Market prices and trading are important information constructs that reveal information to market participants. I study how the observability of market prices and trading (hereafter, market transparency) affects firms' disclosure incentives. I exploit the staggered introduction of TRACE, which made bond prices and transactions publicly observable. I find that firms provide more guidance when their bonds' prices/trading become observable, suggesting that investors' access to market information limits managers' incentives to withhold information. This effect is stronger for firms whose revealed prices contain more new information, and it is more pronounced for the disclosure of bad news. I corroborate my results using (1) a controlled experiment, in which prices/trading were revealed for randomly selected bonds, and also (2) relevant threshold rules. Together, my results suggest that increased market transparency improves investors' access to information not only directly, by revealing the information contained in returns/trading, but also indirectly, by increasing corporate disclosure.

We examine whether proprietary costs drive R&D-active firms' choice of private loan structure. We find that R&D-active firms are more likely to choose single-lender over multi-lender private loan financing. This is consistent with the theory that high-ability entrepreneurs protect their proprietary knowledge by communicating it to a single lender while disclosing generic and less sensitive information to the public. This propensity, however, significantly decreases after the enactment of the American Inventor's Protection Act (AIPA), which accelerated public disclosure of firms' patent details in filings with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This accelerated public disclosure potentially caused R&D information to spill over to rivals, increasing the proprietary costs of single-lender borrowers. AIPA enactment also increased the spread on R&D-active firms' single-lender loans. These findings contribute to the voluntary disclosure and financing choice literature by linking R&D-active firms' choice of single-lender financing to the proprietary costs of public disclosure. Data Availability: From public sources identified in the study.

Prior research documents a negative stock price reaction to initial securities lawsuit filings, on average. Prior research provides no evidence, however, regarding whether and how the market prices information subsequently generated by the litigation process. We examine the market response to a large sample of initial plaintiff complaints and subsequent docket events. Our results are consistent with the market pricing information about issues both systemic to the firm and specific to the pending lawsuit from federal court filings. First, we find the market response to the initial lawsuit filing varies significantly with information about governance and control problems signaled by details of the plaintiff's complaint. Second, we find a significant market response to subsequent court filings that increases with measures of litigation severity and decreases as the litigation progresses over time. Overall, our results highlight the role of federally accessible court filings in facilitating the market's pricing of defendant firms.

A large body of empirical work provides mixed support for the central prediction from agency theory that noisier performance measures receive less weight in incentive contracts. We develop a method to calculate price-based and non-price-based performance measure weights using CEO pay and holdings of stock, options, and performance-vested awards. Consistent with theory, we find that noisier performance measures receive less weight. We find that this negative relation strengthened following the adoption of ASC 718 (formerly SFAS 123R), which equalized the accounting treatment for options and other share-based awards. We further find that firms that increased non-price incentives for CEOs realized improvements in ROA and in Tobin's Q. Our results suggest that misaligned incentives prior to ASC 718, and the under-weighting of non-price measures in particular, negatively affected firm performance.

We provide large sample evidence of law firms facilitating U.S. publicly traded companies' tax planning, investigate when evidence of law firm involvement is strongest, and examine some tax planning mechanisms law firms facilitate. Because companies' tax planning relationships with law firms are not publicly observable, we use litigation filings and SEC comment letters to identify companies' observable law firm relationships. We find a positive association between companies' tax planning and the average tax planning of other companies that have a relationship with the same law firm. This association is stronger for companies that are smaller, younger, R&D-intensive, financially constrained, and facing less capital market pressure, but does not vary with auditor-provided tax services. We also find evidence consistent with law firms facilitating the use of tax havens, Double Irish structures, and special purpose entities. Our findings deepen our understanding of companies' tax planning ecosystems.

While accounting research has extensively examined initial guidance disclosures, the disclosures that managers make when initial forecasts become materially inaccurate have received much less attention. These updates are unique because managers are communicating that their initial forecasts are no longer correct. In this context, we examine how earnings forecast withdrawals affect managers' reporting reputation, relative to earnings revisions and nondisclosure. While managers face immediate negative market consequences after withdrawals, they enjoy reputational benefits (in the form of improved credibility) in the long run when guidance updates resume. In contrast, reporting reputation does not improve for managers who revise forecasts or for those who choose not to update at all. Difference-in-differences analyses confirm this incremental boost to credibility that is associated with withdrawals. This evidence suggests disclosing what managers do not know may be as important as disclosing what they do know when building a reporting reputation.

A large body of empirical research in accounting investigates the causes and consequences of accruals quality, reaching numerous influential conclusions. Yet little work has been done to systematically evaluate the validity of the underlying measures of accruals quality. We evaluate these measures using three criteria: (1) Is the measure unaffected by the underlying economic determinants of accruals? (2) Does the measure consistently reflect errors in accruals? (3) Does the measure facilitate tests with sufficient power to detect plausible variation in accrual errors? Using a combination of theoretical modeling and numerical simulations, we show that all measures fail at least one of these criteria. Our evaluation provides new interpretations of existing research and guides the choice of measures and the interpretation of results in future research. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources identified in the paper.

We investigate the role of gender on the aggressiveness of sell-side analysts' questions during earnings conference calls. Our tests reveal that the verbal aggressiveness of analysts' questions is significantly associated with both the gender of the analyst asking the question and the gender of the CEO fielding the question. First, we find that male analysts are more verbally aggressive than female analysts. Specifically, male analysts' questions are more direct and more likely to be followed with further questions, to have a preface statement, and to be negative, all of which are consistent with verbal aggressiveness. Second, male analysts' questions to female CEOs are more aggressive than their questions to male CEOs. Gender-based verbal aggressiveness appears to be associated with analysts' career trajectories: female analysts who ask aggressive questions have a higher likelihood of becoming “star” analysts, whereas we fail to find such evidence for male analysts.

We predict and find that regulated firms' mandatory disclosures crowd out unregulated firms' voluntary disclosures. Consistent with information spillovers from regulated to unregulated firms, we document that unregulated firms reduce their own disclosures in the presence of regulated firms' disclosures. We further find that unregulated firms reduce their disclosures more the greater the strength of the regulatory information spillovers. Our findings suggest that a substitutive relationship between regulated and unregulated firms' disclosures attenuates the effect of disclosure regulation on the market-wide information environment.

We examine how subjectivity in performance measurement and reward systems (PMRS) is used to mitigate incentive contracting risks. Drawing on data from 38 interviews with supervisory and subordinate managers in four firms, we provide a more comprehensive explanation of the role of subjectivity in risk mitigation than is evident in the prior literature. We provide empirical evidence of the importance firms place on the use of subjectivity to mitigate the risk of incentive misalignment and employee sorting errors relative to its well-documented role in mitigating employee compensation risk. We find that incentive misalignment arising from unanticipated behavioral responses to performance measures is a particularly important risk, managed through subjective performance assessments. The extent of subjectivity we observe poses a significant risk of errors and bias. We observe that both vertical and horizontal information gathering and review by calibration panels are key strategies to mitigate the downside risk of subjectivity.