This study examines former Arthur Andersen clients and provides evidence on the factors involved in their selection of new auditors after Andersen's collapse. Using a unique dataset that identifies whether former Andersen clients followed their audit team to a new auditor, findings reveal companies with greater agency concerns were more likely to sever ties with their former auditor, whereas those with greater switching costs were more likely to follow their former auditor. We also investigate the effect of the forced auditor change on financial statement quality in an effort to provide insight into the mandatory auditor rotation debate. Using performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as a proxy for reporting quality, our results fail to reveal significant improvements for companies with extreme discretionary accruals that severed ties with Andersen, which is inconsistent with the notion that mandatory rotation improves financial reporting.

Using a comprehensive sample of switches to and from the largest auditors (i.e., the Big N), we examine empirically whether the sensitivity of Big N auditor switches to client risk and misalignment changed between the pre- and post-Enron periods. Although we find an increase in the sensitivity to client misalignment, the sensitivity to client risk generally decreases. The results are consistent with Big N auditors rebalancing their audit client portfolios in response to post-Enron capacity constraints arising from the supply of former Arthur Andersen clients and the audit demands imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley rather than increasing their sensitivity to client risk. Additional evidence indicates that the Sarbanes-Oxley demand shock did not affect Big N auditor switching behavior incremental to the initial Andersen supply shock.

This study analyzes whether fair value estimates of fund net asset values (NAVs) produced by private equity managers are accurate and unbiased predictors of future discounted cash flows (DCFs). We exploit the fact that private equity funds have finite lives to compare reported NAVs to DCFs based on realized cash flows for 384 Venture Capital (VC) funds and 195 Buyout funds spanning 1988–2016. Findings reveal that Buyout funds' NAVs display little systematic bias, but VC funds' NAVs are relatively aggressively biased compared to Buyout funds, especially since 2000. Accuracy is worse in the first half of the sample period even though NAV estimates generally are more conservative. Overall, the results reveal significant differences in the association between NAVs and DCFs for Buyout versus VC funds, which is particularly important for private equity fund investors in their consideration of the relevance and reliability of NAV estimates provided by fund managers.