This study investigates whether and when differences in the credit rating agencies' methodologies result in differences in rating properties. In particular, this study focuses on differences in information processing constraints between a rating agency that utilizes qualitative analysis and direct access to borrowers' management in its rating process (Standard & Poor's) compared to one that does not (Egan Jones Ratings Company) and how these differences affect rating quality. We find that as information uncertainty about borrowers increases, Egan Jones's rating accuracy, informativeness, and timeliness decrease relative to Standard & Poor's. Our findings suggest that Egan Jones's more restricted rating methodology can lead to limitations in information processing and, thus, reductions in Egan Jones's rating quality advantage for borrowers with greater information uncertainty.

In this study, we examine whether sell-side security analysts gain access to value-relevant information through political connections. We measure analysts' political connections based on political contributions at the brokerage-house level. We argue that if brokerages are able to obtain private information through their political connections, then analysts at politically connected brokerages should issue more profitable stock recommendations, and this increased profitability should be more pronounced for politically sensitive stocks. Our evidence is consistent with these predictions. Analyses of recommendations issued surrounding the Affordable Care Act further support our main inferences. Moreover, our findings hold after we employ numerous tests to address correlated omitted variables and endogeneity. Collectively, these results suggest that brokerages obtain value-relevant, nonpublic information from their political connections.

We examine the response of informed market participants to the informational signal of auditor changes. Using propensity score matching and difference-in-differences research designs, we document that loan spreads increase by 22 percent on bank loans initiated within a year after auditor changes, increasing direct loan costs by approximately $6.6 million. We also find a significant increase in upfront and annual fees and the probability of pledging collateral, consistent with an increase in screening and monitoring by banks. The increase in spreads is significant for client-initiated auditor changes, with or without disagreements with the auditor, as well as for auditor resignations. Further, the significant increase in loan spreads is documented for upward, lateral, and downward auditor changes. Our results are robust to other proxies for financial reporting quality. Finally, we find no effect resulting from the forced auditor changes due to Arthur Andersen. Collectively, these results suggest that voluntary auditor changes increase information risk, which is priced in private credit markets.