ABSTRACT This study examines the determinants and performance effects of centrality bias and leniency bias. The results show that managers respond to their own incentives and preferences when subjectively evaluating performance. Specifically, information-gathering costs and strong employee-manager relationships positively affect centrality bias and leniency bias. The findings also indicate that performance evaluation biases affect not only current performance ratings, but also future employee incentives. Inconsistent with predictions based on the agency perspective, the results show that managers' performance evaluation biases are not necessarily detrimental to compensation contracting. Although centrality bias negatively affects performance improvement, the evidence does not reveal a significant negative relation between leniency bias and performance. Rather, leniency bias is positively associated with future performance, which is consistent with the behavioral argument that bias can improve perceived fairness and, in turn, employee motivation. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to a confidentiality agreement with the participating firm.

ABSTRACT: We examine detection and severity classification of internal control deficiencies (ICD) identified under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. While the cost/benefit balance of auditor testing of internal controls is highly controversial, prior research has not examined auditor versus client detection of ICD, nor has it examined factors auditors consider in judging ICD severity. We find that auditors detect about three-fourths of unremediated ICD, usually though control testing. This finding contrasts with extant research inferring control deficiency detection effectiveness from publicly available data, underscoring the value of Section 404 auditor testing in improving financial reporting quality. Auditors judge greater severity when a misstatement has already occurred. In the absence of a misstatement, severity is contingent on client and ICD characteristics, implying a more complex and nuanced judgment process without objective evidence of control failure. We also find that clients often underestimate ICD severity, but this tendency is lower among well-controlled companies with a well-designed Section 404 process.

ABSTRACT We examine how subjective performance evaluations are influenced by the level and controllability of an accompanying measure of a separate performance dimension. In our experiment, supervisors evaluate the office administration performance of a hypothetical subordinate. We find that supervisors' subjective evaluations are directionally influenced by an accompanying objective measure of sales performance, even after excluding participants who perceive informativeness across measures. Consistent with concerns for fairness and motivation, we also find an asymmetric uncontrollability effect—supervisors' evaluations are higher when an uncontrollable factor decreases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they compensate for bad luck), but are not lower when the uncontrollable factor increases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they do not punish for good luck). This evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion provided to evaluate performance on one task to adjust for perceived deficiencies in the evaluation of performance on other tasks. Our study integrates theories of cognitive bias and motivation, highlighting the need to consider the potentially interactive effects of different performance measures in multi-task settings.

ABSTRACT: Dichev and Tang (2008) document a dramatic decrease over the last 40 years in the contemporaneous correlation between revenue and expense, along with an associated increase in earnings volatility and a decline in earnings persistence, suggesting a decline in earnings quality. We document that these changes are primarily attributable to an increase in the incidence of large special items. We then examine the extent to which this increase in special items is due to either more frequent real economic events related to special item recognition or to the adoption of new accounting standards. Our evidence suggests that changes in the frequency of economic events associated with special items have played a more important and sustained role relative to the role played by adoption of individual accounting standards. Finally, we find that the changing incidence of these economic events is at least in part related to the well-documented increase in competition in the U.S. economy over the last four decades.

ABSTRACT: We examine whether the two distinct post-earnings-announcement drifts associated with seasonal random-walk-based and analyst-based earnings surprises are attributable to the trading activities of distinct sets of investors. We predict and find that small (large) traders continue to trade in the direction of seasonal random-walk-based (analyst-based) earnings surprises after earnings announcements. We also find that when small (large) traders react more thoroughly to seasonal random-walk- (analyst-) based earnings surprises at the earnings announcements, the respective drift attenuates. Further evidence suggests that delayed small trades associated with random-walk-based surprises are consistent with small traders’ failure to understand time-series properties of earnings, whereas delayed large trades associated with analyst-based surprises are more consistent with a longer price discovery process. We also find that the analyst-based drift has declined in recent years.

ABSTRACT We examine the relation between disclosure tone and shareholder litigation to determine whether managers' use of optimistic language increases litigation risk. Using both general-purpose and context-specific text dictionaries to quantify tone, we find that plaintiffs target more optimistic statements in their lawsuits and that sued firms' earnings announcements are unusually optimistic relative to other firms experiencing similar economic circumstances. These findings are consistent with optimistic language increasing litigation risk. In addition, we find incrementally greater litigation risk when managers are both unusually optimistic and engage in abnormal selling. This finding suggests that firms can mitigate litigation risk by ensuring that optimistic statements are not contradicted by insider selling. Finally, we find that insider selling is associated with litigation risk only when contemporaneous disclosures are unusually optimistic. JEL Classifications: G38; K22; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources indicated in the text.