Abstract The article presents information on some problems of labor union auditing. Organized labor has traditionally regarded criticism of its financial machinery as an attempt on the part of employer groups to weaken its influence and bargaining power. The unions believe that much of the criticism has not been of a constructive nature and has emanated from those whose economic interests were, prior to the present war emergency and the resultant cooperation between labor and management, opposed to their own. Along with this has gone a hesitancy to engage independent auditors who, because their work is closely connected with business enterprises, have been associated in the thinking of labor union members with employers who may have done everything in their power to discourage or destroy organization among their employees. Many unions that engage independent public accountants require that audits be made monthly. In some cases the audits are made by a board of trustees selected by the union membership at regular elections or by special auditing committees elected each time an audit is required.

Reviews the book "Corporate Earning Power in the Current Depression," by William Leonard Crum.

Reviews the book "Trading on the Equity by Industrial Companies," by Charles L. Jamison.

Abstract The article reports on the achievements and progress of the American Accounting Association. One of the impressive accomplishments of the association was the marked increase in membership. The widespread interest of professional practitioners in the work, the aims and objectives, the publications, and the activities of the association in the held of accounting education has been gratifying. Many new teachers at the college level have been added to the membership roles. To all of these new members the association extends a warm and cordial welcome and a standing invitation to participate actively in furthering the purposes which are set forth in our by-laws and statement of purposes. The program of the annual meeting gave a glimpse into still another new undertaking, namely, the development of standards rating in the field of undergraduate and graduate study of accounting. It is hoped that extension of this project may become a continuing activity of the association.

Abstract Reviews the book "Accounting Manual for Small Cities of the State of Washington," by Arthur N. Lorig.

Abstract This article presents information on evaluating alternative methods of accounting for long-term nonsubsidiary holdings of common stock. Long-term investments by one corporation (investor) in the common stock of another corporation (investee) can be classified in one of two basic categories according to the percentage of the common stock of the investee corporation held by the investor corporation. Holdings of more than 50 percent are classified as subsidiary holdings while holdings of 50 percent or less are classified as nonsubsidiary holdings. Under the cost method, "periodic investor income" consists of dividends received by the investor which are distributed from the investor's proportionate share of undistributed investee earnings accumulated since the acquisition of the investment. The book value of the investment on the investor's books, hereafter referred to as "investment carrying value," is periodically reduced by any dividends received in which distributions in excess of investee earnings since acquisition of the investment. Such dividends are referred to in this paper as "excess dividends." Finally, Opinion 18 states that a senes of operating losses of an investee or other factors may indicate that a decrease in value of the investment has occurred which is other than temporary and should accordingly be recognized.

[Positive theory hypothesizes that accounting-based debt covenants are important factors in accounting choices. According to Watts and Zimmerman's (1990) survey, this hypothesis has generally been supported by earlier studies. That is, the closer the firm is to violating accounting covenants, the more likely managers would choose income-increasing methods. Recently, research attention has shifted to the event of covenant violation itself. For example, Beneish and Press (1993) estimate debtors' costs of violations. Further, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) and Sweeney (1992) examine debtors' manipulative behavior before covenant violations. These latter studies find that violations of accounting covenants are costly to debtors, who generally try to manipulate accounting numbers to avoid or defer technical defaults. The present study also focuses on the event of violation, but from the perspective of creditors. It explains two aspects of creditors' decision process following covenant violations. First, we find that creditors react to actual violations in two distinct ways: they could either waive the violations or could demand certain conditions such as early payment, increase of interest rate, reduction of borrowing base, and so forth. Second, we also model creditors' decisions either to waive or to call the debt using the option-pricing framework. We hypothesize that the determinants of waiver decisions include the firm's bankruptcy probability and leverage ratio. Moreover, maturity, size, and security of the debt issue involved should also be important factors in the waiver decisions. Empirically, we find that creditors are more likely to grant a waiver to the firm with a lower estimated probability of bankruptcy and a lower leverage ratio. Further, debt issues that are secured or smaller in size are more likely to have violations waived than unsecured or larger issues. The maturity variable, however, is not found a significant determinant of the waiver decisions. Using the factors identified in this study, managers can assess the probability of receiving a waiver and prepare necessary strategies to ensure the firm's survival. Auditors also can use those factors to assess the possibility of the client's receiving a waiver of covenant violation as part of their evaluation of the firm's ability to continue as a going concern. Moreover, since debtors prefer waivers to nonwaivers, the prospect of receiving a waiver is likely to influence managerial behavior, including the choice of accounting alternatives. Managers expecting a nonwaiver from creditors would have more incentive to select accounting methods to avoid covenant violations.]

ABSTRACT: I examine whether firms alter their behavior in response to changes in accounting standards that mandate new financial statement disclosures. While prior research suggests that new recognition rules lead to changes in firm behavior, there is limited evidence that disclosure rules can impact firm behavior. This study helps to fill this void in the literature by examining the economic consequences of the mandated disclosures of pension asset composition required under SFAS 132R. Under pension accounting rules, the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return (ERR) on pension assets. I find that when firms disclose asset composition for the first time under SFAS 132R, firms that were previously using upward-biased ERRs respond by increasing asset allocation to high-risk securities and/or reducing the ERR assumption. While disclosure requirements arguably create less powerful incentives to alter firm decisions than recognition requirements, these findings offer evidence that firms alter behavior in response to disclosure standards. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.

ABSTRACT: This study examines whether the market reacts more strongly to earnings forecast revisions when financial analysts supplement their earnings forecasts with sales forecasts. I find that earnings forecast revisions supplemented with sales forecast revisions have a greater impact on security prices than do stand-alone earnings forecast revisions, controlling for the incremental information content in sales forecasts. Supplemented earnings forecasts are more accurate ex post, controlling for other individual analyst characteristics. Results are robust to controlling for earnings persistence and time effects. Taken as a whole, financial analysts are more likely to supplement their earnings forecasts with sales forecasts when they have better information. Supplementary sales forecasts appear to lend credibility to earnings forecasts because financial analysts provide sales forecasts when they are more informed.

Prior studies of the strategic interaction between taxpayers and the tax authority have focused on reported net taxable income and on audit policies designed to discover potential misstatement of that single item. This paper extends the literature by modeling taxpayer compliance behavior and tax authority audit strategies within the context of a multidimensional report of taxable income. Specifically, the study analyzes the impact of component reporting requirements on taxpayer incentives to misstate their tax liability. It also allows the tax authority to tailor its audit policy to consider all tax return information. In particular, the model permits the tax authority to audit return components sequentially: the investigation of a second component is conditional on the results of the first component's audit. The study finds that partitioning taxable income into a multi-component report reduces overall tax evasion and increases tax authority net revenue collections relative to a singlereport model of net taxable income. However, the impact on predicted evasion is not uniform across taxpayers. While some taxpayers reduce evasion, others with multiple opportunities to evade are more likely to do so when faced with multi-component reporting requirements.