This study examines the effects of financial reporting complexity on investors’ trading behavior. I find that more complex (longer and less readable) filings are associated with lower overall trading, and that this relationship appears due to a reduction in small investors’ trading activity. Additional evidence suggests that the association between report complexity and lower abnormal trading is driven by both cross-sectional variation in firms’ disclosure attributes and variations in disclosure complexity over time. Given regulatory concerns over plain English disclosures and the trend toward more disclosure, my investigation into the effects of reporting complexity on small and large investors should be of interest to regulators concerned with reporting clarity and leveling the playing field across classes of investors.

This study examines the conditions under which financial restatements lead corporate boards to dismiss external auditors and how the market responds to those dismissal announcements. We find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after more severe restatements but that the severity effect is primarily attributable to the dismissal of non-Big 4 auditors rather than Big 4 auditors. We also document that among corporations with Big 4 auditors, those that are larger and more complex operationally are less likely to dismiss their auditors. Combined, this evidence suggests that firms with higher switching costs and fewer replacement auditor choices are less likely to dismiss their auditors after a restatement, which is informative to the debates about the costs and benefits of mandatory auditor rotation and limited competition in the audit market. Additionally, we examine contemporaneous executive turnover and find evidence that boards view auditor dismissals as complementary rather than substitute responses to restatements. Finally, we investigate the market reaction to auditor dismissals after restatements. The market reaction to the dismissal is significantly more positive following more severe restatements (5.9 percent) relative to less severe restatements (0.6 percent) when the client engages a comparably sized auditor. This positive market reaction is consistent with firms restoring financial reporting credibility by replacing their auditors and highlights the important role that auditors play in the financial markets. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

Research on restatements has grown significantly in recent years. Many of these studies test hypotheses about the causes and consequences of intentional managerial misreporting but rely on restatement data (such as the GAO database) that contains both irregularities (intentional misstatements) and errors (unintentional misstatements). We argue that researchers can significantly enhance the power of tests related to restatements by distinguishing between errors and irregularities, particularly in recent periods when the relative frequency of error-related restatements is increasing. Based on prior research, the reading of numerous restatement announcements, and the guidance that boards receive from lawyers, auditors, and the SEC on how to respond to suspicions of deliberate misreporting, we propose a straightforward procedure for classifying restatements as either errors or irregularities. We show that most of the restatements we classify as irregularities are followed by fraud-related class action lawsuits as compared to only one lawsuit in the group of restatements classified as errors. As further validation of our proxy, we report that the market reaction to the restatement announcement for our irregularities sample (−14 percent) is also significantly more negative than it is for our errors sample (−2 percent). Finally, we demonstrate the importance of distinguishing errors from irregularities by showing the impact it has on inferences about the relation between restatements and CEO/CFO turnover over time.

We examine a comprehensive set of investigations by the SEC’s Division of Enforcement offices to provide evidence on the consequences of these office’s busyness on the formal investigation process. We find that higher office case backlog decreases the likelihood of an investigation into a restating firm. Our results show no evidence that higher backlogs affect the SEC’s ability to pursue cases involving revenue recognition issues and high insider trading, which is consistent with the agency’s stated priorities. But our findings indicate that busy SEC offices are less likely to pursue cases with the largest shareholder losses, which is inconsistent with SEC priorities. Backlog also impacts pursued investigations, leading to more prolonged investigations, a lower Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases likelihood, and smaller SEC penalties. Our evidence suggests that busyness undermines the SEC’s investigation process.

A longstanding literature suggests that earnings provide the market with relevant information about firm performance, but one often overlooked benefit is their role in disciplining market expectations. This study examines the role of earnings announcements in constraining potential mispricing associated with firm-specific media sentiment. We show that media sentiment-driven quarterly returns (orthogonal to risk factors and fundamental news) largely reverse when public earnings are released. Our results suggest that quarterly earnings announcements play an important role in reducing media sentiment-related mispricing. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.