Knowledge that Transforms

We examine how cautionary disclaimers about forward-looking statements affect investor judgments both before making an investment and after having suffered an investment loss. In our first experiment, a cautionary disclaimer appears to effectively communicate to nonprofessional investors that forward-looking statements may not be reliable, but we find little evidence that the disclaimer alters the extent to which forward-looking statements influence nonprofessional investors' valuation judgments. In our second experiment, we shift our focus to ex post judgments and find that the disclaimer influences the extent to which investors feel wronged and entitled to compensation after an investment loss, consistent with investors attending to the disclaimer and acting as if it were, ex ante, effective. Notably, investors continue to feel more wronged and entitled to financial compensation when available evidence suggests that management knowingly issued false or misleading forward-looking statements—even if disclaimed. Together, these results provide support for recent judicial efforts to erode the sweeping safe harbor provisions currently granted to companies. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Recently, a system of audit firm rotation has been implemented for the audits of listed companies conducted in the European Union (EU). In the U.S., in contrast, the regulator decided against such rotation. Whereas proponents argue that rotation would strengthen independence and decrease audit market concentration, opponents stress the importance of auditors' learning effects, which would be eliminated by a change in auditors. In extending the market matching model of Salop (1979), we provide an analysis that integrates these contradictory views. We assume that both auditors' industry expertise and their experience in auditing a client decrease audit costs. We investigate the bidding strategies applied to re-acquire clients that were lost due to rotation, auditors' profit contributions, the equilibrium number of auditors (i.e., audit market concentration), and the economic importance of specific clients. Our findings indicate that the regulators' goals of simultaneously decreasing client importance and audit market concentration are in direct conflict and, therefore, the rotation system might have unintended consequences. Our model, thus, suggests how different institutional parameters give rise to economic forces that can support diverging decisions regarding the implementation of MAR.

We study the information content and determinants associated with voluntary management disclosures of going concern (GC) uncertainties by IPO issuers. In terms of information content, we examine IPO price revision and initial return and find robust support that management GC disclosures are associated with downward revisions in the IPO offer price and, upon considering the mediating effects of the price revision, also associated with lower initial returns. In terms of determinants, and after controlling for other factors (e.g., issuer distress, start-up status, size, cash burn), we find that the presence of a management GC disclosure is negatively associated with a proxy for issuer financial incentives to withhold “bad news” and positively associated with the extent of risk factors disclosure. Overall, our results provide support for the information content of voluntary management disclosures of GC uncertainties by IPO issuers, the presence of which is associated with agency and risk motivations.

Standard setters contend that fair value accounting yields the most relevant measurement for financial instruments. We examine this claim by comparing the value relevance of banks' financial statements under fair value accounting with that under current GAAP, which is largely based on historical costs. We find that the combined value relevance of book value of equity and income under fair value is less than that under GAAP. We also find that fair value income is less value-relevant than GAAP income because of the inclusion of transitory unrealized gains and losses in fair value income. More surprisingly, we find that book value of equity under fair value is not more value-relevant than under GAAP, due both to divergence between exit value and value-in-use and to measurement error in fair value estimates. Overall, our results suggest that financial statements under fair value accounting provide less relevant information for bank valuation than financial statements under current GAAP.

I study the effects of CEOs' unrealized capital gains tax liabilities (tax burdens) on corporate risk-taking. Recent work suggests that high tax burdens discourage CEOs from selling stock. I hypothesize that this causes the executives to become overexposed to firm-specific risk, thereby reducing their willingness to make risky corporate decisions. In a series of tests, I find that corporate risk-taking decreases as CEOs' personal tax burdens increase. Further, firms with CEOs who are more locked-in to their stock positions (i.e., CEOs with higher tax burdens) experience larger increases in risk-taking following federal and state tax cuts. When I investigate the mechanism behind this relation, I find that tax cuts trigger stock sales by the locked-in executives, allowing for improved diversification. Overall, my findings indicate that the personal tax burdens of CEOs affect the firm by reducing executives' preferences for risk at the corporate level.

