This paper examines whether investor relations (IR) officers provide value by facilitating the assimilation of firm information by the market. We find that firms with IR officers have lower stock price volatility, lower analyst forecast dispersion, higher analyst forecast accuracy, and quicker price discovery, consistent with IR officers aiding market participants in their assimilation of firm information. We also show that our findings are stronger for firms with longer-tenured IR officers. Finally, we find that when firms transition from a long-tenured IR officer to a new IR officer, stock price volatility increases, analyst forecasts become more disperse and less accurate, and the price discovery process slows, despite no significant change in the firm's disclosures, media coverage, or performance around the turnover. Collectively, these findings suggest that in-house IR officers, particularly those with greater experience, help facilitate information assimilation by the market, which has positive market effects.

In this paper, we investigate the stock market valuation of the intangible asset created by selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenditure. Although GAAP requires immediate expensing of SG&A, prior studies show that current SG&A generates future economic benefits, suggesting that it creates an intangible asset. We find that the contemporaneous stock market seems to recognize some of the intangible asset value implicit in SG&A. Positive subsequent returns can be earned in firms with a high SG&A intangible asset value. These excess returns are more likely due to investor mispricing than to risk compensation. Furthermore, we find that both analysts' long-term growth forecast revisions and one-year-ahead forecast errors are positively associated with the future value created by current SG&A, indicating that analysts partially incorporate the intangible SG&A asset value into their forecasts. Overall, the evidence suggests that the capital market only partially recognizes the intangible asset value created by SG&A expenditure.

We investigate the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty, where tax uncertainty is the amount of unrecognized tax benefits recorded over the same time period as the tax avoidance. On average, we find that tax avoiders, i.e., firms with relatively low cash effective tax rates, bear significantly greater tax uncertainty than firms that have higher cash effective tax rates. We find that the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty is stronger for firms with frequent patent filings and tax haven subsidiaries, proxies for intangible-related transfer pricing strategies. The findings have implications for several puzzling results in the literature.

We examine how personal lending relationships between lenders and managers are affected by information and accounting environments of borrowing firms. We address this question by exploring whether, following managerial turnover, lenders migrate with the manager from the firm where a relationship developed (origin firm) to the manager's new firm (destination firm). We find that the opacity of the external information environment of the destination firm significantly increases the probability of lenders' co-migration, while accounting irregularities at both the destination and origin firms decrease it. We also show that co-migration is affected by a lender's monitoring efficiency. A lender's monitoring efficiency increases its co-migration probability when a manager moves to an opaque firm, but not when she moves to a transparent one. When the destination or origin firm experiences accounting irregularities, even lenders with strong monitoring capabilities are mostly reluctant to continue their relationship with a migrating manager.