Knowledge that Transforms

We study the joint effects of intercompany investing and reporting of equity method investments on the accuracy and dispersion of analysts' annual earnings-per-share (EPS) forecasts. We compare firm-year observations with and without equity method investments. We posit two non-mutually exclusive explanations for how equity method investments may affect analyst forecast properties. The Opacity Effect posits that the condensed equity method disclosures increase information asymmetry, increasing analysts' forecast errors and forecast dispersion. The Diversification Effect suggests that the diversification of the investor and its investee earnings streams enhances earnings predictability, decreasing analysts' forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Our findings are consistent with both effects operating in the analyst forecasting task. Additional analyses are consistent with the Opacity Effect dominating. This occurrence results, on net, in less accurate and more dispersed forecasts for firm-years with equity method investments.

We examine the impact of SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, on the reporting behavior of commercial banks and the informativeness of their financial statements. We argue that, because mandatory recognition of hedge ineffectiveness under SFAS 133 reduced banks' ability to smooth income through derivatives, banks that are more affected by SFAS 133 rely more on loan loss provisions to smooth income. We find evidence consistent with this argument. We also find that the increased reliance on loan loss provisions for smoothing income has impaired the informativeness of loan loss provisions for future loan defaults and bank stock returns. Data Availability: The data are available from public sources.

We investigate the degree to which including a clawback provision in executive compensation contracts is an effective governance mechanism by documenting the impact of clawback adoption on stock prices. We expect this ex post settling-up mechanism to be beneficial because it diminishes financial reporting risks. In support of our hypotheses, we find that the shareholders of adopting firms experience statistically significant positive stock-valuation consequences relative to propensity-score-matched control samples. Further, firms with previous financial restatements had the largest economic gains, suggesting that a clawback policy can be effective at curtailing incentives for earnings manipulation. Analysis of the bid-ask spread provides evidence that these provisions contribute to reducing financial reporting risk for restating firms, while non-restating firms experience no change in the spread. We find no evidence that clawback provisions entail costs in the form of higher CEO compensation following adoption nor do they influence the design of compensation contracts. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; G38; K12; K22. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Following the Civil Rights Movement and the “quiet revolution” in women's work over the years from 1950 to 1970, women and minorities increasingly joined the auditing profession while the profession ramped up efforts to encourage integration. The purpose of this study is to rigorously examine how the integration of auditors has evolved since the civil rights and quiet revolution period. The primary distinctive feature of this study is that it evaluates the auditing profession's integration by comparing it to samples of occupations similar to auditing for the purpose of isolating auditing-specific forces influencing integration. I find that the pay structure in auditing is unusually equal, consistent with “equal pay for equal work.” The results for women, Hispanics, and miscellaneous minorities are consistent with members of these groups responding as one might expect to equal pay in auditing: groups that are poorly paid in other occupations select into auditing at higher rates, and groups that are well paid in other occupations select out of auditing at higher rates. The results for blacks are anomalous in that their pay in auditing has been good relative to many comparable occupations, but they have nevertheless been poorly represented in auditing. There are a number of theories that could potentially explain why blacks may be anomalously underrepresented in auditing. To begin to test them, I perform an exploratory analysis of the representation of women and minorities among college freshmen, college graduates, and young auditors. The results suggest that accounting is a popular degree among black college freshmen and that a relatively high percentage of accounting graduates are black. However, although they are well represented in the pool of potential new auditors, black accounting graduates enter the auditing profession at very low rates relative to other occupations requiring levels of education similar to auditing. The results suggest that black underrepresentation in auditing is not due to a lack of awareness among, or role models for, young blacks. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available in the IPUMS-CPS database, which is compiled and distributed by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota; the National Survey of College Graduates, which is available from the National Science Foundation; and the Freshmen Survey of the Higher Education Research Institute, which is available to registered users of its website.

