[This paper examines the factors influencing the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find that the use of non-financial measures increases with the level of regulation, the extent to which the firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy, the adoption of strategic quality initiatives, and the noise in financial measures. We find no evidence that the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts is associated with the level of financial distress or the value of CEO equity holdings relative to salary and bonus. Our results also provide no support for the hypothesis that CEOs with greater influence over the board of directors are more likely to be compensated based on non-financial measures.]

This paper develops and tests an option-style valuation model, whose main prediction is that equity value is a convex function of both earnings and book value, where the function depends on the relative values of earnings and book value. Earnings provides a measure of how the firm's resources are currently used. Book value provides a measure of the value of the firm's resources, independent of how the resources are currently used. When the ratio earnings/book value is high, the firm is likely to continue its current way of using resources, and earnings is the more important determinant of equity value. When earnings/book value is low, the firm is more likely to exercise the option to adapt its resources to a superior alternative use, and book value becomes the more important determinant of equity value. Evidence from a variety of empirical specifications is consistent with the convexity prediction.

This paper examines the factors influencing the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus con- tracts. We find that the use of non-financial measures increases with the level of regulation, the extent to which the firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy, the adoption of strategic quality initiatives, and the noise in financial measures. We find no evidence that the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts is associated with the level of financial distress or the value of CEO equity holdings relative to salary and bonus. Our results also provide no support for the hypothesis that CEOs with greater influence over the board of directors are more likely to be compensated based on non-financial measures.