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Locked-In: The Effect of CEOs' Capital Gains Taxes on Corporate Risk-Taking

The Accounting Review 2018 93(5), 325-358 open access
I study the effects of CEOs' unrealized capital gains tax liabilities (tax burdens) on corporate risk-taking. Recent work suggests that high tax burdens discourage CEOs from selling stock. I hypothesize that this causes the executives to become overexposed to firm-specific risk, thereby reducing their willingness to make risky corporate decisions. In a series of tests, I find that corporate risk-taking decreases as CEOs' personal tax burdens increase. Further, firms with CEOs who are more locked-in to their stock positions (i.e., CEOs with higher tax burdens) experience larger increases in risk-taking following federal and state tax cuts. When I investigate the mechanism behind this relation, I find that tax cuts trigger stock sales by the locked-in executives, allowing for improved diversification. Overall, my findings indicate that the personal tax burdens of CEOs affect the firm by reducing executives' preferences for risk at the corporate level.

CEO Tax Lock-In and Share Pledging

The Accounting Review 2026
We study how CEOs’ personal tax incentives shape their share pledging decisions and firms’ restrictions on the practice. Pledging shares entails using company stock as collateral for personal loans, enabling executives to obtain liquidity without making a taxable sale of appreciated shares. Using pledging data from 2006 to 2024, we find a robust positive relation between CEOs’ unrealized capital gains tax liabilities, or tax burdens, and share pledging. This relation is weaker when interest rates are high, consistent with CEOs’ trading off tax benefits against borrowing costs. After Institutional Shareholder Services discouraged share pledging in 2012, firms with high-tax-burden CEOs were slower to adopt antipledging policies and, when they did adopt, chose less restrictive policies. Firms that adopted strong antipledging policies subsequently increased CEO cash pay and stock awards. Our evidence suggests that share pledging helps executives manage personal tax lock-in and that firms consider this benefit when restricting pledging. Data Availability: Data are available from the public and subscription sources identified in the text, subject to applicable data-use restrictions.

CEO Tax Effects on Acquisition Structure and Value

The Accounting Review 2021 96(2), 333-363 open access
We hypothesize that prior evidence of target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities affecting acquisition features is driven by the tax liabilities of the target firm CEO. To test this, we estimate CEOs' capital gains tax liabilities for a large sample of acquisitions and examine the effects of such liabilities on acquisition outcomes. Results indicate that the previously documented positive relations between shareholder-level capital gains tax rates and (1) the likelihood of a nontaxable acquisition (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2004), and (2) acquisition premiums (Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson 2003) are largely driven by CEO tax effects. We also find evidence consistent with (1) CEOs' tax incentives leading to potential agency conflicts under certain conditions, and (2) acquisition structure or premium being adjusted in response to CEOs' taxes depending on the alternatives available to the acquirer. Our study contributes to our understanding of what and whose taxes affect acquisition structure and value.