Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance. Specifically, I investigate, via an experiment, the effect of relative performance information (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based). Given the presence of relative performance information, I examine the effect of the type of relative performance information (private or public) on performance. Using theory from psychology, I predict and find that relative performance information positively affects performance under the two compensation contracts and that this positive effect is greater under an individual performance-based contract than under a flat-wage contract. I also predict and find that, although both public and private relative performance information have a positive effect on performance, the effect is greater when relative performance information is public. Data Availability: Data are available from the author on request.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether politically sensitive contractors pay higher taxes and whether their bargaining power reduces these tax costs. Using federal contractor data, we develop a new composite measure of political sensitivity that captures both the political visibility arising from federal contracts and the importance of federal contracts to the firm. We proxy for bargaining power using the firm-level proportion of contract revenues not subject to competition, the firm-level proportion of contract revenues arising from defense contracts, and industry-level concentration ratios. We find that politically sensitive firms pay higher federal taxes, all else equal. However, firms with greater bargaining power incur fewer tax-related political costs. Our study provides new evidence on the political cost hypothesis in a tax setting and the first evidence of the interactive effects of a firm's political sensitivity and bargaining power on tax-related political costs. JEL Classifications: M41; H26

ABSTRACT We examine the commitment effect provided by mandatory disclosure and the information effect of voluntary disclosure on market illiquidity by exploring a regulatory change that allows smaller reporting companies to reduce the disclosure of certain information in their SEC filings. This regime change allows us to separate the commitment effect provided by mandatory disclosure from the information effect of voluntary disclosure. We find that firms that are eligible to reduce their disclosure, but voluntarily maintain their disclosure level, experience an increase in market illiquidity. We also find that the increase in illiquidity is more pronounced for firms with higher agency costs. These findings suggest that mandatory disclosure serves as a credible commitment mechanism and that losing such commitment by disclosure deregulation is costly in the absence of a loss of information. Our study suggests that while voluntary disclosure is effective in reducing information asymmetry, it cannot replace mandatory disclosure in addressing information problems. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

ABSTRACT: We examine how taxes affect donations given to nonprofit organizations and how this varies across nonprofit types. Most prior studies constrained tax price elasticities to be constant across nonprofits, primarily because the data do not provide donations by nonprofit type. Using nonprofit-level data and average marginal tax rates that vary across years and states, we estimate tax price elasticities by nonprofit type. We find an aggregate public charity elasticity of approximately −1.0 and a private foundation elasticity of approximately −2.0. These results suggest that the cost of the charitable contribution deduction is roughly proportional to its benefit for public charities, but that the deduction stimulates significant giving for private foundations. When we partition our elasticities across 24 public charity types, we find significant elasticities of −1.0 or larger for six types. This result suggests that the effect of the charitable contribution deduction varies significantly across nonprofit types. JEL Classifications: H2; H4; H7; L3; K34 Data Availability: The data are available from public sources identified in this study.

ABSTRACT: I examine whether firms alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards that mandate new financial statement disclosures. While prior research suggests that new recognition rules lead to changes in firm behavior, there is limited evidence that disclosure rules can impact firm behavior. This study helps to fill this void in the literature by examining the economic consequences of the mandated disclosures of pension asset composition required under SFAS 132R. Under pension accounting rules, the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return (ERR) on pension assets. I find that when firms disclose asset composition for the first time under SFAS 132R, firms that were previously using upward-biased ERRs respond by increasing asset allocation to high-risk securities and/or reducing the ERR assumption. While disclosure requirements arguably create less powerful incentives to alter firm decisions than recognition requirements, these findings offer evidence that firms alter behavior in response to disclosure standards. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.

ABSTRACT Using seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 1989 to 2008, we examine the role of accounting conservatism in the equity market. We find that issuers with a greater degree of conservatism experience fewer negative market reactions to SEO announcements. We further show that an important mechanism through which conservatism affects SEO announcement returns is by mitigating the negative impact of information asymmetry. Additional analyses suggest that our results are not driven by the effects of other forms of corporate governance. We also find evidence that conservative issuers continue to use conservative accounting after the equity offerings. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the argument that accounting conservatism reduces financing costs in SEOs. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.