We present a theory that poor matching manifests as noise in the economic relation of advancing expenses to earn revenues. As a result, poor matching decreases the correlation between contemporaneous revenues and expenses, increases earnings volatility, decreases earnings persistence, and induces a negative autocorrelation in earnings changes. The empirical tests document these effects in a sample of the 1,000 largest U.S. firms over the last 40 years. We find a clear and economically substantial trend of declining contemporaneous correlation between revenues and expenses, increased volatility of earnings, declining persistence of earnings, and increased negative autocorrelation in earnings changes. The combined evidence suggests that accounting matching has become worse over time and that this trend has a pronounced effect on the properties of the resulting earnings. This evidence also suggests that the standard-setters’ stated goal of moving away from matching and toward more fair-value accounting is likely to continue and deepen the identified trends in the properties of earnings.

This paper examines whether stock-option grants explain missed earnings targets, including reported losses, earnings declines, and missed analysts' forecasts. Anecdotal evidence and surveys suggest that managers believe that missing an earnings target can cause stock-price drops (Graham et al. 2006). Empirical studies corroborate this notion (Skinner and Sloan 2002; Lopez and Rees 2002). Thus, a missed target could benefit an executive via lower strike price on subsequent option grants. Prior option grant studies explore only general downward earnings management (Balsam et al. 2003; Baker et al. 2003), but our study is the first to explore whether option grants encourage missed earnings targets. Indeed, if missed targets drive the prior results, then the literature has failed to document an important negative outcome of stock-option incentives. We use quarterly and annual data for fixed-date options granted after firms announce they have missed earnings targets. We find that firms that miss earnings targets have larger and more valuable subsequent grants. Further, we find that the likelihood of missing earnings targets for firms that manage earnings downward increases with stock-option grants. To control for the possibility that firms miss earnings targets for operational reasons, we only include firms that likely managed earnings downward (Dechow et al. 1995; Phillips et al. 2003). Backdating or opportunistic timing of grants cannot explain our results because we include only fixed-date grants. While many studies explicitly consider whether and why managers meet or beat earnings targets, ours is the first study to find that some managers may seek to miss earnings targets (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997).

We develop and describe a new measure of long-run corporate tax avoidance that is based on the ability to pay a low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre-tax earnings over long time periods. We label this measure the “long-run cash effective tax rate.” We use the long-run cash effective tax rate to examine (1) the extent to which some firms are able to avoid taxes over periods as long as ten years, and (2) how predictive one-year tax rates are for long-run tax avoidance. In our sample of 2,077 firms, we find there is considerable cross-sectional variation in tax avoidance. For example, approximately one-fourth of our sample firms are able to maintain long-run cash effective tax rates below 20 percent, compared to a sample mean tax rate of approximately 30 percent. We also find that annual cash effective tax rates are not very good predictors of long-run cash effective tax rates and, thus, are not accurate proxies for long-run tax avoidance. While there is some evidence of persistence in annual cash effective tax rates, the persistence is asymmetric. Low annual cash effective tax rates are more persistent than are high annual cash effective tax rates. An initial examination of characteristics of firms successful at keeping their cash effective tax rates low over long periods shows that they are well spread across industries but with some clustering.

We analyze a sample of 330 firms making unaudited disclosures required by Section 302 and 383 firms making audited disclosures required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find that Section 302 disclosures are associated with negative announcement abnormal returns of −1.8 percent, and that firms experience an abnormal increase in equity cost of capital of 68 basis points. We conclude that Section 302 disclosures are informative and point to lower credibility of disclosing firms' financial reporting. In contrast, we find that Section 404 disclosures have no noticeable impact on stock prices or firms' cost of capital. Further, we find that auditor quality attenuates the negative response to Section 302 disclosures and that accelerated filers—larger firms required to file under Section 404—have significantly less negative returns (−1.10 percent) than non-accelerated filers (−4.22 percent). The findings have implications for the debate about whether to implement a scaled securities regulation system for smaller public companies: material weakness disclosures are more informative for smaller firms that likely have higher pre-disclosure information uncertainty.

We find that equity returns associated with credit risk changes are attenuated by the debt value effect of the credit risk changes, as Merton (1974) predicts. We find that the relation between credit risk changes and equity returns is significantly less negative for firms with more debt—controlling for asset value changes, credit risk increases (decreases) are associated with equity value increases (decreases). This result obtains across credit risk levels. The relation is associated with changes in both expected cash flows and systematic risk, as reflected in analyst earnings forecasts and equity cost of capital. By inverting the Merton (1974) model, we provide descriptive evidence that if unrecognized debt value changes were recognized in income, but not unrecognized asset value changes, most credit upgrade (downgrade) firms would recognize lower (higher) income. These potentially counterintuitive income effects primarily are attributable to incomplete recognition of contemporaneous asset value changes. However, for a substantial majority of downgrade firms we find that recognized asset write-downs exceed unrecognized gains from debt value decreases. This mitigates concerns that income effects from recognizing changes in debt values would be anomalous for such firms.