[This study investigates the impact of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 106, "Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions" (FASB 1990, hereinafter, SFAS 106) for a sample of rate-regulated public utility firms. The results of a recent study by Espahbodi et al. (1991) of the market reaction to the issuance of the exposure draft for SFAS 106 suggest that, for a sample including both regulated and non-regulated firms, investors perceived the required disclosures as value-decreasing due to higher contracting costs. However, the unique institutional setting for rate-regulated firms implies that while a similar negative market reaction may result for some regulated firms, there is also a theoretical basis for predicting either no market reaction or a positive reaction to the proposed accounting standard. The no reaction hypothesis is motivated by the nature of the relationship between regulatory rate-setting process and special external financial reporting procedures; as a result, some regulated firms may be sheltered from the indirect costs attributed to SFAS 106. A prediction of a positive market reaction arises from the notion that accounting rules can have an effect on the way regulators set rates, resulting in a direct (positive) cash flow effect for some of the sample firms. Our results suggest that investors in public utilities did not, on average, view the proposed standard as a value-decreasing event. This result is in sharp contrast to the Espahbodi et al. (1991) finding of a large negative average reaction for firms affected by SFAS 106. We also find evidence that the market reaction at the exposure draft announcement varies cross-sectionally based on the market's exante expectation of regulators' actions and the resulting changes in revenues from the adoption (or non-adoption) of the accounting rule for ratemaking purposes. The results thus add to a growing body of literature which demonstrates differences in the market's assessment of accounting information across regulated and non-regulated industries. More importantly, the results point to the role of regulatory response in the market's assessment of impending accounting changes in regulated industries.]
[Libby (1993) suggests a simple model of the acquisition of expertise where knowledge and ability determine performance, and instruction, experience, and ability determine the acquisition of knowledge. An important implication of the model is that a detailed understanding of the knowledge acquisition process is needed before the practical implications of expertise research are evident (see also Bonner and Pennington 1991; Waller and Felix 1984). Libby's review indicates, however, that the vast majority of studies of the knowledge acquisition process focus on what knowledge auditors acquire during a particular period of time with the firm, but not on what particular aspects of instruction and experience lead to superior knowledge.1 The latter type of study is necessary before firms can determine how best to organize auditors' training and experiences to allow efficient and effective acquisition of the necessary knowledge. The importance of analytical procedures in auditing and the popularity of ratio analysis as an analytical procedure are well-documented (e.g., Biggs and Wild 1984; Libby 1985). The current study focuses on the knowledge necessary to perform ratio analysis in audit planning. Specifically, we examine the effectiveness of various combinations of instruction and experience (practice and feedback) in producing this knowledge. The results indicate that combinations of instruction and no experience or of instruction and practice without feedback do not produce knowledge. Practice with explanatory feedback and any form of instruction creates gains in knowledge, but may not always be available in the audit environment. Practice with outcome feedback, on the other hand, does not assist in the acquisition of knowledge unless it is preceded by instruction with what we have labeled "understanding rules," making this combination appear to be an adequate substitute for explanatory feedback. Practice with outcome feedback combined with what we call "how-to rules" does not promote knowledge acquisition. Finally, results indicate that ability aids in the acquisition of knowledge, and that this knowledge is related to performance in ratio analysis. These findings have implications for audit effectiveness and efficiency, and for education and firm training related to ratio analysis. If explanatory feedback can be replaced by a combination of understanding rules and practice with outcome feedback, audit efficiency could be increased since explanatory feedback takes more time and more experienced personnel. Explanatory feedback may also be inaccurate or unavailable, particularly under conditions of time pressure. However, if only outcome feedback is to be provided for ratio analysis, understanding rules must be incorporated into education and training. For the most part, firm training and university education currently provide only how-to rules for ratio analysis (see Bonner and Pennington 1991; Ernst & Whinney 1986). The ideas described above could also be extended to tasks other than ratio analysis for which outcome feedback is available (Solomon and Shields 1993).]
