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The Differential Timeliness of Stock Price in Incorporating Bad versus Good News and the Earnings-Return Asymmetry

The Accounting Review 2023 98(6), 97-124
The larger association between earnings and contemporaneous returns for negative returns than for positive returns is often attributed to conditional conservatism. We reason that this asymmetry may also be driven by the lack of timeliness with which stock price incorporates bad news relative to good news. Consistent with our reasoning, we show that when stock price incorporates bad news with delay, the asymmetry can exist in the absence of conditional conservatism. This suggests the testable hypothesis that the asymmetry decreases (increases) with factors that facilitate (impede) the incorporation of bad news into stock price. Using stock liquidity to test this hypothesis, we find that the earnings-return asymmetry decreases as stock liquidity increases. Our findings support the view that variation in the earnings-return asymmetry also reflects variation in the quality of the return generation process. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources cited in the text.

The Importance of IRS Enforcement to Stock Price Crash Risk: The Role of CEO Power and Incentives

The Accounting Review 2021 96(4), 81-109 open access
We analyze whether tough IRS monitoring generates a positive externality by constraining managers' bad news hoarding activities. Supporting this prediction, we find a negative relation between the threat of an IRS audit and stock price crash risk. Our evidence is consistent with recent theory that outside investors learn more about firms when tax enforcement is stricter. Additionally, path analysis suggests that the monitoring channel (direct path) plays a critical role in shaping crash risk relative to information asymmetry channels of tax planning and accruals manipulation (indirect paths). Consistent with other predictions, we find that the monitoring role of IRS audits intensifies when firms experience worse agency conflicts stemming from CEO power and incentives. Collectively, our research implies that external monitoring by tax authorities protects shareholders against managers suppressing negative firm-specific information that engenders stock price crash risk, particularly when CEOs have wider scope and stronger incentives to hoard bad news.