Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines the impact of the California Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 on CEO compensation costs in affected organizations. Contrary to the stated objective of the Act that executive compensation is “just and reasonable,” we find that CEO compensation costs for affected nonprofits during the post-regulation periods have increased by about 6.3 percent when compared with a control group of comparable unaffected nonprofits. In addition, the relative increase in CEO compensation appears to come from nonprofits that have experienced greater regulatory cost increases. We do not find evidence that the Act resulted in a change in CEO pay performance sensitivity. The observed CEO pay increase is not systematically different across nonprofits that underpaid versus those that overpaid their CEOs during pre-Act periods. Overall, this paper highlights the unintended consequences of regulatory attempts to enhance governance in the not-for-profit sector.

We posit that a change in analyst interest in a firm is an early indicator of the firm's future fundamentals, capital market activities, and stock returns. We measure increases in analyst interest by obser.ving analysts who do not cover a firm but participate in that firm's earnings conference call, and we measure decreases in analyst interest by observing analysts who cover a firm, yet are absent from that firm's call. We find that increases in analyst interest are positively associated with future changes in firm fundamentals and capital market activities, while decreases in analyst interest are negatively associated with capital market activities. We also find that increases (decreases) in analyst interest are positively (negatively) correlated with future stock returns over the next three months and that a hedge portfolio yields a significant abnormal return. Overall, our study shows that analyst interest is a novel and early indicator of future firm fundamentals and capital market consequences.

We investigate a potential selection benefit of stock-based compensation for rank-and-file employees, whose pay under this compensation form is insensitive to their individual efforts. We use a laboratory experiment to demonstrate that individuals with higher levels of dispositional optimism are more likely to choose compensation that is contingent on a company's future stock price than to choose fixed pay, even after controlling for the individual's risk preferences. Furthermore, compared to participants selecting fixed pay, those selecting stock-based compensation also perform better on a challenging problem-solving task, a result that we show is due to their higher levels of dispositional optimism. Collectively, we demonstrate that stock-based compensation can have productivity-enhancing effects, even if stock prices are completely insensitive to individual efforts. In doing so, we provide a partial explanation for the puzzling prevalence of stock-based compensation plans at the rank-and-file level and contribute to the broader contract-selection literature.

Barton (2001) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) show that earnings management through discretionary accruals and derivative hedging are partial substitutes in smoothing earnings before 1999. In this study, we investigate whether Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 133 regarding hedge accounting in 2000 has influenced the relative merit of the two earnings-smoothing methods. Based on a sample of S&P 500 nonfinancial firms during 1996–2006, we find that the substitution relation between derivative hedging and discretionary accrual is significantly attenuated after FAS 133 implementation. We also document a significant increase in earnings volatility associated with derivative hedging post-FAS 133. These results are robust to the use of various model and method specifications, as well as controlling for contemporaneous macroeconomic and regulatory shocks. Overall, our results suggest that a material change in an accounting rule regarding derivatives can influence the level and volatility of reported earnings, as well as the method of income smoothing.

Previous studies indicate that auditors are able to identify fraud risk factors, but may not be able to translate this knowledge into an audit plan that effectively takes these factors into account to increase the likelihood of detecting fraud. Fraud specialists may be able to compensate for such limitations. This study investigates the relative merits of involving fraud specialists in assisting auditors by developing an audit plan that would effectively address fraud risk in a revenue cycle. Results show that fraud specialists did not differ from auditors in the number of procedures selected from a standard audit program; nor were these procedures cumulatively more effective than those selected by auditors. Fraud specialists generated a greater number of non-standard additional audit procedures, and those procedures were marginally more effective, but less efficient, than those of auditors, except for certain groups of procedures. Finally, although the fraud specialists proposed significantly more additional (non-standard) procedures than auditors, their proposed budget increase for this category of procedures was significantly smaller than the budget increase proposed by auditors. Adjustments to the overall time budget did not differ between fraud specialists and auditors. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

This study examines the audit pricing effects when auditors specialize in industries conducive to transferable audit processes. Our results indicate that industry specialists charge incrementally lower fees in industries with homogenous operations, and particularly in industries with both homogenous operations and complex accounting practices. Moreover, we discover that audit quality is no lower for clients audited by these specialists offering fee discounts, consistent with a conclusion that the reduction in fees indicates cost efficiencies rather than lower-quality audits. Further analysis indicates that the shared economies of scale only occur in a subsample of client firms with relatively high bargaining power. When considered in conjunction with prior research using a survivorship approach, our study provides evidence that certain industries lend themselves to specialization because auditors generate cost-based competitive advantages without compromising service quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2008) find experimental evidence that manipulating whether the budget request of the subordinate requires a factual assertion has no effect on budgetary slack when the superior can reject the budget. This calls into question the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Using Rankin et al.'s (2008) manipulation to capture honesty effects, we examine the robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we document that honesty has a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of distributional fairness is reduced by withholding the relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. In Experiment 2, we document that honesty continues to have a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of reciprocity is increased by giving the superior the ability to set the subordinate's salary. Thus, our evidence suggests that honesty effects on budget proposals are generally robust to giving the superior rejection authority. Our study helps explain prior experimental results and clarifies the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors upon request.

In recent years, regulators have considered several initiatives to lower the threshold for disclosing risks to investors. We examine two ways in which disclosing more risks can actually lower investors' perceptions of risk. Utilizing an experiment, we find evidence of two unintended consequences on different types of investors. First, we demonstrate that the addition of low-probability risks to a disclosure can dilute (rather than add to) more probable losses, leading certain investors to lower their perceptions of overall risk. Second, since lowering the threshold changes the overall composition of the disclosure by adding low-probability losses, firms could adopt a tactic of minimization that characterizes the entire disclosure as unimportant, presenting the lowest risks most saliently, using compliance with the low threshold as a plausible reason for giving a lengthy disclosure of generally unimportant risks. Our findings suggest that such a tactic can be persuasive. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

This study examines the antecedents and consequences of analysts choosing to become supply chain analysts (i.e., analysts following both a supplier and its major customer). We find that information complementarities between firms in the same supply chain, between a supplier firm and its industry peer firms, and between the supplier's major customer and other firms in analysts' portfolio affect their supply chain specialization decision. The potential revenues supplier firms generate for analysts' brokerage houses also significantly affect this decision. While supply chain analysts achieve superior forecast performance compared to non-supply chain analysts for supplier firms, they provide lower-quality forecasts for other firms in their portfolios. These findings suggest that analysts allocate resources strategically. Our results are robust to techniques designed to address the potential endogeneity of analysts' supply chain portfolio choices.

We examine the impact of social capital on audit fees. We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with high social capital pay lower audit fees. Social capital measures the level of mutual trust in a region. Our results suggest that auditors judge the trustworthiness of their clients based on where the firm is headquartered and charge a premium when they trust the firm less. The basis of our results is the examination of more than 28,000 audit fees for more than 5,000 firms spanning the period of 2000 to 2009. The results are robust to controlling for a large number of firm-level and county-level characteristics.