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Inequality Grows in Silence: The Impact of Newspaper Closures on CEO-Worker Pay Disparity

The Accounting Review 2026
Addressing income inequality is crucial for ensuring equitable and prosperous societies. This study examines the impact of the local press on intrafirm pay disparity. By using recently mandated disclosures of CEO-worker pay ratios and analyzing the staggered shutdown of local newspapers, we find that within-firm pay disparity increases by 8.2 percent following local newspaper closures. Further analysis suggests that this post-closure increase in pay disparity ratio is unlikely to be driven by either CEO compensation or worker pay alone or underlying economic conditions but instead reflects reduced concerns over reputational damage. Overall, our findings are consistent with local newspapers’ playing an important role in disseminating CEO-worker pay ratios and amplifying their reputational effects, thereby shaping and monitoring within-firm pay disparity. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the paper.

Tough Ratings, Tougher Sell: How Different Types of Adjustment Affect Managers’ Asymmetric Algorithm Use in Performance Evaluation Judgments

The Accounting Review 2026 101(3), 413-440 open access
Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.