Cybersecurity risk is a growing concern for public companies as economic activity increasingly relies on technology. Drawing on finance theory, which posits that lenders possess private information about borrowers, I hypothesize that lenders price cybersecurity risks into loan contracts. A priori, this relation is unclear, given the unpredictable nature of cybersecurity risk and the difficulty lenders face in assessing the likelihood and magnitude of associated losses. Using the private debt market, I find a positive association between cybersecurity risk and the cost of debt. This relation is weaker for borrowers with high-quality information technology and stronger in less competitive lending markets. I also find that, following successful cyberattacks, secondary market loan prices decline (increase) for borrowers with high (low) ex ante cybersecurity risk. Overall, these results suggest that, whereas the SEC’s newly adopted cybersecurity disclosures may provide decision-useful information to retail investors, they may be less relevant for certain stakeholders. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Studies find evidence that opportunistic reporting often accompanies fair value measurement. However, research has not determined whether the source of this opportunism is the estimate of fair value. Using detailed information on insurers' investment holdings, we separate the use of fair value measurement discretion from the application of non-measurement-related discretion in accounting for impairments of financial assets. Our evidence contradicts the view that fair value measurement discretion plays a large role in opportunistic avoidance of impairment recognition for investment securities. Instead, managers appear to avoid recording impairment losses by opportunistically applying subjective criteria regarding perceived loss persistence and intent to hold. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.