Knowledge that Transforms

Using a hand-collected dataset for takeovers from 1996 to 2013, I examine why some target firms obtain a second fairness opinion and the associated wealth effects of doing so. I find that multiple opinions are more likely to be used in deals in which management/investment bank conflicts of interest are high—e.g., buyouts and stapled financing deals. In addition, the use of a second opinion has a significantly positive impact on target shareholders' wealth in these two types of deals. Fairness opinion valuation predominantly relies on accounting data, and the benefit of seeking a second opinion increases with a firm's earnings quality. Collectively, the results suggest that a second opinion is used to facilitate transactions.

This study examines how cross-firm differences in financial reporting practices affect how peer-firm accounting information is used to evaluate CEO performance. I propose that efficient relative evaluation using accounting performance requires peer firms to have comparable financial reporting systems, allowing boards to reduce the information processing costs associated with differences in firms' financial reporting practices. Supporting this view, when peer selection takes financial reporting comparability into account, I find evidence that the earnings of peer firms with high financial reporting comparability serve as a performance benchmark for determining CEOs' cash compensation. My paper empirically corroborates the substantial anecdotal evidence of the use of peer firms' accounting performance as a significant element in boards' evaluation of CEO performance.

This paper examines the effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on companies' financing and investing decisions. Difference-in-differences regression estimates suggest that companies respond to their auditor receiving a “deficiency-free” inspection report by issuing additional external capital amounting to 1.4 percent of assets and increasing investment by 0.5 percent of assets. These effects are larger for (1) financially constrained companies and (2) companies located in countries where there is no regulator or the regulator does not conduct inspections. Further, the effect on financing decisions is stronger in countries with (1) low corruption, (2) strong rule of law, and (3) high regulatory quality. Descriptive evidence suggests that inspections increase the use of financial covenants in debt contracts, which is likely one of the mechanisms through which inspections generate real effects. This paper documents the value of PCAOB inspections in mitigating financing frictions for non-U.S. companies. JEL Classifications: D8; D25; G15; G31; G38; M4; M41; M42. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

I develop measures of firm-level pay disparity and examine their relation to firm performance. Using comprehensive compensation data for a large sample of firms, I find no statistically significant relation between the ratio of CEO-to-mean employee compensation and performance. I next create empirical models that allow me to separate the components of CEO and employee compensation explained by economic factors from those that are not, and use these models to estimate explained and unexplained pay disparity. After validating my estimate of unexplained pay disparity as a proxy for pay fairness, I find robust evidence of a negative (positive) relation between unexplained (explained) pay disparity and future firm performance.

We examine how changing the allocation of hiring decision rights in a multiunit organization affects employee-firm match quality, contingent on a unit's circumstances. Our research site, a U.S. retail chain, switched from a decentralized hiring model (hiring by business unit managers—in our case, store managers) to centralized hiring (in this study, by the head office). While centralized hiring can ensure that enough resources are invested in hiring people aligned with company values, it can also neglect the unit managers' local knowledge. Using difference-in-differences analyses, we find that the switch is associated with relatively higher employee departure rates and, thus, poorer matches if the business unit manager has a local advantage; that is, if the store serves repeat customers, serves a demographically atypical market, or poses higher information-gathering costs for headquarters. In these cases, the unit manager may be more informed than headquarters about which candidates best match local conditions. Data Availability: The analyses presented in this study are based on data shared by a U.S. retail company. The data are confidential, according to a nondisclosure agreement between the company and the authors.

We examine how information dissemination via mobile device applications (apps) affects nonprofessional investors' judgments. In response to the prevalence of mobile device use, the media ungroups content into smaller pieces to accommodate users, and apps use push notifications to highlight this content. These changes increase users' ability to access investment information in real time, leaving some investors feeling as if they are missing out if they are not continuously connected. We validate a scale to capture investors' fear of missing out on investment information (I-FoMO) and document that I-FoMO is distinct from traditional FoMO that occurs in social settings. Then, using an experiment, we find that receiving ungrouped content via a mobile device has a greater effect on investment allocations in the presence, rather than absence, of push notifications. Further, we find that these results hold for higher, but not for lower, I-FoMO investors. JEL Classifications: G23; M41; M48; M49. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

Using the shadow insurance setting, we study the interplay between tax and nontax incentives in income shifting. Shadow insurance involves intercompany transactions designed to help firms meet regulatory capital requirements. However, prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA), foreign-owned life insurance firms could save taxes by using shadow insurance to shift U.S. profits to tax havens. Consistent with expectations, we find that while nontax incentives appear to be the dominant factor behind firms' use of shadow insurance, tax considerations also played a role for certain firms. We also find that shadow insurance is associated with lower liquid asset holdings and increased credit risk. Overall, our results suggest that taxes were an important incentive for foreign-owned life insurance firms to use shadow insurance pre-TCJA. Moreover, in this setting, nontax considerations appeared to have motivated U.S.-owned firms' use of tax havens.

Sell-side analysts employ different benchmarks when defining their recommendations. A buy for some brokers means the stock is expected to outperform its industry, while for other brokers, it means the stock is expected to outperform the market or some return threshold. We show that these stated benchmarks have implications for the distribution of recommendations, price reactions to recommendations, and the investment value of recommendations. We conclude that, depending on the question, academics may need to account for the benchmarks when studying analysts' outputs, and investors may find the benchmarks beneficial in interpreting analysts' advice.

We conduct an experiment to investigate the differential effect of recognizing versus disclosing reasonable and supportable forecasts of future loss conditions on investors' valuation assessments when economic fundamentals either deteriorate or improve. Our main finding is that when entities enjoy growth at constant risk, the accelerated recognition of future loss conditions can induce valuation assessments that are opposed to the entity's enhanced valuation. Supplementary analyses reveal that investors misattribute (some) expected losses to the entity's past performance and rely on unadjusted current summary earnings to assess the entity's prospects. Our findings provide insight into the cognitive processes that lead investors to incorrectly assess earnings trends and inform regulators, standard setters, investors, and preparers that the accelerated recognition of relevant and unbiased forward-looking loss estimates can impair the decision-usefulness of financial statements.

Prior research documents large, persistent productivity dispersion even within narrowly defined industries, suggesting the presence of frictions that impede the efficient allocation of resources. In this paper, we consider the role of information frictions. We posit that high-quality financial reporting with respect to firm productivity can mitigate information frictions and hence facilitate the efficient allocation of resources across firms. Using a large sample of firms in the manufacturing sector, we find evidence consistent with our prediction—industries with higher productivity informativeness tend to have smaller within-industry productivity dispersion. We further find that this relation is stronger in industries with greater dependence on external financing, suggesting that reporting quality affects allocation efficiency, at least in part, through the capital market channel. These findings suggest that the extent to which financial reporting is informative about productivity can affect resource allocation efficiency and hence have real effects at the macro level.