Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT: In this study, we consider the effects of the asymmetry in capital gains tax policy on the communication of private information to investors. Assuming quite plausibly that firm managers tend to favor current stockholder returns relative to future stockholder returns, though not exclusively, we identify conditions under which limitations on the deductibility of capital losses lend efficacy to unverified public disclosures that allow managers of higher value firms to separate from lower value firms in equilibrium. Although the tax asymmetry by itself may not be enough to enable separation, we show how it would nevertheless contribute to the efficiency of separation through explicitly dissipative signals. It further follows that if separation would occur by means of a dissipative signal in any event, then the tax asymmetry is welfare-enhancing. Our findings demonstrate that tax asymmetry can help resolve information asymmetry.

ABSTRACT: We investigate why firms choose to evaluate a tax department as a profit center (“contributor to the bottom line”) as opposed to as a cost center and the association between this choice and effective tax rates (ETRs). Using data from a confidential survey taken in 1999 of Chief Financial Officers, we develop and test a theory for choosing between these two methods of evaluating a tax department. We find that the likelihood of evaluating the tax department as a profit center is increasing in firm decentralization characteristics and tax-planning opportunities. We then employ instrumental variables to investigate whether evaluating a tax department as a profit center provides an effective incentive for the tax department to contribute to net income through lower ETRs. We find that our instrument for profit center firms is associated with significantly lower ETRs than cost center firms.

ABSTRACT: We examine a communication game between an analyst and a decision-maker and investigate how the presence of public information affects the precision of the information the analyst gathers and communicates to the decision-maker. We characterize conditions under which public information causes the analyst to underinvest or overinvest in the information gathered relative to the case where analyst credibility is not an issue. We then discuss when the presence of public information causes the analyst to reduce the depth of coverage of the firm, suggesting that the introduction of public information can make the decision-maker strictly worse off.

ABSTRACT: Nearly half of managers' forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS) end in nickel intervals, whereas only about 20 percent of actual EPS end in nickel intervals. We provide evidence on the attributes, determinants, and consequences of this systematic wedge between managers' predictions and firms' ex post actual performance. Managers' nickel forecasts are not simply a benign response to uncertainty about upcoming earnings, because nickel forecasts are not only less accurate, but also they are more optimistically biased than non-nickel forecasts. In addition to uncertainty, efforts to protect the firm's proprietary information and self-serving opportunism in response to managers' economic incentives also play incremental roles in explaining managers' propensity to issue forecasts heaped at nickel intervals. We also find that managers' nickel forecasts spur even active analysts to issue forecasts heaped at nickel intervals, although analysts' forecast revisions partially adjust for the optimism and noise in managers' nickel forecasts.

ABSTRACT: We document the first systematic evidence on the characteristics and economic consequences of firms subject to employee allegations of corporate financial misdeeds. First, compared to a control group that avoided public whistle-blowing allegations, firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations were characterized by unique firm-specific factors that led employees to expose alleged financial misdeeds. Second, on average, whistle-blowing announcements were associated with a negative 2.8 percent market-adjusted five-day stock price reaction; this reaction was especially negative for allegations involving earnings management (−7.3 percent). Third, compared to a control group that exhibits similar characteristics, firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations were associated with further negative consequences including earnings restatements, shareholder lawsuits, and negative future operating and stock return performance. Finally, whistle-blowing targets exposed by the press were more likely to make subsequent improvements in corporate governance. Our results suggest whistle-blowing is far from a trivial nuisance for targeted firms, and on average, appears to be a useful mechanism for uncovering agency issues.

ABSTRACT: This study tests the hypothesis that founder CEOs are less likely to be fired than non-founder CEOs when accounting irregularities are disclosed. We also examine whether CFOs are more likely to shoulder the blame when the CEO is a founder. Using a sample of 96 newly public firms with accounting irregularities, and a control sample of similar newly public firms, we document that the probability of CEO (CFO) turnover in the wake of an accounting irregularity is lower (higher) when the firm's CEO is also a founder. The difference in CEO turnover rates is dramatic, with nonfounder CEOs turning over at a rate of 49 percent, as compared to only 29 percent for founder CEOs. Our overall findings are consistent with the notion that the board's response to irregularities differs when the CEO is a founder.

ABSTRACT: We review and evaluate the methods commonly used in the accounting literature to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. While much of the accounting literature studies settings in which variables are cross-sectionally and serially correlated, we find that the extant methods are not robust to both forms of dependence. Contrary to claims in the literature, we find that the Z2 statistic and Newey-West corrected Fama-MacBeth standard errors do not correct for both cross-sectional and time-series dependence. We show that extant methods produce misspecified test statistics in common accounting research settings, and that correcting for both forms of dependence substantially alters inferences reported in the literature. Specifically, several findings in the implied cost of equity capital literature, the cost of debt literature, and the conservatism literature appear not to be robust to the use of well-specified test statistics.

ABSTRACT: Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (FAS No. 157), Fair Value Measurements, prioritizes the source of information used in fair value measurements into three levels: (1) Level 1 (observable inputs from quoted prices in active markets), (2) Level 2 (indirectly observable inputs from quoted prices of comparable items in active markets, identical items in inactive markets, or other market-related information), and (3) Level 3 (unobservable, firm-generated inputs). Using quarterly reports of banking firms in 2008, we find that the value relevance of Level 1 and Level 2 fair values is greater than the value relevance of Level 3 fair values. In addition, we find evidence that the value relevance of fair values (especially Level 3 fair values) is greater for firms with strong corporate governance. Overall, our results support the relevance of fair value measurements under FAS No. 157, but weaker corporate governance mechanisms may reduce the relevance of these measures.

ABSTRACT: The literature provides mixed evidence on whether investors find audit reports modified for going concern reasons to be useful. Using a substantially larger sample than previous studies, we observe negative excess returns when the going concern audit report (GCAR) is disclosed. We find that the reaction is more negative if the GCAR cites a problem with obtaining financing, suggesting that the GCAR provides new information to investors. Also, the reaction is more adverse if the GCAR triggers a technical violation of a debt covenant that restricts the firm from getting a GCAR. The evidence suggests that institutional investors drive the reaction to the GCAR, since there is no detectable reaction at low levels of institutional ownership. The market reaction gets more negative as the level of institutional ownership increases, and there is a decline in institutional ownership after the GCAR is issued. We attribute these results to sophisticated investors’ awareness of the firm’s financing needs and the covenants carried by the firm’s debt.

ABSTRACT: This study examines discretionary bonus payments by firms to senior-level executives. Interpreting discretionary bonuses as the result of implicit incentive contracts, I analyze an analytical model that includes a contractible and a non-contractible performance measure. The model yields the primary hypothesis that discretionary bonuses occur when the outcome of the contractible measure is either low or high, but not when the contractible outcome falls in the medium range. Based on a sample collected from public sources, I find empirical support for the notion that discretionary bonuses are paid based on non-contractible performance measures that are related to future financial performance. Moreover, discretionary bonus payments occur significantly more often when the contractible performance measure falls in the tails of the distribution. In contrast, I do not find support for the predictions that discretionary bonus payments are related to the manipulability of the contractible performance measures or that discretionary bonus payments are related to the power of the executives in the companies.