This study investigates the extent to which a retailer's willingness to share internal (sales and inventory) information with a manufacturer and the reliability of the information transmission between the retailer and the manufacturer affect the total supply-chain profits resulting from two alternative inventory management systems. I present analytical models of a traditional system and a Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) system. The VMI system is a supply-chain management technique in which the retailer delegates its inventory decisions to, and shares its internal accounting information with, the manufacturer. With VMI, the parties aim to reduce inventory-related costs and increase supply-chain profits. The theoretical analysis indicates that the system that produces higher supply-chain profits depends on the extent to which the retailer reveals its internal accounting information to the manufacturer and the ability of the manufacturer to accurately receive and use this information in its decisions. Survey data corroborate the model's prediction that manufacturers are more likely to select VMI when retailers provide more precise sales and inventory (i.e., demand) information and when the manufacturers' systems ensure reliable transmission and receipt of this information. The study's results suggest that managerial accountants should consider the retailer's willingness to share sales and inventory information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer's ability to reliably transmit this information before implementing VMI systems.

Abstract This article discuss the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) current activities and goals as they relate to the accounting profession. The Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets was sent to the U.S. Congress, its 175 conclusions and recommendations covered almost every aspect of the securities industry. Since then, the difficult task of implementing the Study recommendations has preempted much of the SEC's time and energy. With the aid of the industry, one have made significant progress. One of the most important achievements was the formulation of the legislation recently passed by the Congress and now known as the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964. Under the new law, many accountants will, for the first time, be faced with problems under the federal securities laws. One should consider it particularly appropriate, therefore, to refer to certain of the new provisions which will be of particular interest to members of accounting profession. The 1964 Amendments deal chiefly with issues of securities traded in the over-the- counter market and the standards of broker dealer firms and their salesman.

Abstract The author discusses the impact of new revenue code on accounting. He describes the effects of taxation and tax laws on accounting theory and practice. He discusses the probable effects of changes in taxing rules on accounting practice. He clarifies the possible effects of tax rules on non-tax accounting by way of illustration. He further mentions two new methods which may be used for tax purposes, which are, the double-rate declining balance method and the sum of the years-digits method. He mentions the effects of changes that occur when a taxpayer changes from accrual method of reporting installment sales to the installment method and changes in the selection of fiscal years for tax purposes. He discusses the change that could affect the willingness of taxpayers to change from an accounting method for accounting purposes. He briefly mentions the minor changes which effected in bringing tax accounting closer to financial accounting and code changes which affect accounting indirectly. He mentions the responsibilities of the accounting profession in face of the new internal revenue code.

Abstract The article focuses on accounting changes brought about by the Revenue Act of 1954. Though the general rule for accounting methods under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as set forth in section 446, is substantially the same as the general rule under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, there are a number of specific types of accounting problems which are singled out for special treatment in the new Code. For the most part, these special provisions represent an effort on the part of the lawmakers to bring tax accounting into closer accord with generally accepted accounting principles. Under the various revenue acts prior to 1939 and under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, there were many differences between the accounting for certain transactions for tax purposes and for commercial purposes. Some of the major differences could be explained on the grounds of public policy, as in the case of the peculiar treatment of capital gains and losses and in the allowance of percentage depletion, to name only two. Others could be said to result from the necessity of determining taxable net income rather than business net income, as in the case of the allowances for expenses of a purely personal nature and the credits for personal exemptions.

Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the simultaneous problems of determining input levels in a multidivisional firm and allocating the input costs to the divisions. A distinction analogous to that in economics between pure public goods and pure private goods is made between pure common inputs and pure private inputs. It is shown that for a pure common input, decentralization utilizing a full cost allocation can result in an efficient allocation of the input. Although efficient decentralization is possible in this case, the "free-rider problem" suggests that such an outcome is unlikely. In addition, it is shown that recently suggested allocation schemes based on game-theoretic concepts may not lead to an efficient allocation of pure common inputs.

