Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 130 requires companies to report comprehensive income in a primary financial statement, but allows its presentation in either a statement of comprehensive income or a statement of stockholders' equity (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] 1997). In an experiment, we examine whether and how alternative presentation formats affect nonprofessional investors' processing of comprehensive-income information, specifically, information disclosing the volatility of unrealized gains on available-for-sale marketable securities. The results show that nonprofessional investors' judgments of corporate and management performance reflect the volatility of comprehensive income only when it is presented in a statement of comprehensive income. We provide evidence consistent with our psychology-based framework that these findings occur because format affects how nonprofessional investors weight comprehensive-income information and not whether they acquire this information or how they evaluate it.

Despite the common use of negotiations to set budgets in practice, accounting research has focused primarily on budgets set unilaterally by subordinates, while goal-setting research in management has focused primarily on budgets set unilaterally by superiors. In addition, budgeting research in accounting has focused almost exclusively on the planning aspects of budgets to the exclusion of their motivational aspects. This study complements prior research in two ways. First, the study examines how budgets and the economic consequences of the budget-setting process differ when budgets are set through a negotiation process vs. when set unilaterally. The study also considers factors associated with negotiation agreement and the relation between agreement and the economic consequences of negotiated budgets. Second, the economic consequences examined are budgetary slack and subordinate performance, allowing us to address the trade-offs between the planning and motivational aspects of budgets. Negotiated budgets differ from unilaterally set budgets in a manner consistent with social norms and/or information transfer occurring during negotiations. Both the budgets and the economic consequences of the budgetsetting process differ when budgets are set through a negotiation process where superiors have final authority in the event of a negotiation impasse vs. when set unilaterally by superiors. Further, negotiation agreement significantly affects the economic consequences of negotiated budgets. Budgets set through a negotiation process ending in agreement contain significantly less slack. A failed negotiation followed by superiors imposing a budget has a significant detrimental effect on subordinate performance.

This study uses an analytical model to investigate the value of the firm when there are temporary differences between when revenue and expense items are recognized for tax- and financial-reporting purposes. The model shows that deferred tax assets and liabilities transform book values of underlying liabilities and assets into estimates of the after-tax cash flows on which the firm's market value is based. The analysis shows that if tax deductions are taken on a cash basis, and if the underlying assets and liabilities are recorded at the present value of their associated future cash flows, then the value of deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities is their recorded amount, regardless of when the asset will be realized or when the liability will reverse. If tax deductions are not taken when the expenditure is made (e.g., depreciation) or if underlying assets and liabilities are recorded at more than the present value of their associated future cash flows (e.g., warranty liabilities), then the market value of deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities is less than their recorded values. The value of the deferred tax account is independent of when that account will reverse.