We examine whether the mandatory introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards leads to an increase in institutional investor demand for equities. Using a large ownership database covering all types of institutional investors from around the world, we find that institutional holdings increase for mandatory IFRS adopters. Changes in holdings are concentrated around first-time annual reporting events. Second, we document that the positive IFRS effects on institutional holdings are concentrated among investors whose orientation and styles suggest they are most likely to benefit from higher quality financial statements, including active, value, and growth investors. These results are consistent with holdings changes being associated with the financial reporting regime change. Finally, we show that increased institutional holdings are concentrated in countries in which enforcement and reporting incentives are strongest, and where the differences between local GAAP and IFRS are relatively high. Overall, our study helps shed new light on the channels by which IFRS information becomes impounded in market outcomes. JEL Classifications: G11; K22; M41; M42. Data Availability: The data used in this study are available from the commercial sources identified in the paper.

We examine the costs and benefits of proactive financial reporting enforcement by the U.K. Financial Reporting Review Panel. Enforcement scrutiny is selective and varies by sector and over time, yet can be anticipated by auditors and companies. We find evidence that increased enforcement intensity leads to temporary increases in audit fees and more conservative accruals. However, cross-sectional analysis across market segments reveals that audit fees increase primarily in the less-regulated AIM segment, and especially those AIM companies with a higher likelihood of financial distress and less stringent governance. On the contrary, less reliable operating asset-related accruals are more conservative in the Main segment and, in particular, those Main companies with stronger incentives for higher financial reporting quality. Overall, our study indicates that financial reporting enforcement generates costs and benefits, but not always for the same companies. JEL Classifications: K42; M41; M42; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.