Abstract ABSTRACT: The objective of this study is to examine how certain contextual factors in auditor-client conflicts affect the perceived ability of auditors to resist client pressure. A review of the literature resulted in the identification of four factors hypothesized to affect sophisticated financial statement users' perceptions of audit conflict outcomes: nature of conflict issue, client's financial condition, provision of MAS by the audit firm, and the degree of competition in the audit services market. A full-factorial, repeated measures ANOVA experiment was conducted using senior loan officers as subjects. The results indicate that a client in good financial condition is perceived as being more likely to obtain its preferred outcome to an audit conflict than a client in poor financial condition. Clients are also viewed as being more likely to obtain their preferred resolution to a conflict when the conflict issue is not dealt with precisely by the technical standards.

[The objective of this study is to examine how certain contextual factors in auditor-client conflicts affect the perceived ability of auditors to resist client pressure. A review of the literature resulted in the identification of four factors hypothesized to affect sophisticated financial statement users' perceptions of audit conflict outcomes: nature of conflict issue, client's financial condition, provision of MAS by the audit firm, and the degree of competition in the audit services market. A full-factorial, repeated measures ANOVA experiment was conducted using senior loan officers as subjects. The results indicate that a client in good financial condition is perceived as being more likely to obtain its preferred outcome to an audit conflict than a client in poor financial condition. Clients are also viewed as being more likely to obtain their preferred resolution to a conflict when the conflict issue is not dealt with precisely by the technical standards.]

Abstract ABSTRACT: A simplified audit setting is used to illustrate the crucial nature of strategic interactions in audit planning and in assessing audit risk. Unlike single-person decisiontheoretic models which essentially represent games against nature, the model developed here allows a prospective audit to influence the behavior of the auditee. We reformulate the problem in a game-theoretic framework with rational players which (1) encompasses strategic factors for both the auditor and auditee, (2) is consistent with behavioral hypotheses regarding the effect of an audit, and (3) is consistent with certain audit phenomena such as randomized strategies. An illustration is provided which demonstrates several points. First, both the auditor and the auditee may frequently use a randomized strategy. Second, the auditor's strategy depends on the interaction between the accounting control system and the auditee's actions. In addition, the use of traditional single-person decision theory may frequently cause errors in estimating audit risk because it fails to consider audit influences on the auditee. Settings in which decision theory may serve as an adequate model simplification are also considered.

[Models that characterize Pareto-efficient sharing of joint venture profits or constrained Pareto-efficient sharing of income in principal-agent contracting problems have ignored tax considerations. We extend the theory by showing that the effect of taxes on optimal contracting (both in the face of and in the absence of moral hazard problems) is related to the effect of changes in risk attitudes towards lotteries over pre-tax income. For example, optimal contracts will reflect the tax-induced demand for insurance of a risk-neutral individual who faces a progressive income tax schedule; that is, the risk-neutral individual will not bear all the risk, and in the face of moral hazard on the act selection of a risk-neutral agent, demand for monitoring will be created where none existed in the absence of the progressive tax. We also show that Pareto-optimal risk-sharing contracts do not generally result in expected tax minimization, even when taxes are modeled as a deadweight loss to the system.]

Abstract ABSTRACT: Models that characterize Pareto-efficient sharing of joint venture profits or constrained Pareto-efficient sharing of income in principal-agent contracting problems have ignored tax considerations. We extend the theory by showing that the effect of taxes on optimal contracting (both in the face of and in the absence of moral hazard problems) is related to the effect of changes in risk attitudes towards lotteries over pre-tax income. For example, optimal contracts will reflect the tax-induced demand for insurance of a risk-neutral individual who faces a progressive income tax schedule; that is, the risk-neutral individual will not bear all the risk, and in the face of moral hazard on the act selection of a risk-neutral agent, demand for monitoring will be created where none existed in the absence of the progressive tax. We also show that Pareto-optimal risk-sharing contracts do not generally result in expected tax minimization, even when taxes are modeled as a deadweight loss to the system.

Abstract ABSTRACT: This study applies citation analysis to evaluate the research contributions of accounting faculties, doctoral programs, and individuals to contemporary accounting research (CAR). A research contribution is measured as CAR citations to a journal article written by an accountant, and CAR is defined as all main articles published in The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Accounting, Organizations and Society between 1976 and 1982. The advantages and disadvantages of the technique are discussed, and the sensitivity of the results to alternative citation measurement metrics is examined.

Abstract Reviews the book "Accounting Principles Through the Years: The Views of Professional and Academic Leaders 1938-1954," edited by Stephen A. Zeff.

[A simplified audit setting is used to illustrate the crucial nature of strategic interactions in audit planning and in assessing audit risk. Unlike single-person decision-theoretic models which essentially represent games against nature, the model developed here allows a prospective audit to influence the behavior of the auditee. We reformulate the problem in a game-theoretic framework with rational players which (1) encompasses strategic factors for both the auditor and auditee, (2) is consistent with behavioral hypotheses regarding the effect of an audit, and (3) is consistent with certain audit phenomena such as randomized strategies. An illustration is provided which demonstrates several points. First, both the auditor and the auditee may frequently use a randomized strategy. Second, the auditor's strategy depends on the interaction between the accounting control system and the auditee's actions. In addition, the use of traditional single-person decision theory may frequently cause errors in estimating audit risk because it fails to consider audit influences on the auditee. Settings in which decision theory may serve as an adequate model simplification are also considered.]

[This study applies citation analysis to evaluate the research contributions of accounting faculties, doctoral programs, and individuals to contemporary accounting research (CAR). A research contribution is measured as CAR citations to a journal article written by an accountant, and CAR is defined as all main articles published in The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, and Accounting, Organizations and Society between 1976 and 1982. The advantages and disadvantages of the technique are discussed, and the sensitivity of the results to alternative citation measurement metrics is examined.]

Abstract Reviews the book "Understand Those Financial Reports: Question-and-Answer Guide for Investors and Nonfinancial Managers," by Raymond J. Lipay.