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Profit Sharing in an Auditing Oligopoly

The Accounting Review 2005 80(2), 677-702
This paper examines how partners in an audit firm can use profit-sharing rules to induce optimal partner behavior from the firm's point of view, taking into account the strategic competition of firms in an auditing oligopoly. We use a linear contracting framework to investigate the effects of profit-sharing rules on individual partners' various decisions, including their pricing strategies and effort choices.We assume that efficient audits of different types of clients require different effort profiles with respect to degree of partner cooperation. For example, the audit of a complex company requires different amounts of partner collaboration than does the audit of a simple company. Moreover, since it is too costly for an enforcement party, such as the head office of an audit firm or a court, to verify each client's type in order to resolve compensation disputes among the firm's partners, it is reasonable to assume that client type cannot be contracted upon for partner compensation purposes. Given this assumption, we derive conditions under which there exists an equilibrium in which audit firms strategically choose different profit-sharing rules to specialize in different types of clients, thereby earning positive economic profits. Our analysis provides insights into the strategic competition among the big audit firms, and helps to explain the observed differences in the compensation plans of these firms and in the nature of their client portfolios.

The Big Four: The Curious Past and Perilous Future of the Global Accounting Monopoly

The Accounting Review 2019 94(1), 353-356
Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation Dan A. Simunic, Gary C. Biddle; The Big Four: The Curious Past and Perilous Future of the Global Accounting Monopoly. The Accounting Review 1 January 2019; 94 (1): 353–356. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-10638 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

Cross-Listing Audit Fee Premiums: Theory and Evidence

The Accounting Review 2009 84(5), 1429-1463
We study the effects of cross-listings on audit fees. We first develop a model in which legal environments play a crucial role in determining the auditor's legal liability. Our model and analysis predict that auditors charge higher fees for firms that are cross-listed in countries with stronger legal regimes than they do for non-cross-listed firms and that the cross-listing audit fee premium increases with the difference in the strength of legal regimes between the cross-listed foreign country and the home country. We then empirically test these predictions. The results of our cross-country regressions strongly support our predictions. In addition, we find no significant cross-listing fee premium for firms that are cross-listed in countries whose legal regimes are. no stronger than those of their home countries. This suggests that cross-listing audit fee premiums are associated with increased legal liability and not with increased audit complexity per se. Our findings help explain why cross-listing premiums occur and what determines their magnitude.