We investigate the determinants of analysts' target price implied returns and the implication of our findings for investment decision-making. We identify four broad sets of factors that help explain the cross-sectional variation in target price implied returns: future realized stock returns, errors in forecasting fundamentals, errors in forecasting the expected return to risk, and biases relating to analysts' incentives. Our results suggest that all four sets help explain target price implied returns, with errors in forecasting the expected return to empirical risk proxies having the greatest impact. Collectively, these variables explain nearly a quarter of the cross-sectional variation in target price implied returns. We use our model to predict the optimistic bias in target price implied returns and evaluate whether investors correctly ignore the predictable bias. The results suggest that investors make similar valuation errors to analysts and/or do not perfectly back out the predicted bias in target prices.

We investigate analysts' motives for rounding annual EPS forecasts (placing a zero or five in the penny location of the forecast). We first show that an intuitive reason for analysts to engage in rounding is in circumstances where the penny digit of the forecast is of less economic significance. By rounding, analysts reveal that their forecasts are not intended to be precise to the penny. We also show that analyst incentives impact the likelihood of rounding. Specifically, we predict that analysts will exert less effort forecasting earnings for firms that generate less brokerage or investment banking business since such firms create less value for the analysts' employers. As a consequence of this reduced effort and attention, the analyst will be more uncertain about the penny digit of the forecast and so will round. Our results are consistent with this prediction. One implication of our findings is that a rounded forecast is a simple and easily observable proxy for a more noisy measure of the market's expectation of earnings. Consistent with this implication, we show that rounded forecasts bias down earnings response coefficients at earnings announcements.