Internal controls influence information quality, thus affecting the ability of supply chain partners, who rely on collaborative systems of information sharing, to reliably contract. Using SOX-related internal control assessments as a proxy for internal control quality and U.S. GAAP-mandated major customer disclosures, we find that supplier internal control quality influences supply chain relationship duration. Specifically, our evidence demonstrates that: (1) poor internal control quality increases the likelihood of subsequent customer-supplier relationship termination; (2) timely control weakness remediation attenuates termination likelihood; and (3) weaknesses affecting customer contracting drive the effect of internal control quality on relationship termination. Our results control for supplier operational quality and performance, and are robust to propensity score matching techniques, controls for reverse causality, and alternative proxies for relationship termination and internal control quality. Overall, our findings are consistent with customers viewing strong supplier controls as important, albeit overlooked, contracting elements with significant implications for supply chain relationships.

This study investigates the impact on auditors' and clients' activities of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections of individual engagements. I find that both auditors and clients react to a Part I Finding, which identifies audit deficiencies on their inspected engagements. Audit firm effort increases on inspected engagements and non-inspected engagements of offices or partners that receive a Part I Finding, suggesting direct, as well as spillover, effects of the PCAOB inspections. The client is also more likely to switch auditors. However, auditor effort and financial reporting quality subsequently decline for inspected engagements that did not receive a Part I Finding. In these cases, clients are less likely to switch auditors. Additional analyses show that the auditor reaction depends on whether the auditor is an industry specialist, the client reaction depends on the size of the auditor, and effects on financial reporting quality depend on whether the deficiency is a firm-wide issue. Overall, these results suggest that both audit firms and clients care about the PCAOB individual engagement inspection process and, in several instances, gravitate toward the level set by the Part I Finding bar.

Debt covenant violation alters firm dynamics, providing creditors with the right to demand repayment, and via that right, influence firm actions. We provide evidence consistent with creditors employing that channel to influence CEO compensation. Using regression discontinuity analysis, we show that in the year after a covenant violation, after controlling for other factors, CEO compensation is 8.5 percent lower and the CEO's compensation package contains fewer risk-taking incentives, as the vega associated with newly granted options is 26 percent lower. These changes are more pronounced when the creditor has greater influence, such as when the borrower and creditor have a prior lending relationship, the creditor is a highly reputable bank, or when the borrower is financially weaker. We also find that CEOs' risk-taking incentives decrease with the number of debt covenants; in particular, the number of performance debt covenants being breached.

Small accounting firms represent important participants in the audit market, yet details of how they operate and develop competencies remain unexplored. Small firms often join forces through accounting associations and networks (AANs), which may help them overcome significant challenges commonly faced by smaller firms. We interview 37 partners from 18 firms representing nine AANs to examine how small firms leverage their AAN membership and to understand the related implications for audit quality. Our findings indicate that small firms acquire needed resources and enhance their market legitimacy through AAN membership; however, the nature and extent to which they do so varies by AAN type. Importantly, we also find that the majority of respondents perceive AAN resources, especially access to expertise, as critical to their firms' audit quality. Our research, informed by a theoretical lens based on resource dependence and legitimacy, enriches existing auditing literature, provides a new perspective for member firms and regulators, and responds to recent calls to understand factors affecting accounting firms' competencies.

This paper investigates the predictive value of tangible long-lived asset impairments for changes in future operating cash flows under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. We find that impairments reported under IFRS are negatively associated with changes in future operating cash flows, whereas those under U.S. GAAP, on average, are not. We investigate whether differences in the predictive value are attributable to differences in recognition or measurement, providing evidence suggesting that impairment recognition under U.S. GAAP is delayed. Evidence also suggests that the value-in-use measurement attribute, allowed under IFRS, does not induce under-impairing as IFRS and U.S. GAAP impairments are similarly related to future impairments. The main result of a negative association under IFRS, but not U.S. GAAP, holds after considering future impairments to control for measurement differences, macro-economic factors, and firm reporting incentives. Further, impairment losses under IFRS are more predictive in high-enforcement countries. JEL Classifications: D78; F02; M16; M41; G38. Data Availability: Data used are available from sources identified in the paper.