Differences in faculty beliefs as to the economic function of accounting, doctoral programs may contribute to the heterogeneity of educational policies and practices that exist across programs. Many accounting doctoral program policy makers appear to adhere, explicitly or implicitly, to either the "human capital" or "screening" theories of occupational licensing/certification. This study compares these two theories and evaluates the educational policies and practices they imply. The analysis suggests that, when relied upon to provide perspective in resolving policy questions, rather than in an orthodox fashion, these theories can provide useful guidance to accounting doctoral program policy makers.

[Differences in faculty beliefs as to the economic function of accounting doctoral programs may contribute to the heterogeneity of educational policies and practices that exist across programs. Many accounting doctoral program policy makers appear to adhere, explicitly or implicitly, to either the "human capital" or "screening" theories of occupational licensing/certification. This study compares these two theories and evaluates the educational policies and practices they imply. The analysis suggests that, when relied upon to provide perspective in resolving policy questions, rather than in an orthodox fashion, these theories can provide useful guidance to accounting doctoral program policy makers.]

[This study examines the motivations for failing firms to change auditors. Some of the factors that could influence auditor switching include audit qualifications, reporting disputes, management changes, audit fees, and insurance needs. Annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements were used to gather data for a sample of 132 failing (bankrupt) firms and a matched-pair sample of nonfailing firms. The investigation's findings strongly supported our prior expectations that failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms. Other findings revealed that neither audit qualifications nor management changes were statistically associated with auditor displacement in failing firms. Failing firms that changed auditors did display a preference to move to a different class of CPA firms. Also, size did not appear to matter with respect to the observed auditor switching among the failing firms, although it appeared to have some effect among control firms. Overall, our study's major findings suggest a definite need to control for the presence of financial distress in studies on auditor switching.]

Reviews the book "Ensuring Database Integrity," by William E. Perry.

Reviews the book "Introduction to Financial Accounting," 2nd ed., by Charles T. Horngren.

This paper uses discriminant analysis as a foundation for an admissions policy for accounting majors. The discriminant model is capable of correctly classifying students into Accept/Reject groups with a statistical accuracy of 78 percent using only three characteristics--grade-point average at 45 semester hours, grade in college mathematics, and grade in English composition. The model, more importantly, correctly classifies 90 percent of those students who, according to the model's criterion, should be rejected. Alternatively, the model is capable of identifying the same percent of those students who perform exceedingly well in accounting. This technique, together with a review and appeal procedure, provides a method of restricting enrollment while still meeting today's demand for quality accounting students.

Reviews the book "Cash Flow Accounting," by Tom Lee.

[This paper uses discriminant analysis as a foundation for an admissions policy for accounting majors. The discriminant model is capable of correctly classifying students into Accept/Reject groups with a statistical accuracy of 78 percent using only three characteristics-grade-point average at 45 semester hours, grade in college mathematics, and grade in English composition. The model, more importantly, correctly classifies 90 percent of those students who, according to the model's criterion, should be rejected. Alternatively, the model is capable of identifying the same percent of those students who perform exceedingly well in accounting. This technique, together with a review and appeal procedure, provides a method of restricting enrollment while still meeting today's demand for quality accounting students.]

Reviews the book "Accounting Information Systems: Concepts and Practice for Effective Decision Making," 2nd ed., by Stephen A. Moscove and Mark G. Simkin.

This study examines the motivations for failing firms to change auditors. Some of the factors that could influence auditor switching include audit qualifications, reporting disputes, management changes, audit fees, and insurance needs. Annual reports, 10-Ks, and proxy statements were used to gather data for a sample of 132 failing (bankrupt) firms and a matched-pair sample of nonfailing firms. The investigation's findings strongly supported our prior expectations that failing firms have a greater tendency to switch auditors than do healthier firms. Other findings revealed that neither audit qualifications nor management changes were statistically associated with auditor displacement in failing firms. Failing firms that changed auditors did display a preference to move to a different class of CPA firms. Also, size did not appear to matter with respect to the observed auditor switching among the failing firms, although it appeared to have some effect among control firms. Overall, our study's major findings suggest a definite need to control for the presence of financial distress in studies on auditor switching.