[Accounting numbers are an integral part of the firm's formal and informal contracts (Watts 1974; Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Ball 1989; Christie 1990). This contracting-based theory of accounting is based on the premise that managers choose particular accounting procedures either efficiently to maximize the value of the firm, or opportunistically to make the manager better off at the expense of some other contracting party (Holthausen 1990). The relative amounts of efficiency and opportunism depend on controls on managers' accounting discretion. Such controls include monitoring by the board of directors, competition from the product markets and from within the firm by other managers, and the discipline of the market for corporate control. It is difficult to determine whether managers make accounting choices to maximize firm-value. Empirical tests often assume opportunism and usually reject the null hypothesis of no association between accounting choice and firm-specific variables such as leverage (Christie 1990). However, many of the empirical regularities interpreted as evidence of opportunism can also be interpreted as occurring for efficiency reasons, which serves to confound these findings (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Sweeney 1994). The few tests based on efficiency rationales find an association between the contracting variables and accounting choice (Zimmer 1986; Whittred 1987; Malmquist 1990; Mian and Smith 1990a). This paper measures the relative influences of efficiency and opportunism in accounting choice by examining a non-random sample that maximizes the probability of finding opportunism. Economics and finance studies document that corporate control actions such as tender offers and proxy fights discipline opportunistic managers. Therefore, we select a sample of takeover targets and examine this sample for evidence of managerial opportunism in choice of accounting procedures. A key assumption of our tests is that, prior to the control action, corporate control targets contain more non-value-maximizing managers than surviving firms in the same industry that were not targets of corporate control actions. This assumption allows us to use surviving firms' accounting procedures as the benchmark for the efficient accounting choice. In this application of Alchian's (1950) "economic Darwinism," surviving firms on average are more efficient than non-surviving firms. An unbiased estimate of accounting opportunism in this sample is an estimate of the upper bound on the amount of accounting opportunism in a random sample of firms. If there is little or no opportunism in our non-random sample, then for firms generally we can discount opportunism as an explanation for choice of the three accounting methods we study. Efforts to explain choice of accounting methods could then be redirected towards efficiency explanations. We measure opportunism by comparing the frequency of choice of income-increasing procedures by takeover targets with the corresponding frequency of their surviving industry peers. We find that takeover targets select income-increasing depreciation, inventory, and investment tax credit (ITC) accounting methods more frequently than their surviving industry peers in up to 11 years preceding the control action. Our analysis includes a multiple regression that controls for efficient choice of accounting methods. Our estimate of the upper bound on the frequency of opportunism is small relative to the mean choices of surviving firms. We conclude that some accounting opportunism exists in the takeover targets, but that efficiency is the more important explanation of accounting choice. However, while the frequency of opportunism is relatively small, the dollar effect on retained earnings of selecting an income-increasing method is large. For the median target firm, the after-tax effect on retained earnings if the firm had been on the alternative method is about 26 percent for depreciation, 9 percent for inventory, and around 5 percent for the ITC.]
Focuses on the knowledge necessary to perform ratio analysis in audit planning. Effects of instruction and experience on knowledge acquisition; Effects of abilities in knowledge acquisition; Effects of knowledge and abilities on performance; Examination of Libby's model.
[This paper builds upon the work of Burgstahler and Jiambalvo (1986a, 1986b) on auditors' estimation of error through sampling. Burgstahler and Jiambalvo used a ball-and-urn inference model to argue that the isolation of sample errors violates professional auditing standards. They speculated that context-specific data about sample errors induces uniqueness perceptions that, in turn, cause auditors non-normatively to isolate the errors. We extend their research by manipulating two variables they suggested, but did not test: (1) containment information, which indicates whether the discovered error is limited to a well-defined subpopulation of unsampled items; and (2) perceived frequency of errors, which is directly related to the similarity of an error to other potential errors. Our results show that containment information strongly affects the projection-isolation decision, regardless of the perceived frequency of the error. In our empirical work, error frequency also affects the judgment. These findings suggest that containment information does not affect the decision solely by inducing perceptions of uniqueness but rather has a direct effect on it. Additional research is needed to describe and understand more fully this important judgment.]
Measures the relative influences of efficiency and opportunism in accounting by the examination of a non-random sample that allows for the probability of finding opportunism. Efficient and opportunistic accounting choices; Effects of accounting choices on retained earnings; Firm-performance measures.
Investigates the impact of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 106, `Employers' Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions' for a sample of rate-regulated public utility firms. Economic consequences of SFAS 106 for non-regulated firms; Expected impact of SFAS 106 on utility accounting and ratemaking.