Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the effects of increased competition stemming from corporate tax rate cuts in foreign competitors' home countries on U.S. domestic manufacturing firms. We develop a measure of U.S. domestic firms' exposure to changes in foreign country tax rates and validate that the measure captures increased competition in the U.S. We find that, on average, U.S. domestic firms lose market power following declines in foreign country tax rates. We also find that, on average, U.S. domestic firms respond by increasing investment in research and development and capital expenditures and by improving total factor productivity. In cross-sectional analyses, we find the impact of foreign tax cuts is concentrated among U.S. domestic firms with low ex ante product differentiation. Taken together, these findings suggest that foreign country tax cuts escalate the competitive threat faced by U.S. domestic firms, and in response, U.S. domestic firms alter their investment strategies and/or become more productive.

I investigate how auditors integrate information technology (IT) specialist input into internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) issue classifications. Given the ill-structured nature of evaluating ICFR issues and the impact of these issues on audit quality, combining knowledge from different perspectives is likely beneficial. Drawing on social identity theory, I predict and find that a weaker one-team identity between auditors and IT specialists yields benefits. Auditors with a weaker versus stronger team identity place more weight on IT specialist input for IT-related issues and differentially weight higher and lower quality input for non-IT issues. I also find that more severe ICFR issues drive the predicted results. My study provides insight into how team identity influences auditor integration of input from specialists. The implications of my study are of interest to researchers, regulators, and practitioners, especially as recent firm initiatives encourage a one-team view for auditors and IT specialists.

Using a global sample of multinational corporations (MNCs) and their foreign subsidiaries, we find that repatriation taxes impair subsidiary-level investment efficiency. Consistent with internal agency conflicts between the central management of the MNC and the manager of the foreign subsidiary being the driver, we show that this effect is concentrated in subsidiaries with high information asymmetry and in subsidiaries that are weakly monitored. Quasi-natural experiments in the U.K. and Japan establish a causal relationship for our findings and suggest that a repeal of repatriation taxes increases subsidiary-level investment efficiency while reducing the level of investment. Our paper provides timely empirical evidence to inform expectations for the effects of a recent change to the U.S. international tax law that eliminated repatriation taxes from most of the future foreign earnings of U.S. MNCs. JEL Classifications: H21; H25; F23; G31. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We examine how product market competition affects the disclosure of innovation. Theory posits that product market competition can cause firms to increase their disclosure of innovation to deter product market competitors. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that patent applicants in more competitive industries voluntarily accelerate their patent disclosures, which are credibly disclosed via the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Our inferences are robust to using changes in industry-level import tariffs as sources of plausibly exogenous variation in product market competition in difference-in-differences designs. Consistent with patent disclosure deterring product market competitors, we find that timelier patent disclosures are more strongly associated with declines in the similarity of competitors' products than are less timely patent disclosures. In total, our results suggest that product market competition increases patent disclosure timeliness, which is consistent with firms using the disclosure of innovation to deter product market competition.

We show that a firm's one-year-ahead capital investments and inventory increase (decrease) when peer firms' Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) narratives become more optimistic (pessimistic). This finding is driven by firms that access peer firms' 10-K filings within seven days of their filing date, and remains after controlling for other determinants of a firm's investments as well as economic connections between the firm and peer firms. Moreover, a firm's investment response varies based on content in peer firms' MD&A narratives. For instance, a firm makes more (less) capital investments when peer firms become more optimistic in their narratives that discuss the industry and investments (competition). Our findings provide broad insights on the information content and proprietary costs of MD&A disclosures. Data Availability: All non-textual data are available from sources identified in the text. Textual data generated by this study are available upon request.

I use the announcement of a market liberalization pilot program in China as a shock to firms' disclosure environment and examine how Chinese firms, foreign investors, and foreign brokers respond. Using a proprietary dataset, I find that affected firms respond to the announcement by significantly increasing the number of selective private meetings hosted by major foreign brokers, but do not use public disclosure channels. I find this increase in private disclosure to be stronger among firms that had strong public disclosure track records and are in need of capital. Firms that increased private disclosure experience improvements in speed of price discovery and liquidity. In addition, they also experience an increase in foreign holdings and raise capital abroad through foreign brokers after the pilot program's implementation. Overall, this paper takes a yet-to-mature economy, presents evidence on dynamic shaping of disclosure, and highlights private disclosure as an important positive channel of communication.

Our study is motivated by the theory of credence goods in the auditing setting. We propose that audit committee accounting expertise should reduce information asymmetries between the auditor and the client, thereby limiting auditors' ability to over-audit and under-audit. Consistent with this notion, our results indicate that when audit committees have accounting expertise, clients (1) pay lower fees when changes in standards decrease required audit effort; (2) pay a smaller fee premium in the presence of remediated material weaknesses; and (3) have a reduced likelihood of restatement when audit market competition is high. Our findings in the under-auditing setting generally are strongest among non-Big 4 engagements, consistent with non-Big 4 auditors being less sensitive to market-wide disciplining mechanisms such as reputation, legal liability, and professional regulation. We also provide evidence that the nature of audit committee members' accounting expertise differentially impacts the committee's ability to curtail over- and under-auditing.

We examine whether social media criticisms posted by small investors can predict subsequent firm acquisition decisions. Specifically, we use textual analysis to examine the internet stock message board postings of 303 value-reducing acquisition attempts. Our empirical evidence shows that small investors' negative postings are able to predict a potential acquirer's subsequent decision to withdraw its attempt. We further find that this predictive ability increases with the information quality of postings, and that the predictive information extracted from social media is incremental to that captured by proposal announcement returns, conventional media coverage, analyst reports, and institutional investors' responses related to the proposed acquisition. Finally, we show that message board criticisms are also able to predict governance outcomes beyond acquisition decisions. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that social media play a role in corporate governance by gathering crowd wisdom and uncovering additional value-relevant information.

Public information that becomes available after a manager's initial voluntary disclosure decision creates incentives for her to reconsider and possibly change that decision. We show that if she has private information that is value-relevant or that impacts the firm's ability to compete in its product market, the option to revise an initial disclosure decision in the face of a public release of information alters both the initial decision and the overall frequency of disclosure. These effects are amplified if she believes that public information arrival is more likely or if the firm's value is more sensitive to it. We also show that an increase in the initial disclosure cost reduces the probability of an initial disclosure and increases the probability of a subsequent disclosure. These effects are reversed if the cost of a subsequent disclosure increases.

This study develops and applies a model-implied measure of information imprecision. We define information imprecision as the degree of noise in investors' prior beliefs about the firm's asset value based on the information set that is currently available. We present a model of credit default swap (CDS) spreads in which the term structure is a function of information imprecision. We exploit observable CDS spreads with short and long maturities to extract an empirical measure of information imprecision. We then examine the moderating role of our measure in two settings. First, we show that the equity market response to credit rating changes increases in the level of information imprecision before the announcement. Second, we show that bond-market professionals' ability to charge a premium to smaller investors, relative to larger investors, increases in the issuing firm's information imprecision. This evidence illustrates the broad applicability of our model-implied measure of information imprecision.