We conduct two experiments to investigate the effects of giving subordinates the possibility to return budget surplus on capital budgeting processes. We predict and find that when subordinates face low uncertainty when submitting their budget request, the possibility to return budget surplus increases budget requests compared to not having this possibility but that this effect is mitigated under high uncertainty. We also predict and find that subordinates return more budget surplus under high than low uncertainty. Together, these results imply that the possibility to return budget surplus can be particularly beneficial for firms operating under high uncertainty. We contribute to the literature by integrating an important feature of budgeting practice into research, i.e., subordinates’ possibility to return budget surplus and by showing that the effects of implementing such an option may strongly depend on the level of uncertainty a subordinate faces. Data Availability: The data and research instrument are available from the authors upon request.

Macroeconomic forces are challenging the ability of audit firms to sustain engagement profitability. Although one available strategy for multinational clients is to employ non-U.S. firms as component auditors (CAs), the impacts of this choice are unclear. We investigate the influence of CAs on engagement economics in Big 6 audits from 2012 to 2022, a period of increasing non-U.S. labor use. Results show that global hours increase with CA participation, suggesting that additional CA labor is needed to substitute for each U.S. hour. Global billing rates decline, implying that principal auditors share savings from lower cost labor with clients. However, U.S. lead team realizations rise with increasing substitution of non-U.S. labor, incentivizing more extensive CA use. Further analysis shows that these impacts are concentrated in engagements with high CA participation in countries with low wages and low English proficiency. Audit quality is not reduced by greater substitution of non-U.S. labor.

This study investigates how real activities management (RAM) by employees to meet internal targets set by managers affects their performance, and how managers’ awareness of employees’ opportunity to engage in RAM moderates this effect. Using two experiments, we predict and find that when managers are unaware of employees’ RAM opportunity, employees who face miscalibrated targets use RAM to restore their own incentives to work hard, resulting in increased employee performance. Counter to conventional wisdom, we also predict and find that making managers aware of employees’ RAM opportunity hurts employee performance. Such managers overestimate employees’ RAM and adjust targets aggressively such that they become more difficult to achieve, leading to lower employee motivation and less trusting employee-manager relations. Overall, our findings show that the opportunity to engage in RAM can have the indirect benefits of motivating higher employee performance, but increasing managers’ awareness of this has negative performance and relational effects. Data Availability: The data and research instrument are available from the authors upon request.

Government-controlled brokerage analysts serve as a market stabilization tool in China. Examining the 2005–2019 period, we show these analysts issue relatively more optimistic—yet less accurate and timely—forecasts during market rescue periods, supporting stock prices. During market booms, they issue comparatively pessimistic but more accurate and timely forecasts, tempering excessive optimism. These patterns are stronger for large firms and state-owned enterprises, and at the most government-influenced brokerages. Markets appear to respond to these forecasts: stocks with greater government-brokerage coverage experience higher liquidity during downturns but lower liquidity during hot markets, with corresponding post-earnings price adjustments. Our findings match Brunnermeier, Sockin, and Xiong’s (2022) theoretical predictions: state interventions can erode information efficiency under intensive intervention while maintaining it under moderate intervention. Collectively, these results underscore that analysts can serve a dual role—as information providers and policy instruments shaping market expectations and stability—in a coordinated economy. Data Availability: The data used in this study were obtained from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database under a commercial license and cannot be redistributed by the authors. Researchers can obtain equivalent data through institutional access to CSMAR.