I empirically investigate the impact of an organization's creativity dependency on the design of its incentive system. In firms for which the primary source of value creation is the creativity of core employees, the designs of incentive systems are particularly challenging. The nature of creative work constrains the feasibility of extrinsic incentives, but at the same time creates a need for them. Accordingly, there is concern that the use of incentives renders people not creative enough, but a lack of incentives makes employees “too creative.” I argue that a solution to this dilemma is the acknowledgment that the decision to use performance-based pay is not made in isolation, but as part of a set of complementary choices. I theoretically argue and empirically show that subjective evaluations of non-task-related performance and performance-based pay are complements in a creativity-dependent setting. I further argue that the intense use of both control mechanisms is the incentive system that best accommodates the control requirements of creativity-dependent firms, and show that the likelihood of choosing this system increases with the creativity dependency.

Firms are facing increasing pressure to provide information about their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) commitment. Firms however differ in the quality of how they communicate CSR-related efforts to stakeholders as well as in the intensity of their CSR contracting. We examine the relationship between CSR disclosures and contracting and argue that the designs of the two practices are complements in signaling a CSR commitment. Using hand-collected data to capture disclosure quality of CSR reports and intensity of CSR contracting (i.e., scope, importance, and degree to which CSR metrics are incorporated) for S&P 500 firms, we show that firms indeed align the design choices of the two practices. In addition, firms using both practices intensively are associated with a stronger CSR commitment and more credible CSR disclosures. Finally, we document that firms that face higher credibility concerns show stronger complementarity between the design of these two practices. Data Availability: All data are available from public sources mentioned in the text.

While prior research on performance evaluation bias has mainly focused on the determinants and consequences of rating errors, we investigate how a firm can provide implicit incentives to supervisors to mitigate these errors via its calibration committee. We empirically examine the extent to which a calibration committee incorporates supervisors' evaluation behavior with respect to their subordinates in the performance evaluation outcomes, i.e., performance ratings and promotion decisions, for these supervisors. In our study, we distinguish between lack of skills and opportunism as two important facets of evaluation behavior, which we expect the calibration committee to address differently. Using panel data of a professional service firm, we show that supervisors' opportunistic behavior to strategically inflate subordinates' performance ratings is disciplined through a decrease in the supervisors' own performance rating, while the supervisors' skills to provide less compressed and, thus, more informative performance ratings is rewarded through a higher likelihood of promotion.

Periodic demand forecasts are the primary planning and coordination mechanism within organizations. Because most demand forecasts incorporate human judgment, they are subject to both unintentional error and intentional opportunistic bias. We examine whether a disaggregation of the forecast into various sources of demand reduces forecast error and bias. Using proprietary data from a manufacturing organization, we find that absolute demand forecast error declines following the implementation of a disaggregated forecast system. We also find a favorable effect of forecast disaggregation on finished goods inventory without a corresponding increase in costly production plan changes. We further document a decline in positive forecast bias, except for products whose production is limited owing to scarce production resources. This implies that disaggregation alone is not sufficient to overcome heightened incentives of self-interested sales managers to positively bias the forecast for the very products that an organization would like to avoid tying up in inventory. Data Availability: Data are the property of the research partner and may not be redistributed by the authors.