Prior studies employ a two-period empirical model and interpret the negative association between accruals in period one and returns in period two as evidence that investors misprice the information contained in accruals. In contrast to prior studies, I employ a three-period log-linear model decomposed from a firm’s book-to-market ratio and show that investors do not misprice the information contained in accruals. My study shows that in the four-year period prior to accrual recognition, equity prices tend to be driven disproportionately by intangible returns, or returns not explained by accounting measures. Accordingly, the relation between prior period intangible returns and future period returns subsumes the relation between current period accruals and future returns. In addition, I link the accrual anomaly and the value/growth anomaly to a common economic mechanism (intangible returns) and show that a strong negative relation between external financing activities and future returns is not subsumed by the accrual anomaly.

This book contends that the current accounting model, which is used worldwide, and the current accounting standard setting process are seriously deficient. The book describes the deficiencies in an historical context and proposes two complete new models to correct the deficiencies. One is an accounting model called the 'wealth measurement early warning model'. The other is a standard setting process model called the 'quick response model'. The new models are revolutionary and controversial. They are revolutionary in the sense of imposing extensive changes on the accounting establishment, but also because they have three characteristics that are totally absent in the current system: they are simple to understand and apply; they are quick to answer questions about new situations; and, they are reflective of economic events as they occur.

Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Search Site Cite View This Citation Add to Citation Manager Citation Steven J. Kachelmeier; Introduction to a Forum on Individual Differences in Accounting Behavior. The Accounting Review 1 July 2010; 85 (4): 1127–1128. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.4.1127 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentThe Accounting Review Search Advanced Search

I am grateful for helpful feedback and suggestions from Linda Bamber, Jean Bedard, and Tracie Majors on an earlier version of this report, though I assume full responsibility. I also thank Mary Capps for painstakingly checking the current affiliations in the Appendix of ad hoc reviewers. Annual Report and Editorial Commentary for The Accounting Review

This study tests the hypothesis that founder CEOs are less likely to be fired than non-founder CEOs when accounting irregularities are disclosed. We also examine whether CFOs are more likely to shoulder the blame when the CEO is a founder. Using a sample of 96 newly public firms with accounting irregularities, and a control sample of similar newly public firms, we document that the probability of CEO (CFO) turnover in the wake of an accounting irregularity is lower (higher) when the firm's CEO is also a founder. The difference in CEO turnover rates is dramatic, with nonfounder CEOs turning over at a rate of 49 percent, as compared to only 29 percent for founder CEOs. Our overall findings are consistent with the notion that the board's response to irregularities differs when the CEO is a founder.

• Accountants and analysts as financial intermediaries Volume I, Part I • Measuring corporate earnings and profitability Volume I, Part II • Financial ratios, the risk of failure, and stock returns Volume I, Part III • Equity valuation Volume I, Part IV • Price-earnings ratios, market-to-book ratios, and stock returns Volume II, Part I • Earnings and stock returns Volume II, Part II • Fundamental analysis and stock returns Volume II, Part III

Performance-based compensation contracts can affect productivity both by motivating effort and by attracting workers whose abilities align best with the offered contracts. Using an experiment in which participants design “rebus puzzles,” this study tests whether the incremental benefits of contract self-selection extend to a multi-dimensional performance environment in which participants choose between a contract that rewards both quantity and creativity versus a contract that rewards quantity only. Findings indicate that participants who choose a creativity-weighted pay scheme perceive themselves to have greater creative potential than those who choose a quantity-only scheme. This perceived creativity advantage manifests itself in the superior initial creativity ratings of such participants’ productive output. However, in the aggregate, participants paid only for quantity eventually surpass the creativity-weighted productivity scores of participants paid for creativity-weighted productivity, whether compensation contracts are self-selected or randomly assigned. Thus, the implications of contract selection on creativity-weighted productivity hinge on the importance of the initial advantage enjoyed by participants who self-select a creativity-weighted contract.

This study focuses on the persistence and market value implications of a subset of nonrecurring charges that are atypical due to repeated occurrence. The increased recurrence of supposedly nonrecurring items perhaps reflects managerial shifting of (more permanent) ordinary expenses to a transitory category or, alternatively, may reflect an environment where these items naturally occur more frequently. Either scenario suggests that these repetitive charges have future earnings implications dramatically different from truly nonrecurring events and should therefore be valued more like a recurring component of earnings. Consistent with this notion, we find that as the frequency of reporting negative special items increases (measured by the presence of multiple prior charges), the persistence of these items significantly increases with respect to future earnings. Our evidence also suggests that the valuation multiple on such charges increases with frequency. That is, the market values “recurring nonrecurring” items more like the other components of recurring earnings.

We review and evaluate the methods commonly used in the accounting literature to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. While much of the accounting literature studies settings in which variables are cross-sectionally and serially correlated, we find that the extant methods are not robust to both forms of dependence. Contrary to claims in the literature, we find that the Z2 statistic and Newey-West corrected Fama-MacBeth standard errors do not correct for both cross-sectional and time-series dependence. We show that extant methods produce misspecified test statistics in common accounting research settings, and that correcting for both forms of dependence substantially alters inferences reported in the literature. Specifically, several findings in the implied cost of equity capital literature, the cost of debt literature, and the conservatism literature appear not to be robust to the use of well-specified test statistics.

We examine auditor independence in the banking industry by analyzing the relation between fees paid to auditors and the extent of earnings management through loan loss provisions (LLP). We also examine whether this relation differs across large banks whose managements are required under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act to evaluate internal control over financial reporting and whose auditors must attest to the effectiveness of such internal controls, and small banks that are not subject to those requirements. We find that unexpected auditor fees are unrelated to earnings management for large banks. For small banks, we find greater earnings management via under-provisioning of LLP by banks that pay higher unexpected total and nonaudit fees to the auditor. These results suggest that auditor fee dependence on the audit client is associated with earnings management via abnormal LLP and is a potential threat to auditor independence for small banks. Our findings are relevant to policymakers contemplating new regulations in light of the recent banking crisis.