We examine how accounting practices that aggregate or disaggregate the contributions of different economic agents influence the choice of organizational form. We consider a principal/multi-agent model where the principal either contracts with all parties directly or delegates part of the contracting authority to one of the agents. Delegated contracts improve risk sharing and generate implicit incentives for the agent entrusted with contracting authority. However, delegated contracts also entail a loss of control in motivating lower-level agents. In addition, when performance is aggregated, delegated contracts render agents' incentives more interdependent and create spillovers up and down the hierarchy. We demonstrate that accounting practices that aggregate the performance of multiple agents can complement organizational forms characterized by greater decentralization. In contrast, accounting practices that capture agents' performance contributions separately favor more centralized organizational forms. Our findings suggest that in settings where performance measurement systems are more aggregate, decentralization is more prevalent.

This study evaluates alternative measures of the tone of financial narrative. We present evidence that word-frequency tone measures based on domain-specific wordlists—compared to general wordlists—better predict the market reaction to earnings announcements, have greater statistical power in short-window event studies, and exhibit more economically consistent post-announcement drift. Further, inverse document frequency weighting, advocated in Loughran and McDonald (2011), provides little improvement to the alternative approach of equal weighting. We also provide evidence that word-frequency tone measures are as powerful as the Naïve Bayesian machine-learning tone measure from Li (2010) in a regression of future earnings on MD&A tone. Overall, although more complex techniques are potentially advantageous in certain contexts, equal-weighted, domain-specific, word-frequency tone measures are generally just as powerful in the context of financial disclosure and capital markets. Such measures are also more intuitive, easier to implement, and, importantly, far more amenable to replication.

We document that the effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on public management earnings forecasts (MFs) is asymmetric. Our results suggest that FD increased managers' use of MFs as a downward-guidance mechanism to help achieve meeting or beating earnings expectations. This effect is more pronounced when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic and when firms had selective disclosure policies pre-FD. We also find that the increased use of MFs as downward guidance leads to post-FD reductions in MF quality (accuracy and informativeness) for the downward guiding MFs that are most likely meet/beat motivated, while quality improves for upward-guiding MFs. Finally, our evidence suggests that results from prior research about FD-induced changes in information environment variables, such as analyst forecast quality and investor trading activities, depend on whether the firm issues MFs and whether those MFs are downward guiding. Data Availability: All data are available from public databases identified in the paper.

Using a recently expanded dataset on supplier-customer links, we introduce a dynamic relationship life-cycle hypothesis. We hypothesize that the relation between customer-base concentration and profitability is significantly negative in the early years of the relationship, but becomes positive as the relationship matures. The key driver of this dynamic is the customer-specific investments that the relationship entails. These investments result in larger fixed costs, greater operating leverage, and a higher probability of losses early in the relationship, but can significantly benefit the firm as the relationship matures. Although many of these money-losing firms in early-stage relationships were not studied in Patatoukas (2012), we find a market reaction to increases in customer concentration similar to that in his paper. This result provides powerful confirmatory evidence of the value of customer concentration. We document one of the intangible benefits of customer concentration, technology sharing, and show how this benefit increases as the relationship matures.

Deloitte's 2007 PCAOB Part II report identifies, among other issues, concerns related to the audit firm's quality controls with respect to auditing income tax accounts. We investigate whether Deloitte's actions to remediate the PCAOB's concerns are associated with changes to their clients' financial reporting for income taxes. We find that Deloitte's clients increased the reported valuation allowance on deferred tax assets and increased the reported reserve for uncertain tax benefits (UTBs) in response to increased auditor scrutiny over income tax accounts. Additionally, we find that in subsequent periods, Deloitte's clients report valuation allowances and UTB balances that are not significantly different than other annually inspected auditors, consistent with Deloitte changing the quality controls related to audits of income tax accounts after the failed remediation of the 2007 Part II report.

Using confidential data from the Internal Revenue Service on who signs a corporation's tax return, we investigate whether the party primarily responsible for the tax compliance function of the firm—the auditor, an external non-auditor, or the internal tax department—is related to the corporation's tax aggressiveness. We report three key findings: (1) firms preparing their own tax returns or hiring a non-auditor claim more aggressive tax positions than firms using their auditor as the tax preparer; (2) auditor-provided tax services are related to tax aggressiveness even after considering tax preparer identity, which supports and extends prior research using tax fees as a proxy for tax planning; and (3) Big 4 tax preparers, in particular, are linked to less tax aggressiveness when they are the auditor than when they are not the auditor. Our findings help policymakers and researchers better understand an important feature of tax compliance intermediaries; particularly, how the dual role via audits is related to observable corporate tax outcomes.

This study examines local characteristics associated with non-Big 4 local market leadership and the impact of non-Big 4 local market leadership on competition. We identify non-Big 4 local market leaders by collecting accounting firm rankings from business publications for 46 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas from 2005–2010. These rankings are based on the number of local office employees and provide a more holistic measure of office size than measures based on public company audit fees. We find local supply and demand factors are significantly associated with non-Big 4 local market leadership and that non-Big 4 leadership is associated with lower overall audit fees in the local market. We also find that non-Big 4 leaders earn a fee premium over other non-Big 4 auditors. Our results imply that non-Big 4 leaders increase local market competition. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources identified in the study.

Despite the importance placed on professional skepticism by the accounting profession and regulators, the failure of auditors to exercise an appropriate level of skepticism continues to be a global issue. We experimentally test a potential barrier to skepticism. We find that outcome knowledge biases supervisors' evaluations of skeptical behavior. Holding a staff member's skeptical judgments and acts constant, superiors on the engagement team evaluate the staff's skeptical behavior based on whether the staff's investigation of an issue ultimately identifies a misstatement. Our evidence suggests that evaluators penalize auditors who employ an appropriate level of skepticism, but do not identify a misstatement. Although consultation with their superiors while exercising skepticism improved staff auditors' performance evaluations, consultation did not effectively mitigate the outcome effect on their evaluations. Last, we observe that auditors in the field anticipate that their superiors will be influenced by outcome knowledge when they evaluate their skeptical behavior. Collectively, our results depict an evaluation system that may inadvertently discourage skepticism among auditors in the field. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

This study examines the extent to which audit clients successfully engage in internal control opinion shopping activities and whether audit market competition appears to facilitate those activities. Regulators have long been concerned about the impact of both audit market competition and opinion shopping on audit quality. We adopt the framework developed in Lennox (2000) to construct a proxy to measure the tendency that clients engage in internal control opinion shopping activities. Our empirical results suggest that clients are successful in shopping for clean internal control opinions. In addition, we find evidence that internal control opinion shopping occurs primarily in competitive audit markets. Finally, our results indicate that among auditor dismissal clients, opinion shopping is more likely to occur when dismissals are made relatively late during a reporting period and when audit market competition is high. Our findings have implications for the current policy debate regarding audit quality and audit market competition.