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Estimating the Marginal Cost of Operating a Service Department When Reciprocal Services Exist

The Accounting Review 1989 64(3), 449-467
[Prior work has examined models in which the reciprocal cost allocation method yields allocation rates that are equal to the marginal costs of operating service departments. We extend this work by analyzing more general production functions for service departments and by incorporating uncertainty. The results demonstrate that the allocation rates derived from the reciprocal cost allocation method are random variables that, in general, are not equal to the expected marginal costs of operating the service departments. In particular, the reciprocal cost allocation rates are biased estimates of these expected marginal costs if any of the service departments operate at a point on their production functions at which the marginal physical product is not equal to the average physical product of their inputs. We also analyze three econometric procedures that provide consistent estimates of the marginal costs. The simulation results indicate that the standard deviations of these estimators are considerably larger than those of the reciprocal cost allocation rates. Because the estimates of the marginal costs provided by the reciprocal cost allocation method have a greater degree of bias, but a lower standard deviation than the estimates provided by the other methods, none of the methods provide estimators that are unambiguously best. Factors that affect the magnitudes of the bias and relative efficiency of the reciprocal cost allocation rates are also discussed.]

The Perceived Importance of Selected Information Characteristics for Strategic Capital Budgeting Decisions.

The Accounting Review 1981 56(3), 519-538
This study examines whether executives have similar preferences regarding information which may be used in making strategic capital budgeting decisions. Measures of perceived importance for selected information characteristics were obtained from 53 senior-level executives involved in strategic capital budgeting decisions. The results suggest that (1) executives have similar informational preferences, (2) the preferred information characteristics depend upon which stage of the decision-problem identification, alternative development, or selection--is being considered by the executive, and (3) environmental and organizational structure variables are not associated with an executive's informational preferences. The potential implications of these results for management accounting system design and for future research are discussed.

The Choice of Performance Measures in Annual Bonus Contracts

The Accounting Review 1997 72(2), 231-255
[This paper examines the factors influencing the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find that the use of non-financial measures increases with the level of regulation, the extent to which the firm follows an innovation-oriented strategy, the adoption of strategic quality initiatives, and the noise in financial measures. We find no evidence that the choice of performance measures in bonus contracts is associated with the level of financial distress or the value of CEO equity holdings relative to salary and bonus. Our results also provide no support for the hypothesis that CEOs with greater influence over the board of directors are more likely to be compensated based on non-financial measures.]

The Executive Compensation Effects of Equity-for-Debt Swaps

The Accounting Review 1989 64(2), 201-227
[This paper provides an analysis of the association between the accounting gain produced by an equity-for-debt swap and executive compensation. Our results suggest that the executives of firms completing a swap transaction experience an increase in cash compensation (salary plus bonus). The increase is largest both in absolute magnitude and in statistical significance for firms whose compensation plans are more "accounting-oriented" (i.e., firms whose executives would be expected to experience the greatest increase in compensation under the hypothesis that firm's compensation plan is not adjusted for the accounting gain produced by the swap). We also find that, on average, the value of the executives' personal equity holdings decreases in the period surrounding the announcement of the swap. The magnitude of this decrease is, on average, comparable in size to the increase in their compensation. However, there is some weak evidence that executives of firms whose compensation plans are more "accounting-oriented" experience a statistically significant increase in their total wealth (i.e., the sum of excess compensation and the value of personal equity holdings) as a result of the swap transaction.]

The Oil and Gas Accounting Controversy: An Analysis of Economic Consequences.

The Accounting Review 1983 58(4), 706-732
Diverse interpretations of the security market reaction to the Exposure Draft for FASB Statement No. 19 exist. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the oil and gas accounting controversy, First, expanded theoretical models for the potential incentive effects and political effects that have been proposed as explanations for the observed security price behavior are developed. Second, the independent variables isolated by our models are used to explore the differential security market reactions of the full cost firms to the Exposure Draft. The empirical results indicate that the variables posited by our theoretical models explain a non-trivial portion of the differential security market reaction for full cost firms. These results provide evidence which is consistent with the existence of an incentive effect.

