To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committee members. Although many audit committees appear to be “fully” independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have “friendship” ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through “advice networks” do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the text.

Although employees' time estimates are used extensively for costing purposes, they are prone to measurement error. In an experimental setting, we research how measurement error in time estimates varies with: (1) the level of aggregation in the definition of costing system activities (aggregated or disaggregated); (2) task coherence (the extent to which the activities that require time estimates present themselves coherently or incoherently); and (3) when notice is given that time estimates will be required (in advance or after the fact), that is, whether participants know that time estimates will be required before they perform the activities. We also test on response mode (estimates in percentages or absolute time units). The results suggest an important trade-off between the level of aggregation and measurement error: increasing aggregation in the definition of activities leads to lower measurement error. Also, advance notification reduces measurement error, especially in settings with aggregated activities or incoherent tasks. Finally, we find a strong overestimation bias when participants provide time estimates in minutes, which may be problematic for Time-Driven Activity-Based Costing that advocates the use of estimates in minutes. These results are relevant to accountants and decision makers who want to assess and control the measurement error in their costing system and to professionals in related areas that make use of time estimates (e.g., billing, tendering).

We examine the effect of more precise cost information on contract renegotiations between supply-chain parties. Specifically, we experimentally investigate the benefits of activity-based costing (ABC) information to address common supply-chain inefficiencies that are caused by the buyer or the seller, but have the same underlying costs. Results suggest that the impact of more precise cost information depends crucially on the cause of the inefficiency that parties need to address during the negotiation. ABC information increases the total joint profit in the supply chain. However, ABC information increases the seller's perceptions of the fairness of the buyer's arguments for contract changes only when the buyer causes the inefficiency but not when the seller causes the inefficiency. The combined effect of ABC information on joint profit and fairness perceptions thus increases the buyer's profit only when buyer causes the inefficiency but not when the seller causes the inefficiency. Data Availability: Data are available from the first author upon request.

Many companies administer wage policies based on tournaments or have different salaries attached to various promotion-based ranks within the company. Employees, however, do not always receive information about pay-level differences at higher ranks prior to joining the company. While some companies openly disclose prize spread information across these ranks, others keep such information secret. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the availability of tournament prize spread information enhances employee effort through both a selection effect and a motivation effect. We predict and find that when employees can select into tournaments of varying prize spreads (which proxies for an environment where prize spread information is available), high-ability employees are more likely than low-ability employees to select into the tournament with a larger prize spread. Thus, the availability of prize spread information produces a separation of employees based on ability. We also find that employees exert more effort when they can select into a tournament than when they are randomly assigned to one (which proxies for an environment where prize spread information is absent). We show that this result is driven by greater homogeneity in the ability of tournament contestants when the availability of tournament prize spread information provides self-selection opportunity. JEL Classifications: C91; D83; M40. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors on request.