We find that the likelihood of forced turnover in the CEO and CFO positions is significantly higher for firms in the aftermath of option backdating than in propensity-score matched control firms. Forced turnover occurs in about 36 percent of the accused firms. The forced turnover rates for CEOs and CFOs are similar and several times higher than normal. The displaced managers are further punished by the managerial labor market, as they are much less likely than control firm managers to be rehired at comparable positions. We also find that backdating firms restructure CEO compensation to rely less on stock options. Finally, we learn the higher turnover extends to the General Counsel. While boards are often viewed as unresponsive to criticisms involving executive compensation, they did respond quite decisively to option backdating allegations and the accompanying adverse publicity. Data Availability: All data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated.

Policy makers and corporations have recently emphasized a code of ethics as an effective aspect of corporate governance. The corporate governance literature in accounting, however, provides little empirical or theoretical support for this emphasis. We address this gap between public policy and the literature by studying the effectiveness of a code of ethics in an experimental setting. Using Bicchieri's (2006) model of social norm activation, we predict that a code of ethics will improve manager return behavior and investor confidence to the extent that it activates social norms that control opportunistic behavior. Further, we predict that adding a certification choice whereby the manager can publicly certify that he will adhere to the code will enhance the potential for the code of ethics to activate such norms. We find that a code of ethics only improves manager return behavior and investor confidence when the code incorporates a public certification choice by the manager. When the code is present but there is no certification choice, manager return behavior does not improve and investor confidence erodes over time because of increased expectations that are not met by managers. An analysis of individual return decisions and exit questionnaire responses supports the activation of social norms as the underlying mechanism behind our results. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors upon request.

Despite a large literature on discretionary accruals, how the use of discretionary accruals impacts corporate financial decisions is not well understood. We hypothesize that a financially constrained firm with valuable projects can use discretionary accruals to credibly signal positive prospects, enabling it to raise capital to make the investments. We examine a large panel of firms during 1987 to 2009 and find that financially constrained firms with good investment opportunities have significantly higher discretionary accruals prior to investment compared to their unconstrained counterparts. Constrained high-accrual firms have higher earnings-announcement returns than constrained low-accrual firms, obtain more equity and debt financing, and invest in projects that appear to improve performance. These results provide supporting evidence that the use of discretionary accruals can help constrained firms with valuable projects ease those constraints and increase firm value. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

We identify two research design issues that explain the inconsistency between the theoretically predicted negative relation between audit effort and misstatements (measured using restatements) and empirical findings. First, auditor risk adjustment behavior induces an upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. Second, the theoretical prediction applies only to audited financial reports (i.e., annual reports) and not to unaudited reports (i.e., interim quarterly reports). Comingling restatements of audited with unaudited reports introduces an additional upward bias in the association between audit effort and restatements. After correcting for these two sources of bias, we find a robust negative association between audit effort and annual report restatements. JEL Classification: M49. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources.

This study demonstrates that stocks with low book-to-market ratios, also known as glamour stocks, have significantly more positive skewness in their return distributions compared to the return distributions of value stocks with high book-to-market ratios. The premium (discount) investors apply to these glamour (value) stocks also correlates significantly with the difference in return skewness. These findings suggest that the value/glamour-stock puzzle is partially explained by investor preference for positive skewness in stock returns. Such preference for skewness, which is consistent with investors having inverse S-shaped utility functions, is observed in such consumer behaviors as lottery purchases and gambling. This paper further documents significant predictive power of accounting-based measures, such as the book rate of return, with respect to the skewness of stock returns. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

We provide evidence that disclosed items are not processed differently from recognized items when the disclosures are salient, not based on management estimates, and amenable to simple techniques for imputing as-if recognized amounts. For a sample of firms with both capital and operating leases, we find that as-if recognized amounts for leases are generally reliable and that both recognized lease obligations and disclosed lease obligations are associated with proxies for costs of debt and equity. The magnitudes of these associations are not statistically different across accounting treatments, suggesting that market participants impound as-if recognized operating lease obligations and recognized capital lease obligations similarly into costs of capital. Conditioning on the reliability of as-if recognized operating lease obligations, we find a difference in the association between recognized versus as-if recognized lease obligations and proxies for the costs of debt and equity when the operating lease disclosures are less reliable. Data Availability: Data used are available from public sources identified in the study.