Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation CHRISTINE A. BOTOSAN; Developments in New Reporting Models,. The Accounting Review 1 November 2010; 85 (6): 2169–2171. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.00000004 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

Examining corporate investment in low-income housing tax credits reveals that firms are willing to incur costs in order to manage the income statement classification of an expense. Accounting rules allow investors who purchase a tax benefit guarantee to amortize their equity in a real estate partnership as a tax expense, rather than as an operating expense, thus avoiding a reduction in pre-tax earnings. Using confidential data from tax credit syndicators, I model the market price of a tax credit as a function of the existence of the guarantee, controlling for foreclosure risk on the underlying real estate. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that an economically significant amount of the guarantee fee is paid by corporate investors for the right to use an accounting method that avoids reductions in pre-tax earnings.

We investigate how shareholder taxes and risk preferences affect both a stock’s expected return, which reflects the capitalization of the dividend tax penalty into stock price, and the fraction of a firm’s stock held by tax-exempt investors. Our model demonstrates that the dividend tax capitalization effect reflects the weighted average tax rate of all investors, where the weighting depends on investors’ risk tolerances. This weighted average tax rate is not affected by the fraction of stock held by tax-exempt investors; however, tax-exempt investor ownership can be correlated with the weighted average tax rate if differences in tax-exempt investor ownership for different stocks reflect differences in investor risk tolerances for those stocks. Our empirical tests are consistent with the model’s predictions, and provide an equilibrium framework for interpreting prior empirical studies in accounting.

FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (FASB 2006), requires firms to disclose tax reserves and to record changes in tax reserves at adoption of FIN No. 48 as cumulative effect adjustments in stockholders’ equity. We predict that between the enactment and adoption of FIN No. 48, relative to historical levels, firms settle disputes more often to potentially decrease visibility to the IRS and release reserves more often to reduce scrutiny and increase earnings (as opposed to retained earnings). We analyze 2005 and 2006 10-Qs and 10-Ks for the 100 largest nonfinancial, nonutility firms followed by analysts. Between enactment and adoption of FIN No. 48, relative to historical levels, firms report more settlements with tax authorities and release reserves more frequently. In addition, firms with higher IRS deficiencies are more likely to settle disputes. Between enactment and adoption of FIN No. 48, firms increased earnings by releasing $4.4 billion of tax reserves, nearly equaling the $4.5 billion released at adoption.

Short-term debt and credit ratings have benefits for financial reporting quality that may be associated with lower audit fees. Using U.S. data for 2003 through 2006, we find that short-term debt is negatively related to audit fees for firms rated by Standard & Poor’s, consistent with more monitoring and better governance mechanisms in firms with higher short-term debt. Credit ratings quality is negatively related to audit fees, consistent with ratings quality reflecting a firm’s liquidity risk, governance mechanisms, and monitoring from rating agencies. We also find that the negative relation between short-term debt and audit fees is stronger for firms with low-quality credit ratings, consistent with auditors pricing lender monitoring.

Recent articles have demonstrated that increased public disclosure can decrease firms’ cost of capital. The focus has been on the impact of information on the cost of capital subsequent to the release of the information (the ex post cost of capital). We show that the reduction in the ex post cost of capital is offset by an equal increase in the cost of capital for the period leading up to the release of the information (the preposterior cost of capital). Thus, within the class of models framing the recent discussion, there is no impact on the ex ante cost of capital covering the full time span of the firm. The extent to which information is made publicly or privately available affects the timing of the resolution of uncertainty and when the information is reflected in equilibrium prices, but there is no impact on initial equilibrium prices. Within a noisy rational expectations equilibrium, rational investors may actually benefit from a higher ex post cost of capital.

This study focuses on the persistence and market value implications of a subset of nonrecurring charges that are atypical due to repeated occurrence. The increased recurrence of supposedly nonrecurring items perhaps reflects managerial shifting of (more permanent) ordinary expenses to a transitory category or, alternatively, may reflect an environment where these items naturally occur more frequently. Either scenario suggests that these repetitive charges have future earnings implications dramatically different from truly nonrecurring events and should therefore be valued more like a recurring component of earnings. Consistent with this notion, we find that as the frequency of reporting negative special items increases (measured by the presence of multiple prior charges), the persistence of these items significantly increases with respect to future earnings. Our evidence also suggests that the valuation multiple on such charges increases with frequency. That is, the market values “recurring nonrecurring” items more like the other components of recurring earnings.

Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation PETER O. CHRISTENSEN, GERALD A. FELTHAM, XIAO-JUN ZHANG; Equity Valuation. The Accounting Review 1 September 2010; 85 (5): 1809–1811. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.5.1809 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

We develop a model to examine the effects of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (FIN 48), on the strategic interaction between publicly traded corporate taxpayers and the government. Several of our findings contradict conjectures voiced by members of the business community regarding the economic effects of implementing FIN 48. Specifically, taxpayers with strong facts obtain higher expected payoffs from uncertain tax benefits and some disclosed liabilities understate the expected tax liability. Consistent with the common conjectures, however, some taxpayers are more likely to be audited or are deterred from entering into transactions that generate uncertain tax benefits because of FIN 48.

We investigate why firms choose to evaluate a tax department as a profit center (“contributor to the bottom line”) as opposed to as a cost center and the association between this choice and effective tax rates (ETRs). Using data from a confidential survey taken in 1999 of Chief Financial Officers, we develop and test a theory for choosing between these two methods of evaluating a tax department. We find that the likelihood of evaluating the tax department as a profit center is increasing in firm decentralization characteristics and tax-planning opportunities. We then employ instrumental variables to investigate whether evaluating a tax department as a profit center provides an effective incentive for the tax department to contribute to net income through lower ETRs. We find that our instrument for profit center firms is associated with significantly lower ETRs than cost center firms.