This paper examines how auditors' judgments about accounting policies may differ when experiencing different levels of affinity for client management and facing different levels of pressure from client management. The theory of motivated reasoning is employed to analyze the effects of these two factors that should lead individual auditors to adopt as a directional goal the acceptance of client management's aggressive accounting. Accordingly, we predict and find that auditors experiencing greater client affinity and facing explicit client pressure suggest lower adjustments to clients' aggressive accounting, consistent with motivated reasoning's goal-related predictions. But our study goes further and investigates also how auditors react when motivated reasoning theory's “reasonableness constraint” is potentially violated by auditors who perceive excessive client pressure. We predict and find, consistent with the individual auditor's “reasonable constraint” being triggered in at least some auditors, that perception of client pressure intensity leads those auditors to propose larger adjustments to client accounting. To support our findings, we re-analyze the data from a prior motivated reasoning audit experiment, replicate that study's reported directional goal results employing methods used in this study and, in addition, find similar results to those found in this study for increased client pressure intensity on auditor judgment.

This study provides novel evidence on the magnitude of switching costs in auditing. Using a discrete choice approach, we infer switching costs from clients’ audit firm choices. The demand estimation reveals that switching costs are significant and vary by direction, with the highest costs associated with switching from non-Big 4 to Big 4 audit firms. Counterfactual analyses of forced switches suggest that switching costs are substantial, ranging from 0.7 billion U.S. dollars (14.2 percent of audit fees) to 1.2 billion U.S. dollars (24.0 percent of audit fees) when aggregated across all clients. Counterfactual analyses of voluntary switching show that the audit market would become highly dynamic and more concentrated if switching costs were removed. Additionally, clients would gain consumer surplus of up to 306 million U.S. dollars (5.4 percent of audit fees) in such a scenario. Overall, our study documents the importance of switching costs for understanding audit market dynamics. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

This study investigates the value of auditor industry specialization. In the first step, we use a discrete choice model to derive the first-order demand for auditor industry specialization. Our results reveal that clients have a general preference for auditor industry specialization, relating to both audit firm and audit office specialization. We observe that specializations at the audit firm and audit office level are substitutes. We also find that larger, more complex clients have a stronger demand for industry specialization at the audit office level. In the second step, we use the results from the discrete choice model to quantify the value of auditor industry specialists for clients. We find the overall value of industry specialization aggregated across all clients is 5.2 million USD (0.36 percent of audit fees) and that industry specialization at the firm (office) level is decisive for auditor choice in 4 percent (6 percent) of all cases.