Estimating the Marginal Cost of Operating a Service Department When Reciprocal Services Exist.

The Accounting Review 1989 64(3), 449-467
Prior work has examined models in which the reciprocal cost allocation method yields allocation rates that are equal to the marginal costs of operating service departments. We extend this work by analyzing more general production functions for service departments and by incorporating uncertainty. The results demonstrate that the allocation rates derived from the reciprocal cost allocation method are random variables that, in general, are not equal to the expected marginal costs of operating the service departments. In particular, the reciprocal cost allocation rates are biased estimates of these expected marginal costs if any of the service departments operate at a point on their production functions at which the marginal physical product is not equal to the average physical product of their inputs. We also analyze three econometric procedures that provide consistent estimates of the marginal costs. The simulation results indicate that the standard deviations of these estimators are considerably larger than those of the reciprocal cost allocation rates. Because the estimates of the marginal costs provided by the reciprocal cost allocation method have a greater degree of bias, but a lower standard deviation than the estimates provided by the other methods, none of the methods provide estimators that are unambiguously best. Factors that affect the magnitudes of the bias and relative efficiency of the reciprocal cost allocation rates are also discussed.

An Examination of the Linear and Retrospective Process Tracing Approaches to Judgment Modeling.

The Accounting Review 1983 58(1), 58-77
Linear model and retrospective process tracing methods of judgment modeling are compared in terms of predictive validity and convergence between measures of cue importance, in addition, the reliability of the linear model is examined. The experimental task required each of 31 subjects to provide either a buy or no-buy decision for 45 stocks (each described by six information cues). For each subject, a linear model was estimated and a retrospective process tracing model was generated by reference to post-experimental verbal reports. The results indicated that (1) each approach exhibited predictive validity, but the retrospective process tracings exhibited a superior ability to replicate the observed judgments, (2) linear model and retrospective process tracing measures of cue importance were related (exhibited convergent validity), and (3) the linear models were generally reliable.

The Executive Compensation Effects of Equity-for-Debt Swaps.

The Accounting Review 1989 64(2), 201-227
This paper provides an analysis of the association between the accounting gain produced by an equity-for-debt swap and executive compensation, Our results suggest that the executives of firms completing a swap transaction experience an Increase in cash compensation (salary plus bonus). The increase is largest both in absolute magnitude and in statistical significance for firms whose compensation plans are more "accounting-oriented" (i.e., firms whose executives would be expected to experience the greatest Increase in compensation under the hypothesis that firm's compensation plan is not adjusted for the accounting gain produced by the swap), We also find that, on average, the value of the executives' personal equity holdings decreases in the period surrounding the announcement of the swap. The magnitude of this decrease is, on average, comparable in size to the increase in their compensation. However, there is some weak evidence that executives of firms whose compensation plans are more "accounting-oriented" experience a statistically significant increase in their total wealth (i.e., the sum of excess compensation and the value of personal equity holdings) as a result of the swap transaction.

Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance

The Accounting Review 2007 82(4), 963-1008 open access
The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed “corporate governance.” Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.

Trades by Insiders and Mandated Accounting Standards.

The Accounting Review 1983 58(3), 606-620
This paper examines trades by insiders as a means of providing additional evidence regarding whether mandated accounting standards give rise to economic consequences. It is argued that corporate insiders should possess information on the economic consequences of accounting pronouncements (or lack thereof) that is at least as accurate as that possessed by other security market participants. Therefore, "unusual" insider trading around the time of a mandated accounting change suggests that insiders perceive that there are economic consequences associated with the accounting change. This research approach was used to examine the trades by insiders in the period surrounding the exposure draft for FASB Statement No. 19. The results indicate that full-cost insiders were selling (relative to their historical behavior and the behavior of successful-efforts insiders) in this period. One (although not the only) interpretation of this result is that full-cost insiders perceive that FASB Statement No. 19 is associated with adverse economic consequences for their firms.