We document that accrual-based earnings management increased steadily from 1987 until the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, followed by a significant decline after the passage of SOX. Conversely, the level of real earnings management activities declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after the passage of SOX, suggesting that firms switched from accrual-based to real earnings management methods after the passage of SOX. We also document that the accrual-based earnings management activities were particularly high in the period immediately preceding SOX. Consistent with these results, we find that firms that just achieved important earnings benchmarks used less accruals and more real earnings management after SOX when compared to similar firms before SOX. In addition, our analysis provides evidence that the increases in accrual-based earnings management in the period preceding SOX were concurrent with increases in equity-based compensation. Our results suggest that stock-option components provide a differential set of incentives with regard to accrual-based earnings management. We document that while new options granted during the current period are negatively associated with income-increasing accrual-based earnings management, unexercised options are positively associated with income-increasing accrual-based earnings management.

ABSTRACT We examine whether customer-base concentration has a differential impact on profitability for firms contracting with major government customers versus firms contracting with major corporate customers. We document that firm profitability increases with the concentration of major government customers, but decreases with the concentration of major corporate customers. We attribute the contrasting results to the differential impact of major government and corporate customers on demand uncertainty. Specifically, firms contracting with major government customers face lower demand uncertainty that enables them to realize more efficiency gains from customer-specific investments, whereas firms contracting with major corporate customers are exposed to higher demand uncertainty that reduces the efficiency of customer-specific investments. Overall, our study suggests that major government customers are unique and important in the composition of customer base, and they impact firm outcomes in a significantly different way than major corporate customers. JEL Classifications: M41; L25; G14; H57.

ABSTRACT We examine whether the complexity of mandatory accounting disclosures prompts managers to voluntarily disclose adjusted measures of actual earnings performance, and whether this practice reflects attempts to obfuscate or mitigate the informational opacity accounting complexity creates for investors. Using the metadata in XBRL filings, we construct measures of accounting complexity that map directly to the mandated standards applied in financial statement filings. We find a positive and economically significant association between accounting complexity and managers’ propensity to disclose non-GAAP earnings information. This relation is robust and incremental to common measures of business and linguistic complexity, and the transitory nature of firms’ economic activities. We also find that the quality and informativeness of adjusted earnings information increases with accounting complexity, consistent with motives to better inform investors when accounting disclosures are complex. Overall, our results suggest that managers use non-GAAP earnings disclosure to mitigate the adverse informational effects of accounting complexity. Data Availability: All data are available from sources identified in the paper. JEL Classifications: M41; M43.

ABSTRACT Prior evidence shows a reduction in leverage after covenant violations, but we do not know whether covenants affect leverage before they are violated. In this study, we use an exogenous accounting-based shock to debt covenants that relaxed covenant tightness (SFAS 160) and examine whether covenants constrain leverage for borrowers that are close to violation, even when the borrower is financially healthy. We find that SFAS 160 increased debt levels in firms that were close to violation. This increase in debt was driven by financially healthy firms, suggesting the likelihood of future covenant violations could impede borrowing by firms. We also find an increase in investment sensitivity to Q after SFAS 160 in firms close to violation, suggesting the additional debt was used to make legitimate investments. Because SFAS 160 was passed in the midst of the financial crisis, it is difficult to generalize our findings to more normal financial periods. JEL Classifications: G01; G30; G31; G33; M21; M41.

ABSTRACT Calls from practice suggest that audit committee members with industry expertise can improve audit committee effectiveness. Nevertheless, regulators and the extant literature have focused on the financial expertise of the audit committee. We posit that audit committee industry knowledge is valuable because accounting guidance, estimates, and oversight of the external auditor are often linked to a company's operations within a particular industry. Taking a holistic view, we examine two measures of financial reporting quality (financial restatements and discretionary accruals) and two measures of external auditor oversight (audit and nonaudit fees). As predicted, we find that audit committee members who are both accounting and industry experts perform better than those with only accounting expertise. We also find that in certain instances, supervisory experts who are also industry experts perform better than supervisory experts alone. Overall, these results suggest that industry expertise, when combined with accounting expertise, can improve the effectiveness of the audit committee in monitoring the financial reporting process. Data Availability: All data are gathered from publicly available sources.