsequently restate the year t financial statements. The increased restatement likelihood only occurs when managers are resource-constrained. Auditors can mitigate the increased restatement risk, but only when they allocate more resources to the engagement. Our results underscore the importance of resource management in the financial reporting and audit processes.

Underreporting, or reporting fewer hours than actually worked, is a prevalent behavior among auditors at all levels. Underreporting can result in negative consequences, such as tight budgets and reductions in future audit quality. In this paper, I propose a low-cost budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting. Using an experiment, I document that individuals with higher underreporting incentives underreport less when given an aggregated budget relative to a disaggregated budget. When individuals have lower underreporting incentives, aggregating the budget has a smaller effect on underreporting. I also provide evidence of the process by performing a mediation analysis. In a second experiment, I examine a budget formatting procedure that reduces underreporting while also mitigating the loss of data richness that results from aggregation. This study provides important insights to audit firms, partners, managers, and regulators who rely on audit hours for budgets, measures of staff efficiency, and measures of audit quality.

We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain, but persistent, information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (1) managers face disclosure frictions 35 percent of the time; (2) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17 percent of the time; and (3) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24 percent of the time. Managers' strategic withholding motives increase investors' uncertainty about earnings by 3 percent. We find that managers' price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third in response to investors' increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure.

We consider the optimal allocation of decision rights over noncontractible specific investments. Risk-averse business unit managers each engage in general (stand-alone) operations and invest in joint projects that benefit their own and other divisions. Which of the managers should have the authority to choose these investments? With scalable investments, we show that decision rights should be bundled in the hands of the manager facing the more volatile environment. With discrete (lumpy) investments, on the other hand, decision rights should be split between the managers, provided they face comparable levels of uncertainty in their general operations. Splitting decision rights better leverages the inherent investment complementarity, counter to conventional wisdom. Our model generates empirical predictions for the equilibrium association of organizational structure and managers' incentive contracts: bundling of decision rights results in pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) divergence across divisions; splitting them results in PPS convergence.

While prior research on performance evaluation bias has mainly focused on the determinants and consequences of rating errors, we investigate how a firm can provide implicit incentives to supervisors to mitigate these errors via its calibration committee. We empirically examine the extent to which a calibration committee incorporates supervisors' evaluation behavior with respect to their subordinates in the performance evaluation outcomes, i.e., performance ratings and promotion decisions, for these supervisors. In our study, we distinguish between lack of skills and opportunism as two important facets of evaluation behavior, which we expect the calibration committee to address differently. Using panel data of a professional service firm, we show that supervisors' opportunistic behavior to strategically inflate subordinates' performance ratings is disciplined through a decrease in the supervisors' own performance rating, while the supervisors' skills to provide less compressed and, thus, more informative performance ratings is rewarded through a higher likelihood of promotion.