I examine whether voting premiums are reduced following mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption for firms that have a dual-class share structure. I find that mandatory adopters' voting premiums decrease, on average, by 8 percent subsequent to mandatory IFRS adoption. This effect is statistically significant relative to the corresponding effect for non-IFRS adopters. Further, I find that this effect is more pronounced in countries with strong legal enforcement and for mandatory adopters that experience an increase in the transparency and comparability of reported information under the new accounting regime. Taken together, these results support the view that mandatory IFRS adoption benefits minority shareholders by providing an effective mechanism to constrain the private benefits of control. However, one should interpret these results with caution as concurrent efforts to strengthen corporate governance regimes and the enforcement of corporate and securities laws may also contribute to the decrease in voting premiums documented in this paper. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from the sources listed in the text.

Firms provide convexity in managers' compensation plans (vega) to induce risk-averse managers to pursue risky, positive net present value projects. The resulting alignment of managers' and shareholders' incentives creates conflicts with lenders, who face an increased risk of default when managers pursue risky investments. We hypothesize that lenders would respond by stepping up their monitoring and threatening foreclosure to inhibit managers from acting on their vega incentives. Strong lender monitoring should, thus, reduce the efficacy of vega incentives. We test this hypothesis in a unique setting, where lenders purchase credit insurance, reduce their exposure to downside risk, and lower their monitoring. Afterward, we find a stronger association between vega incentives and the firms' risky investments. We contribute to the literature by showing that strong lender monitoring reduces the effectiveness of vega incentives and, thus, of the compensation mechanisms that boards of directors put in place to resolve manager-shareholder conflicts.

This study examines the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on IPO underpricing and the relative amount of IPO capital raised in foreign markets. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find a decrease in IPO underpricing and an increase in the relative proceeds from foreign markets following mandatory IFRS adoption. We also find that mandatory IFRS adoption has a greater impact on IPO underpricing and relative foreign proceeds for firms in countries with a larger number of accounting changes, and this relation is more pronounced among firms in countries with stronger implementation credibility. In addition, we find that the decrease in underpricing associated with mandatory IFRS adoption holds for both domestic IPOs and global IPOs, and this effect is more pronounced for global IPOs than for domestic IPOs. Overall, our study contributes to the literature by documenting the impact of changes in financial accounting standards on IPO underpricing and capital market globalization.

We examine whether proprietary costs drive R&D-active firms' choice of private loan structure. We find that R&D-active firms are more likely to choose single-lender over multi-lender private loan financing. This is consistent with the theory that high-ability entrepreneurs protect their proprietary knowledge by communicating it to a single lender while disclosing generic and less sensitive information to the public. This propensity, however, significantly decreases after the enactment of the American Inventor's Protection Act (AIPA), which accelerated public disclosure of firms' patent details in filings with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This accelerated public disclosure potentially caused R&D information to spill over to rivals, increasing the proprietary costs of single-lender borrowers. AIPA enactment also increased the spread on R&D-active firms' single-lender loans. These findings contribute to the voluntary disclosure and financing choice literature by linking R&D-active firms' choice of single-lender financing to the proprietary costs of public disclosure. Data Availability: From public sources identified in the study.