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The Influences of Financial Statement Recognition and Analyst Coverage on the Market's Valuation of R&D Capital

The Accounting Review 2007 82(5), 1195-1225
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 141 (SFAS No. 141)'s requirement that an acquirer in a business combination estimate the fair value of the target's separately identifiable assets and liabilities (including research and development capital) provides a rare occasion where estimated fair values of U.S. firms' research and development (R&D) capital based on private information about their R&D activities are publicly disclosed. The degree to which equity values impound the estimated fair values of R&D depends upon the extent to which the private information implicit in the R&D estimates is reflected in investor expectations. Financial statement recognition of R&D capital and analyst activities have been cited as alternative mechanisms by which private information about firms' R&D activities can be revealed to investors. I investigate the degree to which both mechanisms lead to the public revelation of the private information implicit in the R&D fair value estimates by examining whether financial statement recognition of R&D assets by the target prior to the merger announcement and/or analyst coverage of a target prior to the merger announcement influence the degree to which the target's pre-merger announcement equity value reflects the acquirer's subsequently disclosed estimate of the fair value of the target's R&D capital. I find that the degree to which a target's pre-merger announcement equity value reflects the estimated fair value of its R&D capital is increasing in the amount of R&D-related intangibles captured in the target's pre-merger announcement balance sheets and in the number of analysts covering the target prior to the merger announcement. This evidence is consistent with the notion that both financial statement recognition and analysts' private information search activities lead to the revelation of private information about the value of R&D assets that investors incorporate into equity values. I further find that the positive relation between analyst following and the market's valuation of R&D capital is strongest for the portion of the estimated fair value of R&D capital that is unrecognized by the target prior to the merger announcement. This finding is consistent with analysts filling in the information gap left by the lack of financial statement recognition. The results of this study confirm the theorized roles of financial statement recognition and analyst activities in aiding the market's valuation of intangible assets.

Audit Team Brainstorming, Fraud Risk Identification, and Fraud Risk Assessment: Implications of SAS No. 99

The Accounting Review 2007 82(5), 1119-1140
SAS No. 99 requires brainstorming sessions on each audit to help auditors detect fraud. This study investigates audit team brainstorming sessions and the resulting fraud judgments. The psychology literature provides mixed results on the benefits of brainstorming. Results from my experiment suggest that while the overall number of ideas is reduced, brainstorming audit teams generate more quality fraud ideas than individual auditors generate before the brainstorming session. Further, audit teams generate new quality fraud ideas during the brainstorming session. Results also suggest that audit teams' fraud risk assessments after the brainstorming session are significantly higher than those assessments given by individual auditors on the team prior to the brainstorming session, especially when fraud is present. These results should be informative to standard setters as they suggest that brainstorming audit teams' generation of new quality fraud ideas and their improved fraud risk assessments will likely enhance their ability to identify fraud.

GASB No. 34's Governmental Financial Reporting Model: Evidence on Its Information Relevance

The Accounting Review 2007 82(1), 205-240
This study uses a sample of 530 Texas school districts to investigate the information relevance of governmental financial statements published under Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 34 (GASB No. 34). Specifically, we examine whether the new government-wide statements provide information relevant for assessing a government's default risk, and if this information is incremental to that provided by the governmental funds statements. GASB No. 34 requires governments to publish governmental funds statements prepared on a modified accrual basis, and government-wide statements prepared on an accrual basis. We find that GASB No. 34's Statement of Net Assets (similar to a corporation's balance sheet) provides information relevant for assessing default risk, and this information is incremental to that provided by the governmental funds statements. However, GASB No. 34's Statement of Activities (similar to a corporation's income statement) does not provide information relevant for assessing default risk. The accrual “earnings” measure is not more informative than the modified-accrual “earnings” measure. A government's modified accrual earnings measure can be thought of as a type of measure of changes in working capital. Therefore, our results are consistent with research on corporate entities that attributes the superiority of earnings over cash flows primarily to working capital accruals and not long-term accruals. For our sample of school districts, evidence suggests that total net assets from the government-wide Statement of Net Assets, along with a measure of modified-accrual “earnings” from the governmental funds statement, provide the best information for explaining default risk.

Are M.B.A. Students a Good Proxy for Nonprofessional Investors?

The Accounting Review 2007 82(1), 139-168
We investigate a key assumption underlying much of the experimental research in financial accounting that graduate business students are a good proxy for nonprofessional investors. To conduct our investigation, we categorize recent experimental studies in financial accounting, based on the relative level of integrative complexity inherent in each study's task. We then conduct experiments using two tasks, one that is relatively low in integrative complexity and one that is relatively high in integrative complexity, and compare the responses of two groups of M.B.A. students and nonprofessional investors. Our results suggest that using M.B.A. students as a proxy for nonprofessional investors is a valid methodological choice, provided researchers give careful consideration to aligning a task's integrative complexity with the appropriate level of M.B.A. student. M.B.A. students who have completed their core M.B.A. courses and are enrolled in or have completed a financial statement analysis course are a good proxy for nonprofessional investors in tasks that are relatively low in integrative complexity. Though less definitive, the majority of our tests also suggest that these students are a good proxy for nonprofessional investors in tasks that are relatively high in integrative complexity. However, care must be taken when using students in the first-year core financial accounting course. In tasks that are relatively low in integrative complexity, these students perform similarly to nonprofessional investors except when they are asked to make an investment decision. In tasks that are relatively high in integrative complexity, these students acquire information similarly to nonprofessional investors, but they do not appear to integrate the information in a similar manner.

Who Trades on Pro Forma Earnings Information?

The Accounting Review 2007 82(3), 581-619 open access
In recent years, many companies have emphasized adjusted-GAAP earnings numbers in their quarterly press releases. While managers use different names to describe these nonstandard earnings metrics, the financial press frequently refers to them as “pro forma” earnings. Managers and other advocates of pro forma reporting argue that these disclosures provide a clearer picture of companies' core earnings. On the other hand, regulators, policymakers, and the financial press often allege that managers' pro forma earnings disclosures are opportunistic attempts to mislead investors. Recent evidence suggests that while many pro forma earnings disclosures are altruistically motivated, some may represent managers' attempts to portray overly optimistic financial performance. If this is the case, then less wealthy, less sophisticated, individual investors are arguably the most at risk of being misled. Consequently, this study investigates who trades on pro forma earnings information. Our intraday investigation of transactions around earnings announcements containing pro forma earnings information reveals that less sophisticated investors' announcement-period abnormal trading is significantly positively associated with the magnitude and direction of the earnings surprise based on pro forma earnings. In contrast, we find no association between sophisticated investors' trading and manager-reported pro forma information. Overall, our analyses and numerous robustness tests suggest that the segment of the market that relies on pro forma earnings information is populated predominantly by less sophisticated individual investors. This evidence is particularly relevant to standard-setters and regulators given that Section 401(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and subsequent SEC regulations are specifically designed to protect ordinary investors from misleading pro forma information.